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PREFACE 
The 1994 Special Issue of the Review of Industrial Economics in English is meant to 
give an overview of the main research projects being carried out at the Research Insti-
tute of Industrial Economics of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences. This small 
research unit is consistently working on the industrial and microeconomic aspects of 
the Hungarian economic transition. 
The common keyword for this collection of papers is "enterprise adjustment". This 
type of adjustment has a major importance for understanding Hungary's transition to a 
market economy, and it has several aspects hitherto not sufficiently analysed by the lit-
erature. This term includes or is closely related to topics such as enterprise manage-
ment, foreign direct investment, industrial policy, privatization, labor relations and 
regional policy. All these topics are covered by the five papers included in our Special 
Issue. 
The study by Ádám Török is based on a working paper prepared for the famous 
Blue Ribbon Commission, a consultative body with a spectacular record of scientific 
achievements helping Hungarian transition. One of the last research projects of the Blue 
Ribbon Commission gave an in-depth analysis of the quite good Hungarian perfor-
mance in attracting foreign direct investment. This article tries to establish a linkage 
between industrial policy and the inflow of FDI with a thorough assessment of the 
structural and microeconomic impacts of this inflow on the Hungarian industry. 
The role of managers in privatization is not subject to suspicion in Hungary, espe-
cially at a time of a slowdown of privatization. Moreover, the already five year long his-
tory of Hungarian privatization shows a certain one-sidedness of this process in the 
technical sense. A number of modem techniques of privatization have not been ade-
quately implemented in this country. One of them is management buyouts (MBOs). 
The study by Judit Karsai gives an assessment of the technique itself, but it also 
explains why it has not gained enough ground in Hungarian privatization yet. Many 
firms to be privatized are in crisis, managers becoming owners could be both well pre-
pared and interested in successful restructuring. Therefore MBOs could be an addition-
al tool in accelerating the so much needed structural change in the economy. 
Crisis management is the explicit topic of our next article. The author, Gábor Hov 
nyi, has done much work in adapting models of crisis management to the Hungarian 
transition environment. The specialty of his approach is the idea of multidimensional 
enterprise crisis which is, in fact, a theoretical concept very strongly embedded in the 
everyday practice of Hungarian industry. In case management wants to tackle only one 
aspect of enterprise crisis, it might make other parameters of the company even worse. 
This is why the synthetic approach to crisis management suggested and analysed by the 
study is an inevitable element of micro-level restructuring. 
Crisis management is a keyword for Hungarian regional policymaking as well. 
This is especially so in cases where regional and sectoral problems are combined. The 
study by Erzsébet Viszt offers a comparative international analysis of regional crisis 
management in the steel industry. It is quite interesting to see the extent to which former 
problems of the founding members of the European Coal and Steel Community arise in 
the current Hungarian steel industry, albeit on a much larger scale due again to the 
"multidimensional" character of the crisis. 
Regional crisis management means an increased emphasis on labor market poli-
cies. Judit Ványai examines a primarily agricultural and mining region in Hungary, the 
county of Baranya, as a "textbook" case of crisis phenomena linked to backwardness 
and undercapitalization rather than to distortions in the structure of manufacturing. This 
analysis is also made in an international context, with one region in France and one in 
former East Germany. The latter example gives the study a special color because it 
becomes a challenging exercise in comparative cum regional economics as well. 
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I N D U S T R I A L P O L I C Y A N D FDI IN H U N G A R Y 
Á d á m T Ö R Ö K 
• 
Industrial policy and foreign direct 
investment (FDI) in Hungary1 
1. HUNGARIAN INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT 
IN THE 1980S AND EARLY 1990S 
1.1. Structural change and "de-industrialisation" 
(the changing shares of industry, agriculture and services) 
A major achievement of the country's post-war development seems to be that the Hun-
garian economy seemingly became highly industrialized. At least this is the impression 
from macrostructural indicators. The share of industry within GDP reached 37.2% in 
1980, the share of construction was 8.0%, agriculture and forestry had a share of 19.6%, 
transport and telecommunications 9.1%, commerce 9.7%, and other services 16.4% 
[KSHStatistical Pocket Book 1989., p. 101.]. 
There were no significant macrostructural shifts in the eighties. In 1988, the 
respective shares of the different sectors within GDP were as follows: industry 36.2%, 
construction 6.5%, agriculture and forestry 21.1%, transport and telecommunications 
9.2%, commerce 8.4%, other services 18.6% [KSH Statistical Pocket Book 1989., 
p. 101 .]• 
Figures for 1991 show a 26.8% share for industry, 5.3% for construction, 10.0% 
for agriculture, and 43.8% for all services [Economic Survey of Europe in 1992 and 
1993. ECE, Geneva-New York, 1993., p.78.]. 
The macrostructural developments of the last years have been quite haphazard and 
erratic. An ever deepening crisis of most parts of agriculture and industry went hand in 
hand with the government's mostly poorly coordinated efforts to intervene in the 
"spontaneous" shrinking of several sectors on a case-by-case basis. Concentrating our-
selves on material production for the moment, agriculture is a case very much in point. 
In agriculture, the government's efforts have been focussing on the creation of a 
legal framework for transition from a cooperative-based property structure to a proper-
1
 This study is based on a working paper for the team working on the Blue Ribbon Commission's Research Pro-
ject on "Foreign Direct Investment in Hungary". The author wishes to express his thanks for the comments of 
Péter Balázs, Gábor Веке-Martos, András Inotai and Paul Marer, but he is responsable for all the remaining 
errors. 
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ty structure based on smaller private farms. These efforts have, however, accelerated 
the decline of agricultural production rather than stopping this decline. 
A few figures to show the size of the crisis in the Hungarian agriculture: 
- the total volume of agricultural output decreased by 0.4% in 1988, 6.2% in 1989, 
9.2% in 1990,15.7% in 1991 and (preliminary data) 33.6% in 1992 [KSH, 1993., p.32.]. 
The volume of agricultural output in 1992 corresponded only to 47.4% of the 1987 
level; 
- in the same period, the volume of sales of the main crops and produces changed 
at substantially different rates: wheat -60.4%, barley +0.2%, maize -30.3%, sugar-beet -
30.3%, potatoes -83.6%, sunflower seed -41.4%, vegetables -84.2%, fruits -84.3%, cat-
tle for slaughter -36.4%, pigs for slaughter -58.4%, poultry for slaughter -56.1%, cow 
milk -28.0%, eggs -61.3% (calculations based on preliminary data for 1992, but the 
scope of the distortion is low) [KSH, 1993. pp.32-33.]. 
Recent structural trends in the Hungarian industry also speak of a process of 
almost continuous shrinking. Industrial sales and output in the 1980s showed only a 
modest growth already in the first half of the decade. The deep crisis in Hungarian 
industry beginning in 1988-1989 was distributed quite evenly across the Hungarian 
industry. This is why there was not much structural change in industry during the 
1980s. This is true as well in the macroeconomic as in the microeconomic sense. This 
also means very few firms could show outstanding performances of growth. 
The branch structure of gross output did not change dramatically during the 1980s 
in most cases. Some energy- and capital-intensive sectors (mining, metallurgy) even 
managed to regain their share of 1980 in gross output in 1988 or 1989 after a temporary 
fall during the decade. 
Favorable structural trends like that of the growing percentage of engineering had 
been also reversed by 1988-1989. The only technology-intensive branch of industry ben-
efitting from macrostructural changes in the 1980s was electrical engineering. Its seem-
ingly spectacular development was, however, mainly COMECON-market oriented. 
Investment trends of the 1980s speak of an increasingly serious undercapitalisa-
tion of Hungarian industry. The bottom of the trend within the decade was 1988 for 
most branches. The volume of overall industrial investment was down by almost 20% 
from its 1980 level in 1988. Mining and the also highly capital-intensive chemical 
industry were the two sectors that got increasing bits of the shrinking pie of industrial 
investment. 
The iron and steel industry was neglected by investment policy. The increasing 
undercapitalisation and the opening up of the domestic market of this industry for 
import competition was not followed by the corresponding phasing out of its redundant 
capacities. Most Hungarian steelmakers were unable to adjust as suppliers to the ambi-
tious restructuring programs carried out by several privatized engineering firms in the 
country [cf. Nyers, 1993.]. 
An average share of the iron and steel industry in total industrial investment over 
the decade would probably not have been sufficient to stop the dramatic degradation of 
its capacities. Its rapidly falling share in industrial investment can be compared with its 
almost constant percentage within industrial output. As a result, the rapidly ageing cap-
ital stock was more and more exploited in the iron and steel industry but the relative 
share of its output did not even decrease within the Hungarian industry. 
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Separate figures for rouble and non-rouble exports are available in a sectoral 
approach only from 1986. The shrinking of exports to the COMECON region had start-
ed much before this trading system was finally dissolved. The process started in 1986-
1987 with the decrease of the ratio rouble exports/non-rouble exports in most branches. 
This decrease accelerated during the "terminal status" of the agony of the COMECON 
system, i.e. in 1989. 
A methodological note seems inevitable at this point. Separate figures for the rou-
ble and non-rouble exports of industrial branches are given only from 1986 on in the 
Hungarian statistics. The explanation is the conceptual difference between industrial 
statistics and trade statistics. The Hungarian system of industrial statistics is based on 
enterprises belonging to a given sector. The industrial statistics register, for example, 
steel plates exported by an engineering firm as engineering exports. The same export 
item is considered iron and steel exports by trade statistics. 
Even such a brief analysis of the main trends of Hungarian industrial development 
seems to be able to support the conclusion that there was no sudden crisis in the late 
1980s. This means the external shocks were far from unpredictable. The slowness or 
even a certain reversal of structural changes together with slow output growth during 
the decade prepared the ground for the dramatic crisis. 
A more detailed analysis of the macrostructure of industry shows a process of an 
evident dwindling of output. This dwindling of industry then leads us to the question of 
the role of the state in the restructuring process. 
At this point of our study, a definition of the process we call "de-industrialisation" 
seems inevitable. In our view, "de-industrialisation" takes place when an at least 
medium-term fall of the -volume of output is accompanied by a definitive loss of industri-
al capacities. The latter might mean the discontinuation of using productive capacities 
which could be restarted only at a significant cost (a special form of investment), a size-
able layoff of manpower going beyond a mere rationalization of production, or both. It 
goes without saying that a significant loss of market shares in exports is a crucial factor 
of "de-industrialisation", although losses in exports cannot be understood as a perfect 
equivalent of "de-industrialisation". 
Another key issue in interpreting the "de-industrialisation" process is the com-
bined outcome or "balance" of the loss of capacities and greenfield investment. We can 
speak of "de-industrialisation" only if this "balance" is negative, i.e. new capacities do 
not make up for lost ones. It has to be borne in mind, though, that no new capacity is a 
close substitute of a lost one which means the "balance" cannot have a perfect statistical 
interpretation. 
Indexes of output have shown a marked decline for each sector in industry during 
the period 1988-1992 as well as for its last year. This across the board decrease is shown 
by Table 1. 
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Table 1 
Indexes of volume of output by sectors and subsectors of Hungarian industry 
(1988-1992), previous year=100 
Sector 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 
Mining 96.3 94.8 88.2 89.1 80.9 
Electricity 100.1 102.2 100.2 92.0 88.5 
Metallurgy 104.3 104.4 81.0 67.3 73.7 
Engineering 100.0 100.2 83.8 65.1 73.2 
Building mat. 101.6 98.4 95.0 67.0 86.4 
Chemicals 101.3 96.1 94.6 81.5 86.4 
Light ind. 100.2 95.2 88.3 75.1 83.5 
Food ind. 97.5 101.0 99.1 90.3 87.4 
All industry 100.0 99.0 90.8 78.5 90.2 
Source: Statisztikai Havi Közlemények, 1993/1. KSH, Budapest, March 1993., pp. 17-23. 
The size and the magnitude of the "de-industrialisation" process in Hungary can 
also be well seen from 1992 output volume indexes if the figure for 1987 (the last year 
of real output growth) is 100. The decrease of the volume of output during this six-year 
period was in the different sectors as follows: 
mining: 42.4% 
electricity industry: 16.5% 
metallurgy: 56.2% 
engineering: 60.0% 
building materials industry: 45.0% 
chemicals industry: 35.2% 
light industry: 47.2% 
food industry: 23.0% 
all industry: ' 37.4% 
The sectoral averages seem to indicate that Hungarian industry has collapsed. This 
is true only for a few big and inefficient state firms. More detailed trends of structural 
change show the presence of "distributed lags" in this process of apparent "de-industri-
alisation". Our next table presents subsectoral data as compared to the volume of output 
observed in 1989. The basis year is the initial year of the transition process2. 
2 The other reason we chose 1989 for the basis year is methodological: from this year on, Hungarian industrial 
statistics have a higher degree of intertemporal comparability than before. Figures of output include all firms 
with more than 50 of employment, and give a good representative coverage of those having between 21 and 50 
employees. Therefore the figures of output have an inherent downward bias first of all in subsectors (clothing, 
metalworking, or the entire food industry) where small firms with less than 20 employees have an important 
role in structural trends. 
11 INDUSTRIAL P O L I C Y AND FDI IN HUNGARY 
Table 2 
Indexes of volume of output by sectors and subsectors of Hungarian industry 
(1990-1992), 1989=100; the structure of sales of Hungarian industry 
(in percentage, 1992) 
Volume indexes Structure 
Years 
Sectors, 
subsectors 
1990 1991 1992 1992 
Mining 88.2 78.6 63.6 3.21% 
Coal mining 81.5 77.8 61.0 2.29% 
Oil and natural gas prod. 92.2 80.3 84.5 0.48% 
Electricity 100.2 92.2 81.6 0.93% 
Metallurgy 81.0 54.5 40.2 7.04% 
Ferrous metallurgy 82.8 48.9 34.3 4.09% 
Aluminium metallurgy 83.0 71.0 56.8 2.46% 
Engineering 83.8 54.6 39.9 18.46% 
General engineering 86.1 62.2 49.7 5.27% 
Transport equipment 69.8 40.2 26.0 3.71% 
Electrical engineering 86.3 62.3 47.4 3.15% 
Telecom, equipment * 89.7 52.9 44.5 2.60% 
Precision engineering 89.8 46.6 22.8 1.14% 
Building materials industry 95.0 63.7 55.0 3.51% 
Chemical industry 94.6 77.1 66.6 28.26% 
Crude oil processing 96.0 83.9 85.5 11.54% 
Fertilizers, pesticides 79.4 46.7 32.0 1.41% 
Rubber industry 79.3 55.4 41.8 0.41% 
Pharmaceutical industry 103.1 71.3 53.2 3.88% 
Light industry 88.3 66.3 55.4 12.13% 
Wood processing industry 91.2 74.4 66.0 n.a. 
out of which:Furniture ind. 95.8 76.5 62.5 n.a. 
Paper industry 95.3 73.4 71.3 n.a. 
Printing industry 88.5 70.7 61.7 n.a. 
Textile industry 87.9 57.8 42.5 3.08% 
Leather, fur and shoe i. 83.6 61.6 46.6 1.28% 
Textile apparel industry 88.8 77.9 71.0 1.82% 
Other manufacturing n.a. n.a. n.a. 0.48% 
Food processing industry 99.1 89.5 78.2 26.38% 
Meat industry 96.7 92.7 72.8 5.06% 
Poultry, egg processing 98.5 77.5 65.7 1.73% 
Dairy industry 93.7 80.7 78.3 n.a. 
Canning industry ** 97.3 87.5 72.3 2.76% 
Beer industry 105.6 107.2 112.4 n.a. 
* Including vacuum and lighting equipment. 
** Including the deep-freezing industry. 
Source: for the trend figures Statisztikai Havi Közlemények, different issues from the years 1990-1993. KSH, 
Budapest, (data compiled by Judit Kóczián); for the structural data Statisztikai Havi Közlemények, 
1993/1. p. 25. (our own calculations). 
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Table 2 also presents, as our point of reference for the analysis of structural trends, 
the structure of sales of Hungarian industry in 1992 (output figures are not available)3. 
The overall picture has been changing quite significantly at the lower levels of the 
industrial structure. There was only one subsector (the brewery industry) with some 
(1.5%) growth in 1991 and more (4.9%) in 1992. This was also the only subsector with 
growth along the period 1987-1992. This only example is by far not sufficient for estab-
lishing direct linkages between FDI and industrial development or growth, but the 
brewery industry belonged to those sectors in which FDI led to foreign control of most 
firms in the industry already in early 1992. 
Industrial averages, in fact, do not tell much because the main subsectors have per-
formed in extremely different ways. Iron and steel, for example, was more or less able 
to resist structural pressures before 1990. Its output even increased by 4.6% in the 1987-
1989 period. But the size of the decrease between 1989 and 1992 was 65.8%. Major 
producers such as the companies based at Ózd (OKä) and Diósgyőr (DIMAG, formerly 
LKM) even disappeared temporarily from the market. As a contrary example, the 
DUNAFERR metallurgy complex has been undergoing spectacular modernization. 
The cold rolling mill of this firm is already a joint venture with VOEST of Austria4. 
Engineering has been a field with widely varying subsectoral performances. The 
formerly COMECON-market oriented subsectors were hit the most. In four of these 
subsectors, the vehicles, the electrical engineering, the telecommunications and the pre-
cision instruments industry the loss of output was between 27.8% (electrical engineer-
ing) and 48.1% (precision engineering) in 1991. 
Figures of the decrease of output for the 1988-1992 period (75.1% for vehicles, 
55.2% for electrical engineering, 55.3% for telecom equipment and 75.0% for precision 
instruments) show dramatic losses of output. This is tantamount to the quasi-disappear-
ance of whole industries. This occurred only in some sectors while overall de-industri-
alisation did not took place in Hungary. Therefore the significant shrinking of whole 
subsectors has been the major element of the quite fast but rather one-sided structural 
change in the Hungarian industry. This is illustrated by in kind figures of industrial pro-
duction. All figures are for the period 1989-1992. 
Out of the 19 engineering product groups listed in our statistical source (KSH, 
pp.26-27.), there were only two, household refrigerators and fluorescent tubes whose 
3
 The same methodological remarks also apply here. In addition to them, the definition of sales has to be made 
clear as well: sales receipts excluding turnover tax (VAT), but including price supplements paid by the state 
and accounted by the firms as part of their sales receipts. 
4
 Technology change in the Hungarian steel industry can be illustrated with a few technological examples. This 
industry used the Siemens-Martin technology still at a 40% share in 1990, while oxygene converters gave only 
50% of the output of steel. In 1992, on the contrary, only 3% belonged to the former and 97% to the latter, 
much more modern technology. During the same period, the percentage share of continuous casting grew from 
76% to 83% in the industry. 
s
 The amount of Diesel engines produced for road transport decreased from 17 363 to 3 278. The output of met-
alworking lathes diminished from 943 to 68. The production of buses went down from 11 980 to 3 546. The 
output of household refrigerators (made first by Lehel and, after its privatization, by Electrolux-Lehel) 
increased from 390 333 to 482 131. The amount of spin-driers produced went down from 166 934 to 79 195. A 
considerable fall of the production of telephone exchanges: from 449 to 107. The manufacturing of radio 
receivers basically disappeared: decrease from 124 341 to 821. The output of color TV sets diminished from 
501 719 to 243 485. 
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physical output increased between 1989 and 1992. The domestic producers of both 
product groups belong to major multinational corporations, Electrolux and General 
Electric which is a partial proof of the positive impact of FDI on industrial growth in 
Hungary5. 
The chemical industry is another sector with very varied performances. Two sub-
sectors (the rubber and the fertilizer industry) lost much of their output between 1988 
and 1992. The fall of output was 56.3% for the first and an astonishing 72.8% for the 
second. The fertilizer industry registered a 41.2% drop in output in 1991 alone. 
The petroleum processing industry performed relatively well, its output volume 
decreased only by 19.2%. The pharmaceutical industry was apparently much less per-
formant with 49.5% of loss of output in the same period, but it it also true that this 
industry could preserve most of its high-level R&D base6. It is just this R&D base that 
makes Hungarian pharmaceuticals firms quite lucrative for FDI, although the recent 
Hungary-United States agreement on the protection of intellectual property rights 
makes investment in import-substituting, imitative R&D quite a losing bet for most 
Hungarian pharmaceutical firms. 
The partial acquisition of the painting materials plant of TVK, the biggest Hungar-
ian manufacturer of heavy chemicals, by AKZO of Holland has been a good sign of 
positive change in the heavy chemicals industry. This joint venture is one of the very 
few Hungarian companies accepted by General Motors Hungary as a regular supplier J 
AKZO-TVK supplies more than just a product: it helped GM install an environment-
friendly paint shop in its Opel car plant in Hungary. 
Light industry has been a sector in deep structural crisis. The microeconomic 
aspect of the crisis of the light industry also shows a very dramatic picture. A number of 
traditionally well-known textile companies gave up production (these include 
BUDAPRINT, BUDAFLAX, the Kőbánya Textile Spinning Works, the Sopron Cotton 
Works, the Hungarian Cotton Works etc.), and several medium-size furniture firms had 
to close down as well. The domestic output of wool fabrics decreased by 75% in 4 
years. The same figure for cotton fabrics is about 60%. 
The food industry performed relatively well, even in spite of the fact that its back-
ward linkages became much weaker due to the spectacular decrease of agricultural pro-
6 A decline of output in a subsector does not necessarily prove it is in crisis. The good performance of the phar-
maceutical industry, for example, is shown by its several successful privatization deals. Such is the partial pur-
chase of the pharmaceutical firm Chinoin by Sanofi of France, where the final value of acquisition will depend 
on profitability achieved in the meantime by the joint venture still in Hungarian majority ownership. 
7
 This approach to domestic suppliers is markedly different from that of Suzuki Hungary. The comparison of the 
attitudes towards domestic subcontractors of the two major foreign investors in the Hungarian car industry 
could be quite instructive for understanding the motives of multinational investors one of which (in our case, 
rather Suzuki) seems to strive for market share while the major strategic target of the other is rather the opti-
mization of the return on investment. 
The Japano-Hungarian joint venture has set the target of increasing the share of Hungarian suppliers of all 
material inputs to 50% in one year. The differences in these attitudes vis-...-vis the suppliers can be mainly 
explained with the differences in marketing strategies. GM Hungary is assembling cars mainly for the Hungar-
ian market, while Suzuki Hungary wants to become a competitive exporter to EC markets. This is expected 
from the trade-creating impact of the Association Agreement between the EC and Hungary. The agreement 
makes duty-free imports of the EC from Hungary conditional upon a predetermined level of value added in 
Hungary. 
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duction. The worst performers in this industry (the poultry and the dairy industry) 
"only" registered losses of output of 32.8% and 23.8%. Some subsectors of the food 
industry such as the vegetable oil industry or the sugar industry fared much better than 
even the best branches within other industries. 
The food industry includes the best performing subsector of the entire Hungarian 
industry, the brewery industry. The brewery industry could benefit from two things 
both closely linked to the political and economic transition: 1. the fast increase of 
tourism, 2. the introduction of Western brands (Holsten, Dreher, Gold Fassl) manufac-
tured on a licence basis in Hungary. It is interesting to note that this industry has been a 
preferred target of FDI: five out of seven major Hungarian breweries were sold to for-
eign investors already before mid-1992. 
The growth picture of Hungarian industry is very clearly that of shrinking produc-
tion across the board, although the speed of this process has been markedly different in 
a subsectoral comparison. Several subsectors have seen more than half of their output 
disappear since 1988 or, in some cases, just in 1990 and 1991. 
Our experience with an array of Hungarian industrial companies has taught us that 
many fluctuations of industrial output could have reasons very special to the Hungarian 
economic transition. Several such reasons are behavioral, and are mostly very rarely 
mentioned or not at all in the "mainstream" literature on industrial economics. 
Just one characteristic example can help understand the problem. The volume of 
output of the Hungarian industry was, in January-March 1993, only by 1% below its 
level in the corresponding period of 1992. There were, however, spectacular non-sea-
sonal decreases in a few subsectors such as paper and cardboard [ISIC 2101] (-17.0%), 
detergents and cosmetics [ISIC 2424] (-27.0%), and cement [ISIC 2651] (-33.0%) [Sta-
tisztikai..., 1993. p.8.]. 
These subsectors have two things in common. First, their privatization was carried 
out in a quite negligent way. The formerly oligopolistic or eventually even limitedly 
competitive domestic markets of their products became de facto monopolistic because 
the foreign investor acquired most or all domestic players on the market. This was also 
the case when seemingly different foreign investors participated in the privatization of 
the same subsector - but they belonged to the same group or strategic alliance [cf. 
Beszámoló..., 1993., pp. 4-5.]. 
Second, the foreign owners of most or all firms in these subsectors tried to lobby 
for increased customs protection or the introduction of non-tariff barriers. The govern-
ment has treated, however, import liberalization as an absolute priority. Therefore it did 
not yield to the pressure. In response to this, some of the foreign owned paper, detergent 
and cement manufacturers temporarily lowered or stopped production. 
These decreases in industrial production seem to have much more a tactical than a 
strategic character, but their impact on the overall output picture in industry has been 
strongly negative. The motives of such behavioral patterns manifested by foreign 
investors in Hungary definitely belong to the scope of our research. 
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1.2. Privatization and restructuring at the firm level 
The restructuring of private companies is not an industrial policy problem in most 
cases. The restructuring and the crisis management of state firms might, on the con-
trary, very easily become a policy-related issue. This is mainly true for bigger state 
firms playing a key role in the output and employment of their respective industries. 
The restructuring of ailing state firms can be financed from budgetary resources 
only in a very few exceptional cases, like the 13 state companies (IKARUS, Dunaferr, 
the Pét Nitrogéné Works, the Hungarian Aluminium Industry Co., RÁBA, Borsod-
chem, etc.) suffering from the consequences of the collapse of their traditional markets. 
Even in their cases, however, the government did not provide direct financial help, but 
it designed special financial packages comprising credit guarantees, debt-equity swaps 
and support schemes for interest repayment. 
Privatization is a top economic policy priority in Hungary. Therefore the only fea-
sible solution in many enterprise cases is privatization prior to restructuring. This 
means that the new owner will have to take care of the crisis management and the 
restructuring of the company. The price of restructuring including crisis management is 
always part of the privatization deal. If restructuring has not been done before privatiza-
tion its price lowers the privatization value of the firm. If the former owner (the state) 
takes care of restructuring and crisis management, the cost of this will be (or should be) 
paid by the new private owner as part of a higher privatization price. 
Privatization does not necessarily take place after the restructuring effort of the 
government. This means one could not find any new owner at all for the firm, because 
the capital market would eventually not recognize the effort and money spent on 
restructuring and crisis management. In case there is a new owner he or she might be 
not ready to pay for all the restructuring and crisis management carried out by the gov-
ernment. The most important reason is that the outcome of the restructuring and crisis 
management program would be probably only partly acceptable to the new owner. 
If the firm is, however, sold in a poor financial condition, its sales price will be so 
low that the difference between the combined value of its assets or its theoretical mar-
ket value and its sales price could cover the cost of restructuring and crisis manage-
ment. 
The condition of many Hungarian industrial firms is such that even normal man-
agement practices usually include elements of restructuring and crisis management. 
There are very few companies in the Hungarian industry not suffering either from 
financial, technological, manpower constraints, marketing problems, uncertainties of 
transformation or privatization, or simultaneously all of them. In addition to this, the 
very severe bankruptcy legislation has made restructuring and crisis management nec-
essary even at some otherwise normally functioning firms. 
Another aspect of the widespread necessity of restructuring and crisis management 
in the Hungarian industry is linked to takeovers by foreign investors. Such examples are 
the cases of Intercsokoládé (Nestlé), Lehel (Electrolux), Tungsram (General Electric), 
the Orosháza Glass Factory-HUNGUARD (Guardian Glass), Debrecen Tobacco Facto-
ry (Reemtsma) and Telefongyár (Siemens). Companies standing out within Hungarian 
industry due to their efficiency and good management also became subject to some sort 
of restructuring and crisis management after their acquisition by multinationals. 
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This meant a more or less complete restructuring of the organizational pattern of 
the company in question, a revision of accounting and bookkeeping systems, quality 
management, environmental and safety regulations. For most or all of these aspects of 
their functioning, most apparently successful Hungarian companies were much below 
minimal Western standards. 
A case in point was Lehel-Electrolux, where the seller, the Hungarian State Prop-
erty Agency had to spend almost all of its revenue from the privatisation of the firm for 
an extensive environmental cleanup operation. This operation was made necessary by 
the practice of the former management of dumping hazardous industrial waste in the 
soil on the company's premises. 
We can distinguish between two types of crises hitting Hungarian firms that face 
privatisation. "Strategic" (or "competitiveness-linked") crises hit most Hungarian 
companies due to their unpreparedness to the use of modern management, production 
and accounting practices and their sometimes anachronistic structures. "Strategic" 
crises do not mean the firm is in danger of disappearing, but it still needs restructuring 
in order to adapt itself to modem practices of functioning and competition. Such crises 
can be called "strategic" because they are a constraint on the firm's strategic options. 
"Tactical" (or "survival-linked") crises were, on the other hand, observable only 
at firms with acute financial and/or marketing problems. These were the crises needing 
immediate intervention in order to ensure the survival of the firm. Such crises can be 
called "tactical" because they are a constraint on the firm's tactical options (everyday 
management decisions). 
The two types of crises have common organic roots in 
1. the formerly secured access to traditional markets 
2. the significant delay in introducing modem management, accounting and mar-
keting techniques8 in Hungarian industrial firms and 
3. the unclear efficiency criteria of the use of factors of production. 
2. THE OPTIONS AND TOOLS OF INDUSTRIAL POLICY 
IN HUNGARY 
2.1. Alternative definitions of industrial policy: approaches and strategies 
Hungarian industrial policy had a decreasingly interventionistic character from the mid-
1980s on. Several strategic goals of the immediately pre-1990 industrial policy and the 
behavioural patterns suggested by it for the government were accepted by the industrial 
policymakers of the new government elected in 1990. 
Such common goals included privatization, the liberalization of entry to the Hungar-
ian market, and the creation of a well functioning system of R&D financing for promising 
projects or firms. As a matter of fact, these goals and the industrial policy designed (or, 
more precisely, to be designed) to meet them represented a mix of three main approaches 
8 With other words, the narrow understanding of firm-level modernization comprising only technological mod-
ernization. 
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to industrial policy: the "picking winners and/or losers" approach, the "resource alloca-
tion" oriented approach and the "framework-creating" approach. The proportions 
between the three components of this mix are, of course, not exactly measureable, but 
they seem to have undergone considerable changes in the 1990-1993 period. 
In the first one year or two the "framework-creating" behavioral pattern was 
prevalent in the attitude of the Ministry of Industry and Trade. The ministry contained 
itself to defining a broad strategy for the industrial development of the country, and it 
was very careful to avoid interventionistic measures. This attitude was, first of all, polit-
ically motivated. The ministry wanted to show itself a counterpart of the former 
allegedly "dirigiste" industrial policymaking practices in the country. 
The industrial policy tasks of the new government had dimensions different from 
those of its predecessor in scope and in size. These differences were linked to: 
1. the much larger extent of privatization, 
2. the new challenges arising from the almost complete liberalisation of imports 
and 
3. to the definition of industrial and structural policy itself, with all its implications 
for the reallocation of resources for the R&D purposes of industry. 
Privatization remained a major responsibility of industrial policy, but the creation 
of the State Property Agency (SPA) in early 1990 made it clear that no former ministry 
would be given the task of coordinating and carrying out privatization policy as a 
whole. The Ministry of Industry and Trade has participated in the transformation and 
privatization of industrial enterprises in a rather special role. 
This role combined a decisionmaking function during enterprise transformation 
(due to the fact that the Ministry of Industry and Trade was the founder of most state-
owned industrial enterprises) and a rather consultative role in the subsequent privatisa-
tion process already directed by the SPA. This "hands-off' approach to industrial policy 
manifested itself in the first industrial policy document presented by the ministry in late 
1991. This document gave very little room to defining policy tools, and - with some evi-
dent simplification - it mostly wanted to say what industrial policy should not do. 
The constraint of "non-interventionism" on industrial policy was meant to be put 
in conformity with an active role of industrial policy. This active role would have con-
sisted of "picking up winners" the way modem industrial policies in Western Europe 
do, but the document gave only very general guidelines for sectoral structural policies. 
It emphasised the role of the state in orientating resource flows towards promising prod-
ucts, technologies or enterprises. This "strategy mix" had a very low share of sector-
specific targets or tools, and it almost completely abandoned the traditional macro-level 
approach of former Hungarian industrial policies. 
This strategy document was quite well received by the Hungarian scientific and 
industrial community. It did not go into fulfilment because a wave of bankruptcies or 
deep financial crises swept through big state firms of the metallurgy, the motor vehicles 
and the electronics industry. Enterprise restructuring and crisis management became 
the foremost task of industrial policymakers. 
It became obvious by mid-1992 that industrial policy should redefine its major 
tasks and functions with more emphasis on picking some of the most promising winners 
as well as some of those losers whose disappearance from the country's industry would 
have had very dramatic consequences on Hungarian industrial exports and employ-
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ment. The changing scope of the ministry's policy effort was well demonstrated by the 
second industrial strategy document issued in late 1992. It used quite much from the 
industrial policy related experience of EC member countries in comparable situations. 
We will deal with the scope of the new industrial policy and with its toolkit in sub-
sequent subchapters. It has to be seen, however, that the Ministry of Industry and Trade 
has a very limited ground for action with respect to picking losers or winners, since it 
does not have any significant amount of financial resources to help restructuring big 
state firms. Therefore it has to perform a role of mediating between managements, 
banks and the Ministry of Finance. 
This is why it could not really take any major step ahead in implementing its well 
formulated industrial strategy. Neither proved it able to pick up or simply identify those 
fields of Hungarian industry which could be prepared for integration into the context of 
European industry operating on the Single European Market. In spite of this constraint, it 
is certainly true that the ministry proved able to formulate its new policymaking role but it 
was less successful in finding the financial resources to support this role. Moreover, 
recent developments (referred to earlier in Subchapter 12.) might be showing a shift in the 
functions of industrial policy towards firm-level restucturing. If this is true the "non-inter-
ventionist " stance ofHungarian industrial policy is eventually becoming less evident. 
2.2. The debate over "industrial policy versus economic policy" 
The Hungarian industrial policy is, at least in 1993, not subject to serious criticism as 
far as its scope and the role of "interventionist" elements in its policy mix are con-
cerned. Much more discussed is, on the other hand, the extent to which the ground for 
action or the effectiveness of industrial policy is influenced by economic policy in gen-
eral. With other words, the lack of coordination between economic policy in general 
and industrial policy is quite often emphasized. 
Three fields of economic policy deserve special interest in this respect. All three of 
them influence the competitive position of Hungarian firms, and should therefore be 
understood as de facto complementary elements of the industrial policy mix. 
1. Exchange rate policy. The National Bank of Hungary has been consequently 
carrying out an antiinflationary monetary policy during the last three years. One of the 
main tools of this policy is the avoidance of any real devaluation of the national curren-
cy, whereas its real appreciation is tolerated. During the years 1991 and 1992 inflation 
as measured by the CPI was 10 to 15 percentage points higher than the combined nomi-
nal annual devaluation of the Forint. 
This "strong currency" policy of the NBH is under attack from two directions. One 
of these is the "camp" of export-oriented firms including several major multinational 
companies present with significant productive capacities in Hungary. The interests of 
such firms are represented by the Ministry of International Economic Relations on the 
government side - voices from this ministry repeatedly stress the strong link between 
Hungary's rapidly deteriorating export performance and the exchange-rate-based loss 
of competitiveness. 
Among the export-oriented enterprises, of course, high value added exporters 
might lose the most from the real appreciation of the Forint. Their opinion appears the 
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most frequently in publications of economists linked to Tungsram - General Electric 
and, to a lesser extent, experts representing General Motors and the Austrian paper 
manuifacturer, the Prinzhorn group. 
The other kind of pro-real-devaluation argument can be found in several publica-
tions of Gábor Oblath [e.g. Oblath, 1991.] with the most clarity. His argument is based 
mainly on trade policy linked considerations. In his approach, the too fast liberalization 
of imports in 1989-1991 was not accompanied by a corresponding strengthening of 
Hungary's GATT-conform barriers to imports. The average level of customs duties 
being already rather low (13%) without any significant legal way to raise it, and in a sit-
uation where - as Oblath's argument goes - there is absolutely no room for introducing 
other protective measures, the only feasible solution would be eroding the domestic 
competitiveness of imports with successive steps of real devaluation. 
Both approaches have to be judged according to their meaning for the enterprise 
sphere, because their macroeconomic validity cannot be put in serious doubt. It is hard-
ly questionable that an increasing part of so-called competitive imports (i.e. imports 
able to directly substitute domestically produced goods) could be effectively kept out 
from the domestic market with successive real devaluations, but if and only if several 
conditions are jointly fulfilled. Such conditions include 
a) a strong price elasticity (price sensitiveness) of domestic demand for imports 
(the Marshall-Lerner-Robinson constraint); 
b) an approximately absolute product-level ("qualitative") substitutability of 
imports with domestically produced goods; 
c) a high level of price elasticity of the domestic supply: and 
d) serious inflationary expectations (partly linked to the possibility of further 
devaluations) on the domestic demand side. 
The conditions mentioned above have to be united. If at least one of these condi-
tions is not fulfilled, apparent domestic demand will not increase to a corresponding 
extent, and the difference between former and current demand for "competitive" 
imports will seemingly disappear from the domestic market. It will first try to convert 
itself into foreign currencies, and then either be transformed into temporarily forced 
savings (to become "unbound" whenever the constraints on imports are relaxed), or 
appear abroad as demand for purchases in foreign currency to be imported by tourists. 
This set of conditions puts a serious constraint on the beneficial effects on "com-
petitive" imports to be expected from real devaluations. On the other hand, more expen-
sive "complementary" imports (of mostly semi-finished or investment goods and ener-
gy not available from domestic suppliers) will directly harm the competitiveness of 
domestic producers using them. The higher the share of such imports in all Hungarian 
imports and in the inputs of individual exporters the more any real devaluation will kill 
the price-based competitiveness of all Hungarian exports and the exports of low domes-
tic value added products. 
It has to be noted that the above arguments did not refer to the inflationary impacts 
of real devaluations and/or to their indirect (secondary) competitiveness-eroding effects. 
2. Labor costs. The impossibility of making trustworthy regional comparisons of 
unit labor costs is demonstrated by the fact that the United Nations' recent Economic 
Survey of Europe (1992-1993) publishes [cf. pp. 107-108.] average national labor costs 
of European transition economies only in domestic currencies. 
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Several comparisons known from the press (but with unclear methodological 
backgrounds) put Hungarian unit labor costs generally at a level second only to Slove-
nia and significantly higher than the Czech or the Polish figures. According to one com-
parison, for example, average hourly labor costs are USD 1.82 in Hungary as compared 
to USD 24.87 in Western Germany, USD 19.26 in Austria and USD 17.30 in Eastern 
Germany on the one hand, and USD 1.40 in Poland, USD 1.14 in the Czech Republic 
and USD 0.71 in Thailand on the other [HVG, August 21,1993. p.79.]. 
Our enterprise-level inquiries seem to confirm, however, that unit labor costs tend 
to lose their role as a primary source of comparative advantage for Hungarian manufac-
turing firms. Wage costs carry - independently from personal income taxes - an extra 
58% cost burden consisting of social security contributions and so-called "solidarity" 
payments to finance unemployment benefits. 77ie relative level of non-wage type labor 
costs to be paid by the employer is the highest in Hungary among the countries of the 
region [HVG, August 21, 1993. p.79.]. The share of employer-paid social security con-
tributions within gross wages is above 50% only in Hungary, between 40% and 50% 
only in Poland, while the figures for Slovenia, Austria and Germany are below 25%. 
The Russian, Czech, Slovak and Romanian figures are between 25% and 40%. 
The wide gap between wages paid to employees and labor costs for employers is 
becoming an important factor against FDI in Hungary, because wage-related incentives 
to employees tend to cost abnormally much to firms, and some foreign investors are not 
eager to finance the very inefficient Hungarian social security system. This is not a dis-
suasive factor yet, but the Hungarian government has to understand its influence on the 
competitiveness of 
a) Hungarian exports of commodities and services: 
b) Hungary as a target country for FDI. 
The negative influence of high labor costs as compared to low wages (or the low 
wage content of labor costs) is made still worse by the strength of the Hungarian curren-
cy. It has to be seen as well that current industrial policy has very little influence on 
these factors of competitiveness. In fact, Hungarian industrial policy has at its disposal 
very few tools for directly improving firm-level competitiveness. It can introduce sever-
al policy tools helping the adjustment of the firms, but it has no practical influence on 
monetary, exchange rate policy or fiscal policy considerations all of which treat firm-
level competitiveness as a macroeconomic variable with, at best, only a secondary 
importance. 
3. Competition policy. Hungarian competition policy has become considerably 
more active in the last three to four years. The main role in carrying out competition 
policy belongs to the Office of Competition 9. 
There are several points of more or less overt conflict of interest between the 
Office of Competition, the Ministry of Industry and Trade and the governmental institu-
tions responsible for privatization. The main reason behind these problems is the lack of 
coordination between the strategic targets of different policies. The three policies in 
9 This agency is responsible for the freedom of competition, and it has to enforce competition legislation. It can 
initiate lawsuits against dumping or other unfair trade practices, and it is expected to give strategic support to 
the Ministry of International Economic Relations when the latter cannot use its limited set of tools to protect 
the domestic market from "hit-and-run" type entry to the market. 
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question are competition policy, import policy and privatization policy. We are going to 
show that it is necessary that conflicts almost inevitably arise between one of them on 
the one hand and the two others on the other in case all the three policies are aimed at 
"mainstream" targets usual in transition economies. These "mainstream" targets are a 
far-reaching de-monopolization for competition policy, an almost complete liberaliza-
tion of imports for trade policy and the substantial lowering of the state's ownership 
share within the capital stock of the economy for privatization policy. 
a) Competition policy might face a serious challenge if a foreign investor acquires 
a domestic manufacturer in a monopolistic position. This could be the case also if sev-
eral subsidiaries of the same foreign holding (seemingly different firms) acquire differ-
ent Hungarian competitors on the same market. If this occurs a de facto monopoly will 
be created on a hitherto competitive market. The foreign investor(s) will then be inter-
ested in maintaining its (their) monopolistic position also by trying to get a "waiver" 
from import liberalization for its products. Therefore the result of a seemingly succesfiil 
privatization transaction might be an increasing pressure on competition policy and 
trade policy. 
b) Trade policy (in the import field) could get entangled in conflict with the two 
other policies if privatization in a given sector or commodity group (e.g. consumer elec-
tronics) comprises sales channels rather than production capacities. In such cases liber-
alized imports might drive out domestic production from the market, and the combined 
effect of privatization and import liberalization could be very counterproductive in 
terms of the de-monopolization efforts of competition policy. 
c) The objectives of privatization policy would be more difficult to achieve if 
antitrust regulation did not permit to sell an entire large firm in monopolistic control of 
the domestic market to a foreign investor, and trade policy did not provide protection 
from competitive imports. In such cases it may well happen that a domestic monopoly 
cannot be privatized, and liberalized imports might gradually erode the privatization 
value of the monopolistic firm. 
The three cases can be summarized in the following way. A foreign firm exporting 
to Hungary is interested in a weak trade policy protection of the Hungarian market (low 
barriers to entry) and a strong anti-monopoly policy, mainly if there is already at least 
one incumbent and strong competitor on the market. If this foreign firm intends to par-
ticipate or becomes interested in Hungarian privatization it might well try to acquire its 
strong incumbent competitor. In this case its pattern of interests will become diametri-
cally opposed to the former one. The company will probably lobby for a strong protec-
tion of domestic industry and a weaker antitrust regulation. 
2.3. Current industrial policy in Hungary 
The second industrial strategy was presented in late 1992 by the then Minister of Indus-
try and Trade Iván Szabói10. We consider this document our main source for giving a 
1(> One of the authors of this strategy, János Latorcai, became his successor in early 1993 when Mr. Szabó was 
appointed the Minister of Finance. 
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critical assessment of the targets and tools of the current industrial policy approach of 
the Hungarian government11. 
This strategy document is aimed at identifying the main trends of industrial devel-
opment to be supported by industrial policy and the ones to be eventually changed by 
the government. The industrial strategy and industrial policy of the government are 
based on three sets of exogenous variables: 
1. the trends of development for the main branches and subsectors by the year 
2000; 
2. the international background of Hungarian industrial development by the year 
2000; 
3. the Hungarian technology and R&D policy15. 
The rapid opening of Hungarian markets to imports, the reorientation of foreign 
trade and the complete phasing out of subsidies to enterprises made substantial enter-
prise-level adjustment unavoidable in the short period between 1989 and 1992. 
An array of enterprises could not respond to this challenge. This is why the "nega-
tive" aspect of structural change has dominated so far. Industrial policy has to react to 
such unexpected changes as a loss of 45% of industrial output between 1985 and 1992 or 
that about; 20% of state-owned industrial firms had to declare bankruptcy only in 1992. 
These changes make a completely neutral industrial policy stance inadmissible 
and they call for a more active policy approach. 
The basic scenario for Hungarian industrial growth consists of two periods. Peri-
od I (1993-1995) would be that of "positive stagnation" (i.e. a trend oscillating 
between stagnation and weak growth)15 following the first major steps of restructuring. 
The average annual growth rate of GDP from industry would be between 0 and 3% in 
this period. 
The share of industry within the GDP of Hungary is expected to decrease further 
due to several factors. These factors include: 
- the need for a definite and complete phasing out of capacities that became super-
fluous owing to the collapse of intra-COMECON trade, 
- the shrinking of traditional sectors such as mining, metallurgy, textile, clothing, 
shoe industry as a result of increasing import competition, and 
- the growth of services at a rate above industrial growth. 
Period II (1996-2000, with annual growth rates between 4% and 5%) would be 
that of "accelerated adjustment". A massive qualitative change in the structure and the 
corporate behaviour of Hungarian industrial firms will expectedly take place only dur-
ing the years 2000-2010. This will make necessary several major changes on the policy 
and the enterprise level as well. These changes should include: 
1. the raising of the adaptability and the flexibility of Hungarian companies and 
entrepreneurs to international levels; 
11
 This policy document is analysed from its official concise version published by the Ministry of Industry and 
Trade [Ipari Szemle, 1992 6. pp. 3-7.]. 
12
 This is treated as an exogenous variable in the strategy document. The reason is as follows. The elaboration of 
the Hungarian technology and R&D policy depends first of all not from the Ministry of Industry and Trade, 
but from the National Commission of Technical Development directed by a minister without portfolio. 
13 The two terms used to characterize the two periods were coined by us. They were not used in this form by the 
authors of the document. 
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2. the clear definition of the structural and industrial policy related competences 
and obligations of the Hungarian government; 
3. the substantial speeding up of the preparation for Hungary's EC membership 
both on the governmental (macro), and the enterprise (micro) level; 
4. such an amount of foreign direct investment in the country which would give 
foreign capital a major role in helping the modernization of industry and easing the 
country's serious foreign debt constraint. The latter would help eliminate the serious 
bottlenecks in financing investment projects. 
The set of industrial policy objectives as defined by the strategy document is three-
fold in a time perspective. These objectives are practically identical with the objectives 
of the long-term structural policy of the Hungarian government. 
Short-term objectives: the carrying out of a widespread and successful enterprise-
level crisis management and restructuring effort across the Hungarian industry. As a 
result of this, the weakest points of the industrial structure would have to be eliminated. 
Medium-term objectives: the stopping of "destruction without replacement" of 
industrial capacities and the putting of Hungarian industry on a growth path. 
Long-term objectives: the elimination of the development gap between Western 
Europe and Hungary, a complete integration of the country and its industry in the inter-
national economy. 
The major point of linkage between these different time horizons of industrial and 
structural policy is the role of the government in fostering structural change. This is an 
element of linkage between the strategic vision of the document formulated in a rather 
general manner, its more precisely defined sectoral view and the set of still not quite 
concrete policy tools it proposes. 
2.4. Restructuring: general and sectoral aspects 
The strategy document uses both a descriptive and a normative approach to assess the 
"structural future" of Hungarian industry. For a start, it gives a general outline of 
"promising" industries. In the next step, the document precises the expected role of 
these industries in the process of structural adjustment. The problem of policy tools 
enters the picture at this point. 
The "promising" industries can be pinpointed, on the one hand, from the tradition-
al (Heckscher-Ohlin-Samuelson-type) factor endowments of the economy. On the other 
hand, former or recent export success stemming from specific skills, natural conditions 
or other factors of production can help identify "strategic" competitive advantages as 
well [cf. Porter, 1990]. 
All these advantages, be they comparative or competitive, also have a 
decisive importance for the choice of Hungary as a target by major domestic 
investors. It has to be stressed, however, that cost-based comparative advan-
tages seem to have more importance for "efficiency-seeking" investors whereas 
"market-seeking" investors would be probably more interested in much more 
broadly defined competitive advantages. 
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"Promising" industries include: 
- industries and/or technologies using the high-quality agricultural basis of the 
country: biotechnology, industries offering high value-added food or nutritional prod-
ucts, the deep-freezing industry, the manufacturing of agricultural and food industry 
equipment; 
- health-related industries and/or technologies including as the pharmaceutical 
industry, the medical equipment industry, the production of integrated health care sys-
tems, the manufacturing of non-synthetic drugs; 
- the aluminium industry based on the domestic availability of bauxite; 
- several "upstream" activities of the motor vehicles industry: electronics for cars, 
the manufacturing of leather and artificial leather products, the production of paints, the 
manufacturing of plastics, eventually the glass and the rubber industry; 
- the furniture industry, first of all in its niches to be exploited with a high intensity 
of skilled labor; 
- the clothing industry (costumes, designer or customer-tailored products). 
The sectoral picture drawn by the document presents probable "success" and "fail-
ure" industries on different time horizons. The strategy has an undoubtedly strong sec-
toral bias which seems to introduce some inconsitency into it. The document repeatedly 
stresses its committment to avoid sectoral policies, but its still quite sector-oriented 
approach still provoked quite much criticism. 
The sectoral approach can be only limitedly accepted as a framework for forecast-
ing. The marking of some sectors as "success" ones, for example, cannot mean that all 
or most enterprises in these industries are necessarily likely to succeed. The reverse is 
true for the "failure" industries as well. 
"Success industries" include the following sectors for the different time horizons 
of the strategy. 
For 1995: 
- agriculture-related industries; 
- the pharmaceuticals industry; 
- the manufacturing of plastics; 
- the printing industry. 
For 2000: 
- agriculture-related industries; 
- engineering subsectors including the agricultural machinery industry, the electric 
appliances industry, the household appliances industry, the "upstream" industries 
(backward linkages) of car manufacturing; 
- the pharmaceuticals industry; 
- the fine chemistry industry; 
- the clothing (confection) industry; 
- non-consumer electronics; 
- the construction and the building materials industry. 
For 2010: 
- the food industry (biotechnology); 
- the pharmaceuticals industry; 
- the clothing (confection) industry; 
- the agricultural machinery industry; 
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- the construction industry; 
- the non-consumer (professional) electronics; 
- the fine chemistry (with special respect to cosmetics); 
- the environmental industries. 
Only two "temporary success industries", the printing and the plastics industry are 
supposed to leave the group of "top performers" by the year 2000. The prospective 
expects the creation of a more or less definite set of "success industries" by the year 2000. 
The first rapid period of structural change is supposed to end by the late 1990s, at 
least in the approach of the industrial policy document. In the following decade, only 
"embryonic" industries such as biotechnology and environment-linked industries 
would be able to join them. 
The emergence of several "high-speed" sectors in Hungarian industry between the 
years 1993 and 2000 would suppose not only a major reversal in the as yet very unfa-
vorable rates and trends of investment, but also a continuing disappearance of crisis 
sectors. Some of the latter were also identified by the strategy document. 
The "failure industries" are presented as follows: 
For 1995: 
- mining; 
- metallurgy; 
- the precision instruments industry; 
- the building materials industry; 
- the microelectronics sector. 
For 2000: 
- mining; 
- the steel industry; 
- the textile industry; 
- the telecommunications industry. 
For 2010: 
- mining; 
- the steel industry. 
There is a remarkably fine distinction between "metallurgy" for 1995 and "steel 
industry" for the later years. The reason is the aluminium industry seems to have some 
chances of international adjustment. It can be added to this that a promising sign in this 
respect is the integration of part of the Hungarian aluminium industry into the Alcoa 
group, due to a USD 50 million worth FDI. 
Only one industry (building materials) is supposed to move two categories (from 
the "failure" sectors to the "success" cases) in 15 years. The industries with formerly 
strongly COMECON-oriented market patterns are expected to accomplish their restruc-
turing only after the year 2000. 
Mining and steel are expected to stay partially alive as crisis sectors. This will 
probably be the case everywhere else in Europe, especially in the EC countries. The 
assumption that they would still exist in 2010 in Hungary seems to mean that the gov-
ernment will want to keep alive some mining and steel firms out of strategic considera-
tions. If it does so, however, it will have to provide these sectors'with some resources 
for survival. This is one of the proofs why the idea of a completely "non-interventionis-
tic" Hungarian industrial policy seems to be rather far from reality. 
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2.5. Instruments in the industrial policy's "toolkit" 
The macro-level restructuring process is thought to be carried out mainly not by the 
government. The general (i.e. not industrial policy specific) set of tools to be used if this 
"moderately active" governmental approach to the microsphere is applied would con-
sist of four broad categories: 
1. the creation of a microeconomic environment with several incentives to innova-
tion; 
2. the financing of governmental programs of technology development; 
3. the creation of a modem business infrastructure; and 
4. the government's effort to set up a network of "background" services for firms 
in fields such as marketing, human resources management, finances, training etc.14 
A much larger set of industrial and structural policy tools could be used by the 
government. The strategy document stresses that the use of some of them would go 
beyond the scope of industrial policy in the narrow sense. The industrial policy toolkit 
to be used by the Hungarian government would consist of three specific sets of tools: 
1. "transitional" tools helping the adjustment of industry to the competitive 
("market economy") environment. "Transitional" tools include, first of all, privatiza-
tion and the management of productive assets to be held durably by the state. These 
tools are not analyzed here because they belong more to the scope of specifically priva-
tization-related research. Moreover, their use is more and more confined to the State 
Property Agency and the State Assets Management Corporation. 
2. "strategic" tools applied in order to fulfil longer term industrial policy objec-
tives. "Strategic" tools do not exist for their major part yet, but their creation is envis-
aged by the strategy document. The "strategic" tools include 1. investment incentives; 
2. incentives to entrepreneurs; 3. technology policy; 4. export incentives; 5. the protec-
tion of the domestic market and producers; 6. employment policy; 7. regional policy; 
and 8. the development of infrastructure. 
3. "regulatory" tools at the disposal of the government for application in crisis 
("emergency") situations and/or for maintaining the normal functioning of the market. 
These tools are linked to the Ministry's regulatory and supervisory functions much 
more than to its role in policymaking. Therefore we do not tackle these tools in this 
paper in detail. 
The role in restructuring of each of these tools cannot be underestimated, but the 
policy aspects of their application are not always clear. For instance, fields 3 to 8 are 
regulated mainly by other governmental agencies, and the Ministry of Industry and 
Trade has first of all a consultative role concerning them. 
It is clear that the so-called transitional tools will have the most direct impact on 
FDI in Hungary, but it has to be understood that an increasing part of industrial FDI will 
be "greenfield" type investment. This will be strongly influenced by the general invest-
14
 The government is working on the concept of creating independent consulting services such as productivity, 
quality or logistics centers based on foreign models and partly financed from Japanese, Dutch, German etc. 
resources if these could be made available. These institutions would serve the enterprises on a non-profit 
basis, providing them with efficiency-increasing services in most fields of their activities. 
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ment climate in the country, and the "strategic tools" could be effective in improving 
this climate and making it increasingly lucrative for foreign and domestic investors. 
In the field of investment incentives, fiscal measures have and will have the priori-
ty. New incentives would include 
- changes in the depreciation system favorable for new fixed capital investment; 
- tax incentives for some kinds of investment in line with general industrial policy 
and restructuring objectives; 
- credit support schemes for certain types of investment. 
This fiscal package will try to solve the rather controversial issue of the flow of 
funds for investment from household savings to the enterprises. 
High banking costs and the banks' growing reluctance to take credit related risks 
have created such a situation where interest rates for credits with one year maturities (or 
eventually, but very rarely more) are 2 or 3 percentage points above the rate of inflation 
(measured by the CPI), whereas interest rates for household deposits with similar matu-
rities are 4 to 6 percentage points below the inflation rate. 
In addition to this problem, several commercial banks are clearly not very interest-
ed in accepting household savings, because they cannot normally reinvest them owing 
to the frozen situation on credit markets. Some of the banks go on lowering interest 
rates for household savings, while there are no or only very little corresponding trends 
in interest rates for business credits. 
Industrial policy should give some thought to the creation of investment institu-
tions operating separately from banks. These specialized investment corporations 
would take deposits from or sell their shares to small investors (households), and use 
their capital for enterprise restructuring. 
Investment incentives include a priority treatment of foreign direct investment. 
There is no proposal aimed at enlarging the preferences already offered to foreign 
investors15. On the contrary, the Hungarian government is examining the possibility of 
changing the system in order to make it more discretional. 
ч A joint venture (JV) is entitled to a tax allowance of 
a) 60% in the first 5 years and 40% in the second 5 years (between the beginning of the 6th year and the end of 
the 10th year) of the period when all the following conditions are united: 
- more than 50% of annual sales generate incomes from production; 
- the amount of equity capital is not less than HUF 50 million (approx. USD 0.6 million) with a foreign 
share of not less than 30%. 
b) 100% in the first 5 years and 60% in the second 5 years (between the beginning of the 6th year and the end 
of the 10th year) of the period when all the following conditions exist: 
- more than 50% of annual sales generate incomes from activities described in Annex 4 of this law; 
- the amount of equity capital is not less than HUF 50 million (approx. USD 0.6 million) with a foreign 
share of not less than 30%. [Corporate Tax Law, LXXXVL/1991., Chapter III., Par,12.(l.)]. 
The Annex 4 of the Corporate Tax Law lists 15 types of products or activities with all the codes of products 
or services whose suppliers are entitled to the favourable tax treatment. These 15 groups of products and 
services are: 1. electronics products; 2. vehicle components; 3. machine tools; 4. machinery and equipment 
for agriculture, forestry and the food industry; 5. mechanical components; 6. products used in packaging; 7. 
pharmaceuticals and agrochemical products; 8. protein-based feeding stuff; 9. special food products; 10. all 
items under headings 1 to 9 produced on a subcontracting basis; 11. genetic material or breeding stuff; 12. 
special agricultural products; 13. tourism; 14. special telecommunications services; 15. products and ser-
vices for environment protection. 
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According to as yet unpublished concepts, the sectoral preferences would be abol-
ished, and the minimum limit for FDI enabling the investor to apply for corporate tax 
preferences will be increased 2 or 2.5-fold. The government will have a right to take a 
case-by-case approach in decisions about corporate tax preferences to be offered to for-
eign investors. 
The reason is the fiscal impacts of some excessive incentives for foreign direct 
investment were evidently negative. These preferences were probably not the main 
attractor of foreign direct investment to the country, since multinational firms do not 
normally consider high-level exposure to corporate taxation an absolute behavioral 
priority. 
The new package would include, in the first place, the conclusion of investment pro-
tection (asset protection) agreements and agreements on avoiding double taxation with 
the highest possible number of countries with which such agreements are still missing. 
In the field of incentives to entrepreneurs, the "strategic" tools include new sup-
port schemes for SMEs. They will be welcome by the Hungarian business community. 
Although there are already about 30 different preferential credit or support schemes in 
the country, most of them are practically inaccessible for smaller entrepreneurs. 
Most of these schemes consist of refinancing credits with only limited use. These 
credits are offered by the National Bank of Hungary together with World Bank credits 
and foreign credits open only for imports from the creditor country. 
As a fourth possibility, the Hungarian Foundation for Entrepreneurship Develop-
ment also opened a preferential credit line of HUF 6 billion (USD 70 million) in 1990, 
but this was just one action. Finally, the so-called START credit line of HUF 3.5 billion 
(USD 40 million) was opened in 1991. Due to its favorable conditions, it was complete-
ly used within a few months. 
The amount of preferential credits open to entrepreneurs in the years 1990 and 
1991 was about HUF 30 billion (USD 400 million) altogether, and they used about half 
of it. These credits are managed by commercial banks, but they mostly do not commit 
their own funds to these credit lines. This fact already shows that the lack of resources 
for investment and entrepreneurship is only partly a real fact if the conditions of access 
to credits are far from lucrative. 
There are two main reasons for the mismatch between the excess liquidity of banks 
and the excess demand for credits of the entrepreneurs. First, the banks charge very 
high rates of interest due to their high marges (operational costs). A not less important 
reason is that owing to the apparently high risk of credits to small entrepreneurs, collat-
erals requested by banks are enormously high. 
If, for instance, they include real estate owned by the debtor, the nominal value of 
the collateral might be 1.5 to 2 times higher than the amount of credit. Such problems 
are behind the fact that several major entrepreneurial credit lines are very much under-
utilized. Best known examples are credits with National Bank refinancing, and the so-
called Existence Credit. 
Other schemes for supporting SMEs arc outside the banking sphere, but the appli-
cation of most of them is still at best in the initial phase. These schemes have been pro-
posed by the Ministry of Industry and Trade and accepted by the government, but most 
of them have not been introduced. The reason is problems and conflicts of competence 
between the ministries, but also the lack of the necessary minimum of financing. 
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These schemes would include, similarly to British, Dutch, Finnish or Spanish 
examples from the 1980s 
- preferential credits or credit guarantees for startup firms; 
- the creation of the institutional background for the supply of venture capital; 
- state participation in the raising of venture capital (e.g. through the purchase by 
state-owned investment corporations of special "venture capital" shares issued by new 
firms); 
- the creation of special funds or support schemes for innovation and R&D; 
- special support schemes for energy-saving investment; 
- support for installing computerized accounting and management assistance sys-
tems at startup firms; 
- the establishment of a banking network able to assist SMEs and specialized to 
help them. 
The "strategic tools" related to technology policy have to be based on a consensus 
between the economic ministries of the government and the State Committee for Tech-
nology Development. The latter is a governmental agency in charge of coordinating and 
partly financing R&D in Hungary. An integrated national system of R&D has to be cre-
ated out of the hitherto segmented university-based, academic and industrial networks. 
The Ministry of Industry and Trade does not have significant resources for financ-
ing R&D, but it already has two specialized agencies for such a purpose. In any event, 
the competences of this ministry and the State Committee for Technology Development 
seem to be overlapping in R&D policy issues which makes it quite difficult to make 
R&D related policy tools a really integral part of industrial policy. 
3. INDUSTRIAL POLICY AND FDI 
3.1. Should FDI be a tool or a target for industrial policy? 
The combined amount of FDI in the Hungarian economy seems, according to several 
estimates, to have reached USD 5 billion in mid-1992. Our estimate is that approxi-
mately 60% of this is in the Hungarian industry [the figure given by the SPA is 66%, 
Figyelő, September 16, 1993., p.9.], but with one important complementary remark. It 
seems that this share calculated on a stock basis conceals the fact that the share of indus-
try in FDI inflow has significantly oscillated during recent years. 
This share peaked, together with the amount of annual inflow of FDI into the Hun-
garian industry, in 1991 when it reached 70%, and the 1992 figure was already down to 
48%. In the first half of 1993 this percentage share was only around 40%, so its trend 
seems to be a downward sloping one. 
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Table 3 
Inflow of FDI in the Hungarian industry by sectors 
(1990 - 1993 [I-VI.]), in million USD 
Year 
Sector 1990 1991 1992 1993*/ 
Mining 3.2 9.6 2.4 1.1 
Electricity 
- 0.1 15.5 0.0 
Metallurgy 31.6 31.6 25.8 5.1 
Engineering 235.8 579.4 46.4 23.4 
Building mat. 102.8 170.5 8.0 9.3 
Chemicals 98.1 181.6 43.7 9.3 
Light ind. 155.1 208.0 16.6 10.0 
Other ind. 6.3 9.0 1.4 1.0 
Food ind. 96.5 458.2 54.9 13.1 
All industry 729.4 1641.5 236.2 72.8 
* First half of the year. 
Source: computations by Judit Zsarnay from Statisztikai Havi Közlemények , CSO of Hungary, 1991/10, 
1992/12,1993/7; Gazdaságstatisztikai Évkönyv, CSO of Hungary, 1993. 
The table clearly shows that the engineering industry is the priority sectoral target 
for FDI in Hungary. The light industry has lost much of its attractiveness for foreign 
investors, whereas the most capital-intensive "smokestack" sectors have been practical-
ly neglected by foreign investors. The metallurgy industry seems to be an exception to 
this general statement, but it has to be borne in mind that two major FDI-related trans-
actions in the most depressed steel industry areas of Northeastern Hungary have col-
lapsed and most of the foreign capital invested there has been withdrawn. 
The sectoral targets of FDI in Hungarian industry will have to be analysed on the 
enterprise level. The listing of some major FDIs in the Hungarian industry will make it 
possible to discern at least one major structural difference between the behavioral pat-
terns of FDI in the Hungarian industry and other countries of the region. 
It could be observed already in the 1970s that early FDIs in each East European 
country that authorized them were concentrated around only one major FDI in each tar-
get country. This focal point was the INA-Dow Chemical JV in former Yugoslavia and 
the Oltcit JV in Romania. This tradition was continued in the early 1990s by the Czech 
Republic (Skoda-VW) and Poland (FSM-Fiat). Both of these countries still have more 
than the half of FDI in their industry just for one JV (both in the passenger car industry). 
On the contrary, the Hungarian picture is much more dispersed. If we take the 
example of the passenger car industry again: the combined value of the four major FDIs 
by heavyweight multinationals (GM, Suzuki, VW-Audi and Ford) is USD 753 million. 
This is definitely less than the amount expected to be invested by VW in Skoda, and 
about 40% of the Fiat investment in FSM of Poland. 
The picture from this methodologically not unquestionable table seems to be still 
quite convincing for our industrial policy oriented argumentation. As opposed to the 
already mentioned other East European cases where Citro%on, Fiat and VW equally 
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Table 4 
FDIs in the Hungarian industry 
(transactions amounting to more than USD 50 million) 
Engineering 
Sector, Hungarian/foreign firm Value of FDI, mn USD 
Tungsram/GE 350 
RÁBA/GM 250 
Audi 200 
Suzuki 180 
Ford 123 
Westel/US West 55 
IKARUS/ATEX (Russia) 50 
Lehel/Electrolux 50 
Building materials 
Hunguard/Guardian Glass 120 
Food industry 
NMV/Ferruzzi, Unilever 120 
Debrecen Tobacco/Reemtsma 68 
Szerencs/Nestl, 55 
Sugar refineries/Ferruzzi 50 
Veszpr,m Dairy/Unilever 50 
Paper and packaging materials industry 
Paper mills/Prinzhom 132 
Compack/Sara Lee 100 
Tetra Pak 50 
Aluminium and chemical industry 
Chinoin/Sanofi 75 
Oxig,n-Dissousg z/Hoechst 70 
Köfém/ALCOA 50 
TVK/Columbian Chemicals 50 
Remark: most of these figures coincide with information from other sources, but their methodological consisten-
cy is not confirmed, and the source of the table as it is indicated below is not a statistical publication. It 
is therefore suggested to use these data only as background information. 
Source: Magyar Hírlap, August 16, 1993, p. 13. 
wanted to make their FDI in Eastern Europe a specialized part of their worldwide pro-
duction network16, many FDIs in the Hungarian industry seem to have only a local or 
regional importance. According to our terminology, they can be considered much more 
"market" than "efficiency" oriented FDIs. For example, GM Hungary produces cars 
mostly for Hungary and the neighbouring countries, Philips Hungary (too small to be 
16 The French firm used its JV plant in Romania in the early 1980s as the sole production base of its not success-
ful Axel model, Fiat builds the Cinquecento cars only in Poland, and Skoda has replaced SEAT as the down-
market end of the Audi-VW-SEAT product line. 
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included in the table) VCRs for the region, with Nestlé, Electrolux, Suzuki and 
Prinzhorn being also mostly regional or domestic market oriented JVs in Hungary. 
But this approach is misleading, since it compares only downstream JVs with each 
other. Contrary examples abound in the Hungarian industry: 
a) GM Hungary is much more important as an upstream firm (engine manufactur-
er) serving the group's several other European car plants; 
b) Ford Hungary (and Audi Hungary) are upstream plants as well, selling fuel 
pumps (and engines) to car assembly plants in Western Europe; 
c) GE Hungary (Tungsram), Nestlé or Lehel/Electrolux (and Opel Astra cars made 
by GM Hungary can also be added to them) produce goods for Western exports that are 
absolutely identical to the group's similar products made elsewhere in Europe. 
Examples a. and b. represent cases where West European assembly plants of 
multinational manufacturing firms established backward linkages in Hungary through 
an FDI. On the contrary, the Czech and Polish examples mentioned17 have two differ-
ent things in common: 
1. Both the Fiat and the VW projects created only forward linkages for their groups 
in Central/Eastern Europe. Both the FSM and the Skoda plants use much more Italian or 
German parts than the value of parts they export to Fiat or VW. 
2. These forward linkages took shape in the most downmarket products of both 
multinationals. Using industrial economics parlance: one of their major motives for 
these FDIs might have been to gain control over or to reduce the degree of contestabil-
ity of their European markets "from the bottom ", i.e. Central/Eastern Europe. 
While examples a. and b. as well as the two major Czech and Polish cases repre-
sent situations of vertical product differentiation and/or vertical intra-group integra-
tion, examples c. are markedly different. They have an evidently horizontal character in 
the sense that the function of these Hungarian JVs of multinationals cannot be defined 
by their backward or forward linkages within the European network of plants of the 
group. They sell (the case of Lehel is a certain exception to this assessment) products in 
Hungary and abroad that are completely standardized within their multinational group, 
and being therefore perfect substitutes (and perfect competitors) of the identical prod-
ucts of the other European plants of the group. This means a high level of intra-firm 
integration for these Hungarian subsidiaries of multinationals. 
With all the tribute paid to such positive examples, these cases are still far from 
general in the Hungarian industry but they have appeared at least. This is why there is 
no simple answer to the question concerning the "tool" or "target" type role of FDIs for 
Hungarian industrial policy. However, the existence of a dozen or so Hungarian JVs 
really organically integrated in their European "mother" firms provides one part of the 
answer. These "showroom" casesis have to be understood as targets for an industrial 
policy having a feeler for FDIs. 
17
 We are aware that these few examples aren't representative either for Polish or Czech industrial policy or for 
FDIs in those countries. Their "test pilot" role and structural importance is, however, undisputed for those 
countries as well as for potential foreign investors there. If not for other reasons, then due to the exceptional 
size of these FDIs. 
'8 It might be interesting to reflect upon the fact that out of about 22 thousand productive JVs in the Hungarian 
industry almost always the same half dozen or so (GM, Suzuki, Audi, GE, Sanofi, Electrolux) are referred to 
as "success stories" in the country. Are other positive cases not widely known or do they have much bigger 
components of failure? 
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They can be tools as well in the sense that they can generate a widely perceived 
demonstration effect. Suzuki Hungary is a good example in this respect: the tough on-
the-job training practices and the excessive expectations of loyalty of the Japanese cer-
tainly generated a hostile attitude in Hungary. Interestingly, this was less the case 
among their own Hungarian employees than among Hungarian firms having some kind 
of "Japanese option" for their future. Hungarian employees rapidly learned about an 
important "tradeoff': Japanese firms are tough employers but, as a rule, they offer a 
much higher degree of job security than their European or American counterparts. 
Less successful (or less demonstratively successful) JVs can serve Hungarian 
industrial policy as "strategic tools": they can bridge gaps of financing R&D or invest-
ment projects. As a matter of fact, no sharp distinction can be made between FDIs as 
targets and as tools for industrial policy. Attracting FDIs should certainly be made one 
of the targets of industrial policy. It is interesting in this respect that the fiscal and the 
industrial policy approaches to FDIs regularly clash with each other within the govern-
ment1 ' . The trend in 1991 and 1992 was the "phasing out" of fiscal incentives for FDIs, 
but slow structural change and balance of payments problems have helped the "indus-
trial policy approach". 
Bertalan Diczházy, the Vice Chairman of the Board of the SPA recently urged, for 
example, the re-introduction of extensive fiscal incentives for FDIs in Hungary with 
these incentives covering privatisation transactions with foreign participation [Figyelő, 
September 16, 1993., p.9.]. His argument is based on the desire on increasing Hun-
gary's competitiveness on the demand side of the FDI "market" (where, for example, 
the better geographical location of the Czech Republic has to be offset), but he also 
made a concession to the fiscal approach with stressing the need for increasing revenues 
from privatization. 
So attracting FDIs should be considered as industrial policy tool, but FDIs already 
present in the Hungarian economy can be used as tools for fostering industrial develop-
ment. Our last subchapter tries to tackle the problem of how FDIs can effectively help 
the restructuring process of the Hungarian industry in the present and in the medium-
term future. 
3.2. The role of FDI in Hungarian industrial restructuring - a strategic view 
If we use a "black box" approach for industrial FDIs in Hungary and understand a for-
eign majority owned industrial JV as one single unit, we have to treat it in a context of 
cooperative and competitive relationhips. Its cooperative relationships are the ones 
described with the terms "backward and forward linkages" borrowed from Hirschman, 
whereas its competitive relationships can be called its "horizontal linkages". 
These relationships can be competitive in more than one sense: the company com-
petes for market shares (in the field of its forward linkages) with its competitors, but it 
19
 With some simplification: the fiscal policy approach tries to treat fiscal revenues as a priority, and it is there-
fore against using strong fiscal incentives to attract FDIs. The industrial policy approach considers structural 
change and competitiveness increase as priorities, and wants to use FDIs as one of the main sources of capital 
supply serving these priorities. In the second approach, an extensive use of fiscal incentives is part of the 
package. 
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can also use its backward linkages as competitive tools. For example: a JV can be more 
successful on the domestic market than its domestic competitor ifit makes better use of 
its backward linkages (or has better backward linkages) than its competitor. 
The foreign investor will have no special interest in helping the restructuring of its 
"target" firm in Hungary unless it is stimulated to do so. The above mentioned invest-
ment or FDI incentives could have such a stimulative effect. It occurs, however, quite 
often that the so much expected restructuring of the Hungarian firm by the foreign 
investor creates other restructuring tasks within the industry. This is the case when one 
of the reasons why the Hungarian firm in its original, state-owned form was not com-
petitive was its dependence on uncompetitive suppliers. This set of "unhealthy" back-
ward linkages (since the suppliers were not forced to become more efficient) is replaced 
by the foreign investor by its own input channels. The result is an explosion of crisis 
among the former domestic suppliers. 
Such examples abound in the former complex system of input-output links 
between the Hungarian metallurgy and engineering industry. No exact figure can be 
given, but several privatization deals of Hungarian engineering firms (Ganz Hunslet, 
Lehel, IKARUS, Láng, and more than one chemical engineering companies) consum-
ing much steel show that privatization almost necessarily led to significant cuts in their 
input links to the Hungarian metallurgy industry. These cuts might have served the for-
eign investors even in two respects: 1. they could create favorable backward linkages 
with providing their former suppliers with new market shares (the "market-creating" 
effect); 2. they could increase the efficiency of their production in Hungary owing to 
cheaper supplies (the "efficiency-increasing" effect). 
Contrary developments can take place if the FDI is aimed at using Hungary as a 
jump-off point for entering the EC market (Suzuki is a typical example), because in 
such cases supply channels within Hungary have to replace some of the foreign 
investor's former ones. The ensuing backward linkages can be very strong and mutual-
ly beneficial in such cases, because the foreign investor does not really have a choice: 
inputs (to a certain predetermined extent, of course) have to come from Hungary. 
Therefore it has to make concessions to domestic suppliers (not in issues of quality or 
price, of course, but in securing a better access to capital and/or technology for the Hun-
garian partner) or acquire a partially domestic input basis2«. 
The role of FDI in restructuring can be, in general, twofold, depending on the level 
of the restructuring process. This role can be more indirect than direct in macroeconom-
ic restructuring, because the relative share of FDI in the productive capital assets of the 
Hungarian economy would hardly be higher than 30%, or at the order of magnitude of 
USD 10-12 billion (depending on exchange rates) even by the year 2000. Furthermore, 
FDI will be concentrated in a few regions, industries and probably also in a limited 
number of bigger investment projects or firms. 
20 This has been done by Suzuki as well: the Japanese firm "persuaded" some of its Japanese suppliers to transfer 
technology under favorable terms to the would-be Hungarian suppliers. In most cases, "satellite" JVs were 
created around Suzuki Hungary by these Japanese and Hungarian suppliers. There were attempts to do the 
same in the food industry where one or two foreign investors got the idea of securing the Hungarian agricul-
tural basis for their production in the country by acquisitions. They could not do so, however, due to the 
unclear legal situation in the field of the privatization of land. 
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These FDIs could generate substantial spillover effects, but Suzuki type far-reach-
ing spillovers are not likely to become the rule. It could be expected that further major 
investment projects in the car industry, consumer electronics industry and the fine 
chemistry industry among others will take place in Hungary, but their industrial and 
regional spillover-generating effects will greatly vary (cf. the difference between the 
nearly zero direct spillover on domestic subcontractors of GM Hungary or Ford Hun-
gary and the much stronger spillover effect of our favorite example, Suzuki). Moreover, 
these FDIs will mostly be greenfield investments. Therefore they could only promote 
macro-level industrial restructuring. 
Industrial policy could help FDIs accelerate the macro-level restructuring process 
by offering FDI incentives on a non-sectoral basis, but progressively increasing with 
investment size. It would be a great mistake to think that the dominance of big enter-
prises in the "socialist" industry of Hungary was a symptom of serious structural defi-
ciencies per se. The problem was rather based on the fact that most of these firms were 
"money-guzzlers" and had no chance at all to become efficient under state ownership. 
If, however, industrial policy wants to generate substantial and positive employ-
ment, technological and subcontracting-based spillovers in Hungary due to FDIs, it has 
to promote first of all the creation of several big industrial firms with foreign owner-
ship. These FDIs together with the creation of their network of subcontractors would 
certainly help the macro-level restructuring process. 
Exceptionally strong spillovers can be expected from such FDIs which are able to 
directly attract other major FDIs to Hungary. Due to the small size of the domestic mar-
ket of the country, it cannot normally be expected that direct competitors would attract 
each other. For example: the fact that GM established an engine plant and an assembly 
line for smaller passenger cars in Hungary could hardly persuade VW or Ford to do the 
same thing, as it is hardly imaginable that Siemens would follow Philips in building a 
VCR factory in Hungary. 
FDIs could be attracted to Hungary by such other FDIs which could create sub-
stantial positive externalities for them. To present it in a simplified little model: in Step 
One the Hungarian government uses FDI incentives to get a major multinational 
investor into the country for improving its telecommunications network. This modern-
ization offers substantial positive externalities to other foreign investors, e.g. in indus-
try. FDI incentives for new investors still add up to these positive externalities. "Syner-
gic" positive externalities could result from the combined effect of FDI incentives and 
improved infrastructures. 
Thus, in fact, those foreign investors could benefit from "synergic" positive exter-
nalities more than the others in Hungarian industry which would invest in the country in 
Step Two, after the modernization of its major infrastructural (financial, telecommuni-
cations etc.) networks, when still the same FDI incentives are offered by the govern-
ment. 
This does not mean, of course, that only latecomers could reap the benefits of a 
more actively FDI-oriented industrial policy, but it is probable that they could gain 
more from positive externalities. On the contrary, the first foreign investors in Hungary 
could acquire market shares less expensively than the latecomers. 
Micro-level (enterprise) restructuring can be accelerated with the contribution of 
FDIs only as part of the privatization process. The evident slowdown in Hungarian pri-
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vatization makes this task a rather daunting one for industrial policy. It would go much 
beyond the scope of this study to analyse the perspectives of Hungarian privatization 
and the restructuring role foreign investors could play in the Hungarian industrial firms 
still open for FDIs. 
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M A N A G E M E N T B U Y O U T S IN H U N G A R Y 
J u d i t K A R S A I 
MANAGEMENT BUYOUTS 
IN HUNGARY 
ABSTRACT 
In the absence of road markers, management buyouts (MBOs) are paving their own 
way in Hungary. For example, in practice employee ownership nearly always means 
management ownership. Hungarian MBOs are not based on the deliberate application 
of well-established Western methods. Instead, they utilize techniques that were credit 
burdens, and thus increased risk, due to the general lack of capital; certain rigidity, 
traceable to employee participation, when effecting changes adversely affecting 
employees; or the danger of a company being quickly plundered, as a result of the low 
level of personal risk-taking. 
MANAGEMENT BUYOUTS IN HUNGARY 
In practice, the peculiarly Hungarian version of the MBO is definitely beginning to gain 
ground, albeit indirectly and nearly independently of government intentions. MBOs 
have particularly facilitated the privatization of those smaller or mid-sized firms, as 
well as larger state-owned enterprises breaking up into smaller parts, where the liquid 
resources of the managers and cooperating employees, together with credits attained on 
concessionary terms, were adequate to execute the buyout. 
MBOs comprise those buyouts initiated by managers who then attain a determin-
ing role among the new owners. Deals, wherein the buyer is an already functioning 
company or the new ownership proportion of the managers does not achieve a control-
ling interest', are not considered MBOs. Those deals in which the attainment of owner-
ship rights is delayed, temporarily limiting the exercise of those rights, can only be con-
sidered potential management buyouts. (Such are leasing and holding constructions.) 
1 The size of the controlling interest depends on the ownership structure. Where ownership is widely distributed, 
controlling interest may be assured with as little as 25 percent. 
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UNDER THE COVER OF OTHER METHODS 
To date no official statistics have been kept in Hungary on management buyouts. 
Indeed, until 1992 not a single MBO, as such, had taken place. The adversarial atmos-
phere surrounding those company directors who had retained their positions, charges 
related to their political past and their role in the previous regime, and the demands for 
their removal, allowed them to participate in privatization only under the cover of other 
methods. Management buyouts are not an officially declared method of privatization; 
no regulation has been passed to control the attainment of ownership by managers. 
Management buyouts, though widespread in Western countries, have been insufficient-
ly studied in Hungary. 
By the second half of 1993 we could already see a few management buyouts tak-
ing place "in the open", most often in conjunction with, and complementing, employee 
buyouts. This phenomenon is partly related to the changing privatization strategy, 
which now exhibits a preference for domestic ownership, and is concurrent with a 
rather large proportion of personnel changes at the management level2 and the coming 
of the elections. 
In principle, analysis of Hungarian deals should be relatively simple as up to now 
management buyouts have occurred strictly within the framework of privatization. The 
State Property Agency and the Hungarian State Holding Company are the two organi-
zations responsible for executing and auditing the privatization process, while repre-
senting the interests of the seller - the state. Neither entity includes in its breakdowns of 
sales separate figures for managers as buyers. Nor does the registered data reveal the 
proportion of managers' participation in the new ownership structure emerging from 
the buyout. Lacking such statistics one can only estimate in a "round-about way" the 
number and importance of management buyouts. (So far there have been no manage-
ment buyouts through the stock exchange.) 
Due to the magnitude of capital required, most management buyouts probably 
(could have) occurred in the framework of the self-privatization program designed for 
the privatization of small and mid-sized firms, and of large state-owned enterprises 
breaking up into smaller units. Of the approximately 700 companies included in this 
program, around 200 were sold off by the summer of 1993. 
In the opinion of consultants representing the SPA and executing transactions in 
its name, nearly half of the firms sold under this program ended up in employee owner-
ship. Employee buyouts, however, were almost without exception management buy-
outs - as demonstrated by the research conducted by Éva Voszka.3 Thus, it can be con-
cluded that in the sale of approximately 100 small and mid-sized firms managers gained 
control of the privatized company. As firms sold in this manner represented 36 percent 
of the total revenue received by the SPA under the self-privatization program, it can be 
deduced that managers attained ownership of slightly more than one-third of the total 
assets privatized through this program.4 
2 According to the minister responsible for privatization, over the last three years more than half of the old man-
agement guard have left their positions. (Szabó [ 1993]) 
3 Voszka [1993/a] 
"Zsubori [1993], N.I. [1993] 
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Another possible, though inevitably imprecise, approach is to equate management 
buyouts with employee buyouts. If we suppose that in every employee buyout manage-
ment acquires the ownership necessary to control the firm, then the number of manage-
ment buyouts equals the number of employee buyouts. Unfortunately, there is no exact 
data on employee buyouts either. Only data from deals carried out on the basis of the 
ESOP law adopted in the summer of 1992 is available. 
According to analysts, SPA officials and directors of consultancies and founda-
tions, the number of firms sold to employees prior to the passage of this law can be 
placed at around 30.5 Complementing these figures with data from the SPA-according 
to which through August, 1993, 65 firms were sold to employees under the framework 
ofESOPMve arrive at the same figure of 100 employee buyouts. (Table 1) 
Table 1 
Number and value of ESOP buyouts 
BUYOUTS TOTAL 
Period 01-12/1992 
Number 7 
Value 
(HUF bn.) 2.13 
01-05/1993 01-07/1993 
6 17 
1.12 7.52 
01-08/1993 01/92-08/93 
58 65 
12.91 15.04 
Source: Szabó [1993] p. 52 
Tények... [1993/a] p. 13 
Tények... [1993/b] p. 35 
Even today the aggregate ownership proportion held by employees within firms 
managed or wholly or partially sold by the SPA is quite small, just 3.4 percent. Howev-
er, this proportion has been growing extremely dynamically in the past several months, 
tripling between May and August, 19937 
Statements of leading SPA officials also indicate that ESOPs are beginning to pro-
liferate. In recent months purchases by foreign interests have declined dramatically, 
while the number of those taking advantage of preferential payment terms has jumped 
substantially. ESOP has become the most common tool of privatization.8 
According to projections, there is considerable demand for the application of the 
majority employee share ownership program in the privatization of mid- and large-
sized firms - thus no longer just among small and mid-sized firms.9 The vice-chairman 
of the board of directors of the SPA stated that some of the underlying motivations for 
the attitude of the SPA towards ESOPs are "important political forces and recommen-
dations by parliamentary representatives."10 
5 Voszka [ 1992/a], N.G. [1993/a], N.G. [1993/b] 
6 Tények... [1993/a] p. 13. 
'Tények... [1993/a] p. 13. 
8 Cz.V. [1993/a] 
9 Between 50 and 100 registration applications have been submitted, and the establishment of ESOP organiza-
tions is under way at many more firms. (Nagy [1993]) 
10K.G. [1993] 
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We can get a picture of some of the estimated 100 individual employee buyouts by 
relying on case studies,11 news pieces, interviews with company directors and informa-
tion gained from consultants participating in the deals. Through a combination of these 
sources, 17 individual buyouts can be studied in detail, though not at the same depth. 
Within this statistical "sample" there were roughly similar numbers of producers, 
traders and companies with other profiles (shipping, planning, market research). The 
balance of this paper will concern itself with an introduction of the characteristics of 
employee/management buyouts based on the privatization of these firms. 
SPA CRITERIA 
Managers of over two-thirds of the firms in this sample of employee/management buy-
outs originally made plans to privatize their companies through a buyout. That is, they 
intended in any case to tum over ownership of the firm to the employees. The rest 
believed that their company would need a considerable injection of new capital to 
assure further development, and that the company's employees would not have enough 
financial resources to purchase the firm. 
Of the seventeen cases considered, nine of the buyouts were completed prior to the 
passage of the ESOP law (of these, six took place in 1991). Six occurred between Sep-
tember, 1992, and the end of the year. In the remaining two cases the process was only 
completed in 1993. 
As we can see from Table 2, in those cases where the buyout occurred after the 
transformationl12, the ownership proportion of employees was higher than when the 
buyout took place at the same time. The buyout groups chiefly had to share ownership 
with the SPA, the Hungarian State Holding Company, local governments, commercial 
banks, and on occasion, with outside investors who retained a very small ownership 
proportion generally left over from the period of transformation. 
At most of these companies the only significant minority shareholder was the 
SPA, mainly due to the prescription that 10 to 20 percent of shares be set aside for hold-
ers of compensation certificates. At more than a few firms employees purchased these 
shares in whole or in part, and at other firms short-term plans included their acquisition. 
(Presently, compensation certificates may be used to purchase ownership, a transaction 
enjoying substantial preferences.) 
In the cases surveyed buyouts essentially led to exclusive employee/management 
ownership, without the participation of outside investors. Thus ownership in the long 
run is shared between management and employees. 
The value of firms sold to employees did not show any correlation with the size of 
the firm nor with the timing of the sale. Table 3 indicates the relationship between the 
sale price and the nominal value of state assets offered for sale. 
и Financing for this research was provided by National Scientific and Research Foundation grant no. T 4583, 
"Domestic and foreign experience in management buyouts." 
12 Transformation - making the state-owned enterprise a company under the procedures of the Transformation 
Act without having yet changed the ownership - itself is not privatization. 
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Table 2 
Ownership structure of companies bought out by employees/management 
simultaneously with or following transformation 
Timing of Number of Ownership Ownership 
purchase firm proportion of proportion of 
employees and other owners 
management (%) 
(%) 
Simultaneously 1 22 (+29 options) 49 
with 2 46 54 
transformation 3 64 36 
4 56 (+7 options) 37 
5 90 10 
Following 6 75 25 
transformation 7 80 20 
8 82 18 
9 100 -
10 90 10 
11 80 20 
12 88 12 
13 90 10 
14 100 -
15 75 25 
16 68 32 
16 89 31 
Source: calculations based on data derived from case studies 
Table 3 
Sale price of companies privatized through majority 
employee/management buyouts 
Sale price as a percentage of the nominal value of state Total 
assets offered for sale 
0-50 51-75 76-100 100 and 
above 
Number of 
companies 2 5 6 4 17 
Source: calculations based on data derived from case studies 
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When establishing the sale price during the buyout, the SPA as a rule was 
very generous towards employees, granting without exception all the preferences 
available to workers in the Assets Policy Guidelines. So when it approved this pri-
vatization solution, the Agency made possible the maximum utilization of the 
preferences. 
Thus generally "the sale price" was a composition of different prices for different 
assets. In the case of workers' shares the discount could reach as high as 90%, while 
employees were generally entitled to a 50% discount, with the remaining portion of the 
assets normally offered at 100% of the nominal price. Taken together these prices made 
up the "total" sale price. 
The scale of the preference, as prescribed by the Assets Policy Guidelines, was 
determined according to the value of the equity of the company being sold and the pro-
portion of the annual gross basic pay accounted for by the purchasing collective. (The 
SPA often allowed the preference to reach even 15% of the nominal, or share, equity 
when the total value of the annual wages made this possible.) In conclusion, the State 
Property Agency, acting in the spirit of the Assets Policy Guidelines, sold companies in 
its portfolio to employees on quite favorable terms. 
At one or two of the companies the preferences offered include options for pur-
chase of additional shares with the price set at the nominal value at the time of the orig-
inal sale. 
In not a single buyout leading to employee ownership did the SPA attach condi-
tions on the buyout price connected to the future performance of the company. That is, 
besides the base price the sales contracts never contained stipulations according to 
which the SPA would receive additional revenue in the future arising from the firm's 
profits or its sale of assets. 
Such a procedure would not have been in the interest of the SPA in any case, as 
every year it had to meet a revenue target. Furthermore, it did not have the manpower to 
keep track of these kind of long-term revenue flows. 
At any one time the SPA represented the state's ownership rights in more than 
one and a half thousand firms, meaning that it had to manage simultaneously a 
tremendous amount of sell-offs. Due to the great number of firms under its purview 
the SPA-as owner-did not, and could not, know the essentials of the companies 
belonging to it. 
The Agency could only base its estimation of a firm's value on the results of 
appraisals carried out by independent experts. The SPA was in no position to check the 
market value of the firms over which it practiced ownership or holding rights, as in 
Hungary a market for the purchase and sale of companies for the most part still does not 
exist due to the insufficient development of capital markets. 
This superficial acquaintance with the firms belonging to it prevented the SPA 
from examining the practicality of the business plans outlined by the different bid-
ders, when that should have been one of the most important factors in distinguish-
ing between possible buyers. In the case of those employee groups attempting a 
buyout with the aid of loans, the SPA took the position that the bank granting the 
credits was much better able to judge these matters. Thus, if the bidder possessed a 
promise of credit from a bank, the SPA did not question the practicality of its busi-
ness plan. 
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The SPA wanted in part to balance its "weak spot" arising from a lack of knowl-
edge regarding the firms with the doctrine of competition13, prescribed anyway by law. 
In this way the Agency also sought to defend itself against those who might question the 
professionalism of its work or the correctness of its procedures. 
Fearing bids by "outsiders" speculating on the company's real estate and probably 
aiming to eliminate the company's profile, those submitting bids for majority employee 
buyouts asked the SPA to waive the competition requirement. In many cases the SPA 
accepted this argument, announcing a closed tender instead of open bidding, thus 
restricting the circle of prospective buyers and at the same time limiting the control 
coming from choice. 
Just one-quarter of the firms in our sample were sold through open bidding. In the 
remaining cases the tender was either closed or not even announced. The latter occurred 
when the winner of a previous tender was unable to meet the conditions and had to 
renounce the purchase, or when the State Property Agency did not wish to announce a 
tender because of the special nature of the given company's activities. 
In some cases the number of prospective buyers was not limited merely by the 
"invitation" system of closed tenders. Interviews with directors of the firms examined 
clearly revealed that the firms tried to scare off potential competitors by leaking out 
misleading information concerning their company. 
Besides limitations presented by this monopoly on information, the SPA was fur-
ther hindered by the murkiness of the system of conditions by which they had to evalu-
ate offers. Expectations placed on the Agency changed from time to time leaving the 
SPA to decide in each case which factors would receive priority. 
When drafting their bids, prospective buyers had to account for a number of con-
flicting criteria, for example, the number of companies already sold; the magnitude of 
the privatization proceeds; the nationality of the buyers; the prospects of the company; 
strengthening market competition; or other macro-economic objectives, such as the cre-
ation of jobs. Thus, it is no accident that bids emphasizing employee participation 
enjoyed wildly varying chances of success. 
Analyzing the first few buyouts, the economic director of the SPA came to the 
conclusion that in nearly every case examined the SPA was compelled to depart from 
the prescribed norms. Namely, the Agency considered business-based valuations in 
place of assets-based ones, allowed experimental methods, and approved lower levels 
of contributions demanded from employees.14 
After a period in the beginning when the SPA managed each company "individu-
ally", a longer period followed in which the Agency handled employee buyouts with 
caution and great circumspection. ESOP-like bidders, as well as later groups openly 
acknowledged as ESOP-bidders, could only win the tender if they were truly the best 
candidate, or if they presented the only valid and acceptable offer.15 
13
 In the case of ESOPs, regulations do not require competition, but neither do they prohibit it. In practice, the 
SPA generally opened up to competition these types of collective bids, though most often through a closed 
tender. 
»4 Jelentés a magyar... [1993], p. 120. and Lajtai [1993] 
и A részvétel... [1993] 
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Introduction of a new privatization strategy breaking with the previous revenue-
centered policy and aiming at greater participation by domestic buyers behooved the 
SPA to change its official attitude. For several firms in our study this resulted in "posi-
tive discrimination". 
Following the change in the direction of privatization, the SPA, which had until 
then concentrated on revenues and approved buyouts only of profitable firms, broke 
with its past practices. 
It was said that the reason for the new privatization policy was the large number of 
firms remaining on the SPA's docket and the relatively slow increase in foreign interest 
compared to the rise in the number of companies on offer. In fact, however, political 
considerations played a greater part. 
The advantage enjoyed by domestic bidders, including employees of the affected 
companies, could only be detected in the wake of SPA decisions arrived at not via open 
bidding but in closed tenders through the application of murky criteria. 
EMPLOYEES AND MANAGEMENT 
Compared to similar Western deals, the main players in Hungarian MBOs were much 
more often the employees of firms being bought-out. 
At most companies the management employed a propaganda campaign to spur 
worker participation in the buyout. In the course of this "education" management spoke 
of the opportunity represented by the buyout and about methods of payment, mention-
ing as well that attainment of ownership rights did not automatically guarantee employ-
ees' jobs. As a result of these propaganda campaigns an average of 70-80 percent of 
employees took part in privatization. 
As at many firms share subscription meant the distribution of shares of various 
types and degrees of preference, the opportunity to subscribe was in most cases limited 
by a set of rules. The subscription quota for individual workers was determined by a 
system of points reflecting the number of years at the company, position and income. 
This preference based on length of employment, average salary and position-all 
reinforcing each other-resulted in a higher level of subscription for managers. Among 
the other workers, members of the old guard had the advantage. 
Where a set of rules was not used to regulate share subscription, the inner owner-
ship structure of the buyout group was determined on the basis of individual monetary 
contribution. As in most cases higher level employees had more income and savings 
available for investment purposes, unregulated subscription also led to a dominant role 
for management. 
In general, in early buyouts effected by ESOP groups the size of the monetary 
contribution determined the ownership structure of the newly privatized company. 
Later, because of the SPA's "disapproval", the principle of monetary contribution 
was replaced by the principle of allocating subscription according to contribution to 
the firm's profits. However, as contribution to the firm's profits was measured by 
personal salary, this approach also led to higher ownership proportion for manage-
ment.16 
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Those workers devoted to their jobs, and willing to make sacrifices to preserve 
them, on average contributed the equivalent of one-two months' wages to the buyout. 
At the highest levels of management contributions to the tune of hundreds of thousands 
of forints, and in some cases millions of forints, were not uncommon. Among the 
employees, payments ranging between 20 and 50 thousand forints were typical, while 
among managers sums between 100 and 700 thousand forints were the norm. The value 
of individual contributions varied quite widely, always depending primarily on the 
position held at the company. 
Though data is unavailable on many firms, usually there were 15-25 managers 
who gained a particularly large ownership proportion on the basis of their contribution, 
giving them a controlling interest. In two cases a wide circle of employees attained a 
controlling ownership proportion thanks to special subscription rules, while in two 
other cases the managers were capable of independently purchasing additional shares. 
It is quite difficult to get a clear picture of the resulting ownership structures. The 
available data is insufficient to determine the aggregate ownership for management and 
other groups of employees resulting from trading in property certificates, subscribing to 
preferential or "normal" shares, and buying out the ownership proportion originally set 
aside for compensation purposes. Table 4, prepared on the basis of available data, 
shows the ownership proportion following the buyout for some of the firms in our sam-
ple. 
Management's majority ownership within the buyout group or, in other cases, an 
ownership proportion in excess of 25 percent ensuring its power to veto, shows that the 
bulk of majority employee buyouts were in reality management buyouts. This claim is 
reinforced by the fact not displayed in the table that management's ownership propor-
tion attained simultaneously in various frameworks was combined while the equity 
stake of employees remained scattered. 
As the statutes of buyout groups almost always included the right of preemption or 
compulsory sale of shares at a predetermined price with regard to the shares or business 
quotas of those leaving the company, the ownership proportion of management will 
most likely rise. 
At some companies the controlling role of management arising from their owner-
ship participation was further reinforced by special regulation of the voting rights. 
While in some places the voting rights accrued to all shares bought on credit, in other 
instances they could only be enjoyed after the shares had been paid for in full. And at 
still other firms a portion of the shares (20-25 percent) together with their attendant vot-
ing rights were not distributed at all. 
In the case of employees the exercise of the rights accruing to their shares was sig-
nificantly suppressed as the bodies elected to represent those rights were made up 
almost entirely of the firm's managers, thus inevitably ensuring that the latter's interests 
would dominate. Quite often the leaders of the ESOP group emerged from the highest 
l í When the SPA began to experience more and more often extremely large differentials between the largest and 
the smallest ownership proportions in ownership structures based on the magnitude of monetary contribution, 
the Agency issued a warning that, "in the case of disproportionate distribution the ESOP group would be treat-
ed on the same terms as other investors and would not receive the tax preference." (Mészáros [1993] p. 35.] 
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Table 4 
Internal distribution of ownership at the time of buyout within some firms ending 
up in majority employee ownership 
Number of Ownership proportion of middle and Ownership proportion of 
company high level management workers 
(%) (%) 
1 54 46 
2 25 75 
3 45 55 
4 71 29 
5 36* 64 
6 40 60 
7 51 49 
8 60 40 
9 37* 63 
*Note: not including ownership proportion attained through ESOP groups 
Source: calculations based on data derived from case studies 
echelons of the firm's management. Thus at general meetings little was heard beyond 
the "voice" of management. 
Thus management, in its dual roles of owner and director and as representative of 
the employees, in practice was unfettered in making all sorts of strategic decisions. 
Employee-owners could express their opinion about their own narrow field, but had no 
say in strategic decisions. 
Managers of the firms in our sample did not mention any problems in decision-
making arising from the wide ownership structure. Generally, it was no problem to get 
decisions sanctioned; indeed, as one manager noted, they "had to go to great lengths 
just to get enough of the general assembly to come together to constitute a quorum." 
Supervision of managers having controlling ownership interest in the newly priva-
tized firm in most cases was rendered impossible by the composition of representative 
bodies and management's accumulation of functions. Employees, as a "special" owner-
ship partner, were thus hardly able to fulfill the supervisory role played by Western 
investors wielding venture capital. Employees' capital and often expertise were insuffi-
cient for this task. No mechanism emerged which could effectively ensure some mea-
sure of control - neither proper representation nor a system of weekly and monthly 
reports. Feasibility studies and business plans were neither detailed nor concrete 
enough to make these documents suitable for exerting some sort of external control. 
Lack of proper supervision obstructed even necessary changes within manage-
ment. Thus, during the buyout, managers "purchased" not only ownership but their 
positions as well.17 "Locking" managers into their positions could prove extremely 
17 Vanicsek [1993] 
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dangerous to a newly privatized firm, especially if the managers chose to enhance their 
own income at the expense of the company thereby driving it into the ground - a phe-
nomenon not yet experienced among the firms in our sample, though certainly not 
inconceivable.18 
Not only was a mechanism, an institutional structure and expertise lacking for the 
proper exercise of a controlling role by employees as ownership partners, but also any 
consciousness on the part of employees of their status as owners. This "sham owner-
ship" achieved through "sham investments" did not make this class truly interested in 
growing wealth. The proportion of their income made up by dividends was so insignifi-
cant that it could not compete with their consciousness as "wage workers", intent solely 
on receiving higher wages and keeping their jobs. 
These two types of consciousness came into conflict chiefly when decisions need-
ed to be made on the utilization of excess funds for development, on the order of wage 
increases, as well as on employment streamlining. However, as these firms, burdened 
as they were with huge debts, did not often have excess funds, and as in any case the 
ESOP groups had to devote dividends towards repayment, there were no real debates on 
these questions. Generally the workers accepted the relatively low wage increases, and 
management did not really attempt to carry out large-scale dismissals. 
At two of the companies in our sample, where the financial situation deteriorated 
to such a degree that large-scale dismissals became unavoidable, management kept the 
employee-owners on the payroll as long as possible. 
In the conflict between economic rationality and employees' interests, the latter 
held the upper hand-right up to the collapse of the company. It is no surprise that it is 
especially in such a difficult time as reorganization that employee-owners possessing 
numerous small shares are least able to behave as owners. 
Extraordinary credit burdens made it especially difficult for newly privatized firms 
with capital-poor owners to find their feet. Inclusion of employee-owners, who though 
bringing hardly any fresh capital into the venture made possible by their very participa-
tion the drawing of enormous amounts of credit, greatly increased the risk of these buy-
outs. (At the same time, however, their participation undoubtedly ensured the buyout's 
political acceptability, as well as its acceptability within the firm.) 
Participation of employees could enable up to 98 percent of the deal to be financed 
by loans. In such cases, however, the obligation to repay these loans probably has not 
served as an incentive, but rather has exerted a shackling effect, even if the credit condi-
tions are more favorable than those generally granted. 
The participation of employees as co-owners in the buyouts meant that, lacking 
capital, buyouts were financed through credit to such an extent that the newly privatized 
firm assumed extraordinary burdens. Because of this credit burden, these firms could 
not apply for new loans for improving competitiveness, for development or for market 
expansion. (Thus it is not the restructuring of the firm, but the change in ownership, 
which exhausts the firm's creditworthiness.) 
Due to this enormous amount of credit, the newly minted owners were very 
restricted in exercising their rights over the assets. At these heavily mortgaged firms 
i8Voszka[1992/a] 
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there was little opportunity to take necessary steps towards reorganization, such as the 
sale of superfluous assets, and the closure or sale of loss-making units. Dismissals, on 
the other hand, would have run up against the opposition of employee-owners. Manage-
ment, which had acquired ownership with the assistance of employees, refrained as 
long as possible from taking reorganization steps which would harm the interests of 
their "co-owners" in their capacity as employees. 
An additional risk in majority employee/management buyouts was presented by 
the financial assistance rendered by the firm being bought-out. 
The buyers' intention to pay off the debts incurred during the buyout from the fir-
m ' s future revenues was in essence in line with the expectations of Western investors. 
Peculiar to Hungary was the practice of having the company targeted for purchase con-
tribute to the down-payment necessary for the loan. Among the companies in our sam-
ple it was quite common for the workers to pay the down-payment on the purchase out 
of excess wages, bonuses, or loans granted by the company, all drawn from the firm's 
profits. These resources originated from the firm's earlier profits, from the sale of some 
assets, from the utilization of idle rental properties, or from the 20 percent of the pur-
chase price refunded on the basis of the transformation law. 
At the time of share subscription or credit application, two companies even 
attempted to stimulate their employees to even greater levels of risk by rewarding larg-
er subscriptions with larger bonuses. 
The management of firms destined for sale also tried to assist the employee buyout 
by signing off on the feasibility study required for the ESOP group's credit application 
submitted by the employee s-which naturally included the managers. The firm's direc-
tors provided collateral security for the credit application submitted by employees/man-
agement, and allowed the firm's assets and its order-book to serve as collateral for buy-
out credits. 
The greatest help, however, for these firms came from a preference by law avail-
able only to ESOP groups. According to this preference, the firm to be bought out may 
tum over 20 percent of its pre-tax profits to the participating employees as an extraordi-
nary outlay. (Thus the repayment of the credits was financed from this tax-free source 
and dividends taken together.) 
Through these various forms of assistance granted to employees buying out their 
company, in reality the former owner-i.e. the state-contributed to the purchase. If a 
company goes bankrupt, the capital granted for its purchase is also lost. Thus the state, 
to the extent of this assistance, shoulders risk instead of the new owners. 
THE ROLE OF BANKS 
The firms almost exclusively approached commercial banks for credits. In the search 
for partners, which at some firms took several months, each manager personally visited 
at least two-four commercial banks. Among the financial institutions the managers 
experienced widely differing attitudes and expertise as regards buyouts. 
The firms generally chose that bank which offered the lowest rates and the longest 
term and accepted the collateral that the firm was able to provide. Of the 17 firms in our 
sample two did not have to resort to outside resources to finance the purchase. The other 
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firms generally covered a significant portion of the purchase price through loans; 
indeed, 11 of the 15 firms which received credits, financed more than 70 percent of the 
purchase from loans. 
Following the introduction of the preferential Existence Credit (E-Credit)19 for 
privatizations, the only difference remaining between'the banks was in their acceptance 
of collateral, as the law mandated uniform interest rates, service charges, the necessary 
down-payment and the maximum term and grace period. With the passage of the ESOP 
law the collateral also became more regulated, as it contained detailed rules concerning 
the bank lien over property of ESOP groups, the compulsory utilization of dividends for 
loan repayment, and responsibility for the management of the firm's assets. 
E-Credit, which became more and more favorable in the name of stimulating 
domestic privatization demand, "whetted the appetite" of ever more employee collec-
tives (management) for their own companies. In essence the only control over these 
plans was that exerted by the bank's credit assessment, which weighed the risk repre-
sented by the given company against the collateral the firm was able to offer to mitigate 
this risk. This meant that in reality the banks did the primary screening of these offers, 
while the State Property Agency conducted a secondary screening. 
Though the vast majority of the firms in our sample were profitable at the time of 
privatization, of the deals approved by the SPA "which utilized ESOP as a privatization 
technique, 90 percent were barely profitable."20 Most publications dealing with this 
topic21 considered an 18-20 percent rate of profitability sufficient for a privatized firm 
to repay credits. Thus, it can be expected that after the three-year grace period the buy-
out groups will face serious difficulties. 
The banks used every possible method to protect themselves against the possibili-
ty of non-performance, though in some cases the decision to grant credit was not made 
primarily on business grounds. 
As the feasibility studies prepared by firms contained many uncertainties, and in 
many cases the banks had neither the manpower nor the expertise to make a profession-
al appraisal of the venture's future, the banks concentrated on the examination of prop-
erty guarantees and coverage available when the credit was being granted. The value of 
the security demanded usually amounted to one and a half times the total value of the 
loan. In addition, the bank occasionally had the shares placed into trusts or ordered spot 
collections on current accounts. Sometimes it even demanded share options at the orig-
inal purchase price.22 The requirement for the bought-out firm to present a guarantor 
was a part of the credit contract even before it was mandated by the ESOP law. 
Every single bank granting credits insisted that the firm in question bank exclu-
sively with them, thus enabling the bank to observe the financial workings of the firm. 
In addition, they gained a long-term client who would utilize their services for all future 
banking needs. Banks exercised control not only through examining accounts of the 
19 In Hungary it is possible to obtain loans for buyouts on favourable terms, as a special loan facility is available 
exclusively to Hungarian investors. The interest rate on these loans is 75% of the central bank base rate. Com-
mercial banks are allowed to add up to 4% as commission. 
20 Félreértések... [1992] p. 5. 
21 Jelentés a magyar... [1993] p. 119., Vanicsek [1993], Borbély [1993] p. 25., Boros [1993] p. 25. 
22 Réti [1992], Nagy [1993], Rajna [1993] 
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given firm. Credit contracts usually stipulated "information and control rights" con-
cerning the firm's operation and financial affairs. 
In practice this was achieved in different ways. At one firm, for example, the bank 
inspected the company's books and examined semi-annually the profits. In one case a 
representative of the bank even claimed a seat on the privatized company's board of 
directors, thus gaining access to the organization's operations.23 
Though it did not affect the firms in our sample, a new institution began operations 
in early 1993. It was established to offer guarantees for ventures which though promis-
ing could not provide the necessary guarantees. The Credit Guarantee Co. Ltd. was 
authorized to assume risk up to HUF 100 million and up to 80 percent of the required 
collateral. Since this institution became involved, the level of collateral has dropped 
from one and a half times the size of the loan to just 70 percent. Thus, it is no accident 
that most of this new institution's clients were employee groups.24 
With the assumption of partial guarantee the largest obstacle to credit applications 
for buyouts was eliminated, thus almost ensuring a massive increase in the demand for 
credit. With a little exaggeration it can be said that due to this new opportunity neither 
the firm's nor its ability to provide property guarantees would have a real impact on the 
decision to grant credit for buyouts. In this manner, at the mainly state-owned banks, 
political criteria could gain a voice in the selection process. The Financial Research 
Ltd.'s report25 on privatization reinforces this statement:"... the willingness of banks to 
grant credit is often influenced by factors outside business considerations, such as per-
sonal contacts and, occasionally, the exercise of political will."26 
Banks also try to reduce risk in these privatization loans by requesting the person-
al participation of the bought-out firm's managers in the deal. At one company the 
"bank would only offer credit to the managers, or to the workers, on the condition that 
the other group also invest in the firm."22 
Thus, the banks prefer that management occupy a dominant position in the buyout 
group, as this way they bear personal risk. According to the banks, the contribution of 
managers to the purchase is a sign of their motivation and seriousness of purpose. It is 
no accident that the banks always inspected the statutes of the buyout group giving 
them information on the breakdown of ownership proportions. This position of the 
banks was not in total harmony with SPA practice, which attempted to screen out those 
ESOP buyouts which were actually management buyouts.28 
The desire to divide and decrease risks and the commercial banks' decisive refusal 
to back promising deals lacking proper guarantees showed that the banks, essentially 
23 Boda-Karsai [1993] p.8. 
24 H.L. [1993.] 
25 Jelentés gazdaságunk... [1993] p. 150. 
25 "Day after day we hear reports that as regards the distribution of Existence Credits necessary to carry out 
employee-management buyouts, the old guard of politically compromised company managers are not even 
attempting to secure such loans. Members of a new guard possessing local influence and close to the parties of 
the ruling coalition have a much better chance in the competition for credits." Voszka [ 1992/b] 
27 Réti [1992] 
28 Recently the SPA has begun to consider joint ESOP and MBO deals felicitous, as this makes is possible to 
avoid granting employee preferences to manager-led groups. 
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the only source of financing for buyouts, neither wanted to nor were able to assume 
risks for deals with uncertain returns. 
"It is not for commercial banks to finance risky deals," they say. And they are 
right. Credit is not the most appropriate form for financing these types of ventures, as 
capital contributions would entail a much smaller initial burden. These deals would ide-
ally be financed by the inclusion of co-owners subscribing to normal shares which 
could be traded. 
Co-owners willing to provide financing, though they receive a share of the profits 
through dividends, are not motivated solely by dividends. They play the market, hoping 
to sell their shares later at a profit. (Their experience and expertise, gained during prior 
investments, enable them to enhance the buyout's chances for success.) 
Financiers-venture capital and entrepreneurial stock corporations-willing and 
capable of assuming the risks associated with buyouts can only operate through well-
developed money and capital markets. It is too soon to expect the establishment of such 
corporations given the present underdeveloped state of Hungarian money and capital 
markets. "The great majority of savings are for the short term and thus unsuitable for 
long-term capital investments, and furthermore the growth- and long-term-investment-
oriented, serious entrepreneurial stratum willing to place their own capital (assets) at 
risk is quite narrow."2® 
Thus, in Hungary majority employee/management buyouts are financed by com-
mercial banks, though this is not one of their intended functions. As there are few trust-
worthy, good debtors among credit applicants, and only very few investments prove 
worthwhile, the majority of these deals are very risky. Furthermore, this risk is exacer-
bated by the magnitude of the credit burden assumed during buyout. This is why com-
mercial banks try to distribute their risk. They compensate themselves by acquiring 
ownership. They pass on part of the risk to a state institution established to grant guar-
antees, part to a central bank offering discount rates, and part to the members of the 
buyout group. This latter group bears only a tiny proportion of the risk as their own con-
tribution to the financing of the deal is extraordinarily small. In reality, it is the state 
who bears their risk as well, to the extent that they complement their own capital contri-
bution with capital drawn from the firm to be bought out. It is obvious then that the dis-
tribution of risk is equivalent to passing it on to the state. For as the owner of the com-
mercial banks, the National Bank of Hungary, the Credit Guarantee Co. Ltd. and the 
bought-out firm the state bears the risk.30 (The situation is the same in the cases of leas-
ing, installment payments or property management. Here the state bears the risk not as 
the majority owner of a commercial bank, but through the State Property Agency, a 
state institution.) 
* * * 
Summing up the characteristics of Hungarian MBOs, we can state that in compari-
son with Western constructions, the players are quite different and risk-takers are espe-
cially missing. 
29 Varga [1993], and see also, László [1993] 
30 Voszka [ 1992/b], [ 1993/b], [ 1993/c] 
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MBOs are financed primarily by credit which-in the absence of partners willing to 
investmakes these deals extremely expensive and risky. Due to the underdevelopment 
of the financial infrastructure, i.e. the stock market, not only it is hard to locate willing 
investors, but even when they are present their interest is dampened by the difficulty of 
getting out of deals. 
The fundamental economic conditions for the proliferation of MBOs include the 
improvement of the Hungarian economic situation, economic growth, drop in inflation 
and a concurrent decrease in interest rates. These conditions are important for all new 
ventures and are indispensable for deals financed in large part by credit. The number of 
ventures offering a favorable opportunity for management buyouts will probably only 
increase noticeably when the buying and selling of shares and quotas becomes itself an 
attractive investment form in Hungary. 
However, a straightforward political decision is also required if economic consid-
erations are to be emphasized in the participation of management in privatization. In 
this case the otherwise natural process by which management breaks into the ranks of 
ownership thanks to its expertise and personal contacts could take place in the open. 
Following this decision, it would become possible for managers, possessing the profes-
sional and entrepreneurial expertise, as well as the capital, necessary to take risks, to 
purchase companies. This would be one way for companies to be transferred to profit-
oriented owners capable of attracting capital, in contrast to the present situation in 
which workers lacking sufficient capital become owners. 
53 M A N A G E M E N T B U Y O U T S IN HUNGARY 
LIST OF REFERENCES 
B. Á. (1992): Félreértések az MRP kapcsán (Misunderstandings in connection with 
MBOs). Privinfo, No. 13., p. 40. 
Boda Dorottya-Karsai Judit (1993): Magad Uram... (You should do it yourself if you 
don't have a servant) [Presentation at a workshop conference on "Unemployment 
in Hungary" held in Seregélyes between September 9 and 11] 
Borbély Szilvia (1993): A vezetői tulajdonszerzés lehetőségei és esetei Magyarorszá-
gon (Possibilities for management buyouts in Hungary, and some examples.) 
Manuscript. June 10. 
Boros András (1993): Technika és finanszírozás (Technology and financing). Figyelő, 
May 20. 
Cz. V. (1993/a) : Átlagosan egymillió forintot kaptak (They got one million Forints on 
average). Napi Világgazdaság, July 3. 
Félreértések az MRP kapcsán II (Misunderstandings in connection with MBOs, II.) 
(1992): Privinfo, No. 17., p. 5. 
H. L. (1993): Működni kezdett a Hitelgarancia Rt. (The Credit Guarantee Co. Ltd. 
began operations). Magyar Hírlap, July 6. 
Jelentés a magyar privatizációról 1992 (Report on Hungarian privatization in 1992.) 
(1993): Privatizációs Kutatóintézet, March. 
Jelentés gazdaságunk 1992. évi helyzetéről (Report on Hungary's economy in 1992). 
(1993): Jelentések az alagútból, Pénzügykutató Rt., May. 
Karsai Judit (1991): "Hiteles" vezetők. MBO ügyletek külföldi és hazai tapasztalatai 
("Creditworthy" managers. Foreign and domestic experience with MBOs.) 
Közgazdasági Szemle, No. 9, pp. 872-887. 
Karsai Judit (1993/a): Management buyout — külföldön és itthon (Management buyout 
- abroad and in Hungary). Külgazdaság, No. 2, pp. 26-33. 
Karsai Judit (1993/b): Álruhában (In disguise). Figyelő, March 25, p. 17. 
K. G. (1993): Diczházi: Az MRP bajjal járhat (Diczházi: ESOP might go hand-in-hand 
with trouble.) Figyelő, March 11, p. 7. 
Lajtai György (1993): Az alkalmazotti kivásárlás szerepe a vállalatok privatizációjában 
(The role of employee buyouts in the privatization of companies.) Ipari Szemle, 
No. 1, PP-31-32. 
László András (1993): Hiányzó tőkepiac (The absence of the capital market.) Napi 
Világgazdaság, July 1, p. 14. 
Mészáros László (1993): Privatizáció vezetői kivásárlással (Privatization through man-
agement buyout.) ÁVÜ Privatizációs Füzetek 16, Építésügyi Tájékoztatási 
Központ, Budapest 
Nagy Ildikó (1993): Gyökeret vert az MRP? (Did ESOP take root?) Magyar Hírlap, 
July 16, p. 13. 
N. G. (1993/a): Munkavállalói résztulajdonlás a gyakorlatban (Employee share owner-
ship in practice.) Napi Világgazdaság, January 15. 
N. G. (1993/b): Jogi bizonytalanság az MRP-k körül (Legal uncertainties surrounding 
ESOPs.) Napi Világgazdaság, September 4. 
N. I. (1993): ÁVÜ: sikeres az önprivatizáció (SPA: self-privatization is a success.) 
Magyar Hírlap, July 6. 
5 4 M A N A G E M E N T B U Y O U T S IN HUNGARY 
Rajnai Györgyi (1993): Módosítani kell az MRP-törvényt (ESOP law should be modi-
fied) [An interview with János Lukács, head of Rész-Vétel Foundation and mem-
ber of SPA's board of directors], Magyar Hírlap, March 12,p. 10. 
A részvétel a fontos? (Is participation the main thing?) (1993): [An interview with 
János Lukács, head of Rész-Vétel Foundation and member of SPA's board of 
directors]. Heti Világgazdaság, July 17, p. 91. 
Réti Pál (1992): Vezérgondolat (Guiding idea). Heti Világgazdaság, November 7. 
Szabó Tamás (1993): A magánosítás három éve és előzményei (The three years of pri-
vatization and its antecedents.) Állami Vagyonügynökség, July. 
Tények a privatizációról (Facts on privatization) (1993/a): ÁVÜ-közlöny, Heti Privin-
fo, No. 16, October 5, p. 13. 
Tények a privatizációról (Facts on privatization) (1993/b): Privinfo, No. 17, p. 35. 
Vanicsek Mária (1993): MRP, tehát tulajdonos dolgozók és vezetők (ESOP, that is, 
owner-workers and -managers.) Népszabadság, March 18. 
Varga György (1993): Illúziók nélkül (Without illusions.) Figyelő, October 7, р.З. 
Voszka Éva (1992/a): Kerülőutak, ösvények, zsákutcák. Privatizáció 1991-ben 
(Detours, paths and dead ends. Privatization in 1991.) Közgazdasági Szemle, No. 
6, pp. 513-524. 
Voszka Éva (1992/b): Privatizáció: kockázatos "keresletélénkítés" (Privatization: a 
risky way of "stimulating demand".) Népszabadság, December 8. 
Voszka Éva (1993/a): Két úr szolgája (Az önprivatizációról) (The servant of two mas-
ters-on self-privatization) in "Jelentések az alagútból". Pénzügykutató Rt., Janu-
ary. 
Voszka Éva (1993/b): Magánvagyonok-közösségi kockázatok (Private means-public 
risks.) Népszabadság, July 23, p. 12. 
Voszka Éva (1993/c): E nélkül nehezebb, de kinek? (It is more difficult without this, but 
for whom?) Figyelő, September 9, p. 17. 
Zsubori (1993): Túl a kétszázadik eladáson (Beyond the two hundredth sale.) Figyelő, 
July 15. 
C O R P O R A T E M A N A G E M E N T 
G á b o r H O V Á N Y I 
• 
Corporate management concepts 
and methods 
in a multidimensional crisis situation 
INTRODUCTION: THE THREE TYPES OF CRISES 
In happy market economies there are two main types of crises distinguished. The par-
tial crisis develops in a particular area (plant, factory, etc.), or function (as problem of 
production, labour management, liquidity, etc.) of the corporation. In this case, the 
main task is: isolation and solution of the crisis, then incorporation of the cured unit, or 
function into the activity of the entire company. (I call this as "soft landing" crisis man-
agement [Hov nyi, 1992]). Generally, in market economies there is a special crisis 
management "team" established to eliminate the partial crisis. 
The second type of crisis is the total corporate crisis. In this case, the whole com-
pany is in a crisis situation which endangers the firm's survival. At that time, there is 
nothing to isolate with mostly heavy casualties (drastic lay-offs, withdrawal from mar-
kets, perhaps selling-off parts of the company, etc.) the remaining parts of the company 
should be set afloat. (I name this as "quick take off" crisis management [Hov nyi, 
1992]). Generally, in total crisis, new corporate management or a professional crisis 
management team takes over the firm's control. 
In the past decades, both types of crises reached the companies of developed mar-
ket economies, in more or less stable economic environment, under the conditions of a 
growing economy, sometimes of stagnation or mild recession. Neither new economic 
policies nor new economic regulations of a government coming into office caused stag-
gering changes in the economic environment of the companies. At most, companies of 
crisis industries might have complained about the general crisis of their close surround-
ings, but despite that, their wider environment -the national and regional economic 
environment-remained more or less stable, which gave an important basis for recovery. 
Crisis situation of the Hungarian companies-first of all, of the large industrial cor-
porations-can be listed in a third-type one. The total corporate crisis hit them in "unsta-
ble" economic environment, more precisely under environmental conditions of deep 
national economic and also regional crisis. These "unfortunate events" are well-known: 
national economy touched by recession, high inflation rate, low level infrastructure; 
inconsistencies of economic policy on government level, its "overdeveloped" institu-
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tional structure; low efficiency of the welfare system, huge deficit, big government cen-
tralization of profits with re-distributions; mostly obsolete technology in many compa-
nies and lack of financial resources; "softening quality" of human resources, decline of 
quality discipline, of performance inclination, of creative entrepreneurial view and atti-
tude (not once, which were induced by environmental conditions); finally, regionally, 
collapse of the corporations' ex-COMECON markets and insolvency of traditional 
business partners on these markets. Characteristics of this third-type crisis situation is 
that the crisis does not only appear on company level, sometimes in an industrial 
branch, but 1) on higher levels: in the entire national economy, in certain cases, in eco-
nomic regions representing significant parts of the import and export market - and 2) on 
lower levels: also in the human resources, including both the managers and their subor-
dinates. Therefore, I call this the multi-dimensional crisis of the companies. 
In view of the recovery, the basic question is in a multidimensional crisis: will the 
company find new markets where it could sell making profits moreover, with such 
result that ensures not only its liquidity but also the necessary technical and economic 
developments, that is, its long term survival. And the acquisition of a new market 
requires new products mostly a new product line, in order to have those, new technolo-
gy, huge investments, higher productivity, renewed organization and management are 
necessary. In case of such crisis, the question also should be answered: if the adverse 
domestic environment remains unchanged, under what particular conditions can a Hun-
garian corporation be successful in a new external market? I call the solution of this 
third type crisis situation as "emergency take-off [Hoványi, 1992]. 
The big question of Hungarian companies-primarily, of the large industrial corpo-
rations-is the following: in what way can this third type, multi-dimensional crisis situa-
tion be resolved? what kind of corporation concepts and management methods may 
help the recovery? in given cases, what kind of government actions are required to stim-
ulate the recovery? 
HUNGARIAN CRISIS MANAGEMENT ATTITUDES 
Loosing markets is the characteristics of the majority of Hungarian industrial corpora-
tions, and the 40-50% drop in production coming with it, drastically reduced their 
incomes and increased their unit costs. That is why companies are squeezed by every 
day worries of insolvency. Moreover, the high interest rates on loans taken to maintain 
liquidity (the rates follow the up-swinging inflation) put further financial burden on 
companies. As a result, fewer and fewer companies are able to pay their suppliers the 
equivalent for delivered materials, components, sub-assemblies, etc. Thus was bom the 
"company debt-circle" which further worsened the financial situation of those who 
were in it. Living in this series of events, one group of the Hungarian crisis managers 
see this as liquidity crisis, and fight for individual tax reduction, debt conversion to 
equity, more favorable loans. This "survival strategy" was followed, for example, by 
the management of Precision Mechanics Corporation. In the background of its thinking, 
the hope was hidden that the lost COMECON external markets will reopen again rela-
tively soon, and growth in the Hungarian economy would take off significantly, 
increasing both foreign and home demand. 
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The other group of Hungarian crisis managers responded to the challenge with re-
organization. This was the re-organizational crisis management. Mostly big corpora-
tions i.e. Dunaferr, Taurus-have chosen this road establishing profitcenters, divisions, 
smaller but independent business units within their organization. These mostly LLC 
form units were expected to help the company's recovery with flexible business policy 
and financing, quick adaptation to market opportunities, afficiant profit orientation. But 
re-organization rarely reached its objective: the market adaptation, flexible business 
policy, etc. should have needed investments, and the LLCs had neither capital nor cred-
itability-and their new independent units only increased the number of employees with-
in the company's decentralized functional organizations (marketing, accountancy)-
what was not compensated by the increase of productivity. Because of all that the re-
organizational crisis management did not prove itself as the way out... 
The sell-off of company units, and the use of the income derived from that to set 
afloat the company, is a well-known and sound method of crisis management in market 
economies. The Hungarian crisis managers also tried to sell-off some parts of their 
company but the result has been far behind the usual that could be reached with this 
method in market economies. There are more reasons for that. The Hungarian crisis 
managers wished to get rid of loosing company units in a tight squeeze situation which 
kept offered prices low. In a stagnating economy there were no investors lining up and 
this lack of competition pushed prices further below. The modest income of sold com-
pany units was simply swallowed by the debt stock of the remaining ones thus, practi-
cally, there were no significant resources left for setting afloat the company. This is 
well demonstrated in the example of Gamma Works. In multi-dimensional crisis situa-
tion, therefore, in case of a fairly indebted company, its chances for constructive recov-
ery by sale of company units are not rosy (Török, 1993). 
A new group of crisis managers-conforming to modern views-believed that 
acquisition of new markets is the key in resolving the crisis. This is possible if there are 
competitive products and intention to acquire markets is paired with efficient market-
ing concepts and actions. Although, this type of marketing-view crisis management was 
rare, mostly because a large part of the companies did not have competitive products or 
available resources for establishing such products; market acquisition was made diffi-
cult because of lack of their knowledge of the competitive markets, their vague market-
ing concepts, their enervate marketing actions, and as a conclusion of all these that they 
could break into the competitive markets with heavy price sacrifices only. (Mostly, that 
is why the few "successful" financial results of marketing-view crisis management lag 
far behind the theoretically possible ones.) 
As we've seen, after the described, rather doubtfully successful crisis management 
concepts, the question arises: What are the roots of Hungarian crisis management prob-
lems, where should start, in majority of the cases, the crises management concepts 
from? I see this startpoint in technology orientation: in majority of the crisis situations, 
crisis managers have to create and realize the recovery plan by analyzing the given facts 
and possibilities of the state and development of the company's technology. The funda-
mental facts and possibilities are demonstrated and amalgamated into series of steps in 
the 1st table. The start is dual: 
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1. Assessing whether the company has modern technology, can its technology be 
modernized with small investment, or it is mostly obsolete, therefore, may be modern-
ized with very big investment only. 
2. Assessing whether the company's technology may be divided into individually 
useful parts according to different businesses, or the technology can function only as 
integrated unit in a closed system. (Example for the latter is the technology of an oil 
refinery). 
After this starting point follows the definition of the required steps in areas of 
investment requirement, organization structure, privatisation (taking into account also 
the possible new owners), expected technology level, product development, marketing, 
human resource management and company management. Characteristics of this tech-
nology oriented crisis management method is partly the complex problem appreciation, 
partly that it shows a clear direction for the crisis managers in modifications of the com-
paniy's organization, the ways of privatisation, the targets of HRM, etc. 
The situation is different if the company has a well developed new product idea 
which promises a break through in the markets and the company's recovery may be 
realized with it. In this case the crisis management built on innovative product idea 
comes to forefront. The innovative charasteristics may derive from technical novelty, 
cost and price advantage, breaking into new areas of consumptions, product develop-
ments satisfying entirely new users, etc. Establishing such concepts have their partial 
tasks and one by one steps. Such series of steps are shown in figure 1. presenting at each 
step also the possible variants of technology modernisation and privatisation. This con-
cept with the steps also covers the entire action of crisis management from gathering the 
new product ideas to the realization of the marketing plan, the selling of the produced 
goods. 
A big possibility of Hungarian crisis management is privatisation of the company 
in crisis. Though, it must be known that only such an investor is willing to buy a corpo-
ration in crisis who has a clear idea how to recover the company, or-in case of a profes-
sional investor-who wants to eliminate its competitor and win its markets. If he wishes 
to recover the company and provides the necessary capital, in most cases, new products 
and (in part) new technology are linked to the captal, also productivity will be taylored 
to international standards, the investor's existing marketing practices and selling exper-
tise gained on world market, will be transferred-and to all these contributions one more 
factor will be added: its own CEO or topmanagers. Apparently, this is proven by 
Tungsram's example after the takeover by GE (Thurow, 1991). The company can well 
escape from the crisis with this type of privatisation, though, probably there are just a 
few Hungarian crisis manager unless close to retirement, or able to convince the pro-
fessional investor about their suitability, or counting on other type of advantages from 
the investor, who are for the chance of the company's recovery-willing to put their 
neck under the hatchet of an executor... 
Particular privatisation method of crisis management is the management buy-out. 
A prepared crisis manager intends to do that if he/she has a very clear concept for elim-
inating the crisis-but is not able to realize it under the present ownership conditions. 
Management buy-out can be useful also in the frame of a general privatisation process, 
when the crisis manager can buy only some of the company's assets what happens not 
once in Hungary. Of course, the crisis manager needs also capital and entrepreneurial 
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ability besides the buy-out concept. But if these are there, then it is less risky sometimes 
to start a brand new enterprise than to set afloat a bankrupt one. The crises manager may 
decide nevertheless for a buy-out because he does not have enough capital for an inde-
pendent enterprise, or the company's (partial) assets may be bought under quite favor-
able conditions. Many examples are known in Hungary about artificial devaluation of 
company assets and this way acquired unfair wealth-but this does not bring us to the 
conclusion that there would be an obvious correlation between the real value of buy-out 
price and the chance of recovery. A new resale of the company on a value which is clos-
er to its real value than the one that was paid before-which may bring "MBO extra prof-
it" to the crisis manager-slows down the recovery by all means. 
NATIONAL ECONOMIC DIMENSION OF THE CRISIS SITUATION 
The crisis manager of a Hungarian company senses the national economic crisis day by 
day: decreasing demand on domestic market, business partners equalize their bill late, 
the government is trying to balance its budget with larger tax burdens, new credit 
(which would be necessary to maintain solvency and finance developments of the com-
pany) becomes more difficult to get and it is more and more difficult to pay back the 
acquired credits and its interests because sales volume is decreasing, this way price 
income is less and less but interests are increasing because of inflation which follows 
the economic recession, etc. Theoretically, in a multi-dimensional crisis situation, 
mainly those Hungarian companies keep their viability which can profitably sell their 
whole production, or most of it, on external competitive markets. (In practice, however, 
the problem is not so simple: most industrial corporations are linked to the participants 
of the domestic economy with numerous purchases and co-operative connections, its 
activity has to follow the Hungarian regulations and its financial management is built 
into the Hungarian financial system, etc. Because of that even selling its whole output 
on Western markets wouldn't be an insurance to defend the company against the crisis.) 
The companies, that also sell on internal markets in big proportion, are not able to 
overcome the multi-dimensional crisis by themselves: they expect overall provisions 
from the government to help induce the growth of the national economy thus creating 
favorable environmental conditions for recovery. This expectation is very strong and 
has the disadvantage that some crisis managers do less than what would be possible in 
order to get out of the crisis because they are waiting for "helping" government regula-
tions. 
Initiating economic growth is a very difficult operation though, which can happen 
in a complicated power field where contradictory factors have effects on each other. 
The effects of government regulations-according to classical perception-condense on 
four key areas: economic growth, inflation, unemployment and financial position of the 
national economy (state budget deficit, foreign-trade balance, size of foreign liabilities, 
etc.) In case of the latter three favorable changes may take place which can help eco-
nomic growth. For example, decreasing unemployment increases buying power, mod-
eration of budget deficit may reduce levy and with it may stimulate enterpreneurship, 
investments, etc. But economic growth may come with unfavorable changes on the lat-
ter three. For example more advanced technology and higher productivity may result in 
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lower prices, therefore production and sale may grow-but in consequence of automa-
tion, the number of lay-offs and thus unemployment may grow too, the government can 
help economic growth with the development of infrastructure, and may widen employ-
ment thus buying power-but development can cause large deficit in the state budget, 
etc. That is why the government must consider whether the disadvantages coming with 
the obtainable (hoped) advantages on the latter three key areas will remain within 
acceptable range? 
In case of a multi-dimensional crisis, the crisis managers should not just wait for 
such government regulations (which are based hopefully on a complex efficiency 
analysis) but should forecast also their expected consequences. Only this way can the 
manager work out a real crisis plan. He can prepare this qite complicated and, obvious-
ly, multi-variant forecast by following a general model, "comer points" of which are 
created by figures of expected economic growth, inflation, unemployment and charac-
teristic financial balance of the economy. Based on these he can reckon with the most 
significant economic tasks of the government-then from effect analysis of measure 
variations to realize these-he may establish his own macro-economic scenarios, that is 
his own, complex forecast variations [Hoványi, 1993]. Such general model has been 
shown in figure 2. The crisis manager has to consider three types of effects in the 
model: 
1. Measures brought to solve particular government tasks influence other govern-
ment tasks and may modify their challenge. 
2. Government measures effect the value, of the four "comer points". 
3. The value of each "comer point" has an effect on the other ones, too. 
It is worth to make some remarks in connection with the macro-ecomic dimension 
from the point of view of the crisis manager. 
- The pull out force of economic growth in a multi-dimensional crisis is the Hun-
garian corporations' technical-technological modernisation (which requires significant 
investments, i.e. mainly foreign capital), and the abmpt increase in numbers of the 
SMEs. Because of lack of capital at home and decreasing willingness of foreign 
investors to invest, the main driving force of economic growth in Hungary can be the 
area of small and medium size companies: this should have been recognized by the gov-
ernment in time (2-3 years ago). The economic growth started by the SMEs may create 
favorable conditions also for the recovery of big corporations-which then may speed up 
both the small and mid-size sphere's development and the growth of national economy 
by a sort of multiplicating effect. 
- The widening export and its contribution to the growth of GDP is very important. 
But the start of economic growth without the quickening of internal markets is not 
enough for the recovery of a wider circle of big corporations in a multi-dimensional cri-
sis. Similarly, without significant and lasting growth of export for competitive markets, 
big corporations can not or can only temporarily stand up. Therefore, widening of inter-
nal markets and growing export for competitive markets are both necessary require-
ments of lasting economic growth. 
- It makes the forecasting of the macro-economic dimension of the crisis easier for 
the crisis manager if the government makes effect studies for establishing its own con-
cepts and regulations, and also publicizes the findings of those studies. (Modem gov-
ernment work requires these publicized studies, primarily in the economic field-which 
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comes together with the risk that by the gap of the calculated and ensued effect, Parlia-
ment, press and society alike may better check the government's ability.) 
- The effect study of planned government concepts and regulationshas to be made 
by the government also to make it able to bring decisions based on strictly economic 
facts and connections instead of preconceptions or ideological convictions. One lesson 
of the Hungarian crisis situations is that ideologies never make forget-at least on long 
term- the absence of economic results but economic results make forget the lack of ide-
ologies on long term as well... 
HUMAN RESOURCES IN THE MULTI-DIMENSIONAL CRISIS 
According to the well known motivation system of Maslow, one strive for security after 
satisfying its physiological needs then wishes to be member of a society; after that 
wants to have its environment's acknowledgement and, if getting all that, tries to per-
form and realize itself in every day work (Maslow, 1954). Today in the Hungarian 
multi-dimensional crisis, living standards worsened, unemployment has grown and 
threatens more and more people. In this double squeeze people are less motivated for 
their environment's acknowledgement or for realizing themselves in their every day 
work; the basic interests have been keeping the job (i.e. security) and at least the 
approximate maintenance of earlier established living standards (many times with 
overtime, a second job etc.). However, in particular layers of society-consisting mostly 
of retired people and of big families having many children-the attention already con-
centrates on physiological needs. 
Because of worsening living standards, the role of income creation among motiva-
tions, therefore, increases and of non-financial motivations (acknowledgement, profes-
sional career, self realization, etc.) decreases. Consequently, in multi-dimensional crisis 
situations, financial incentives are the most important motivatig tools for performance 
growth, for avoiding the crisis or for the recovery from it. Of course, a company hit by 
the crisis does not have plenty of financial resources. This internal contradiction of the 
need and the possibility of motivation may be softened, though not dissolved for the 
employees by the fear of the company's liquidation and unemployment which follows 
that. Though, this fear will not urge for what there is utmost necessity in a crisis: inno-
vation and creativity. 
In a multi-dimensional crisis situation not only the mentioned internal contradic-
tion curbs the contribution of human resources to solve the crisis. Obstacles of the solu-
tion are loose work and quality disciplines and low level of work intensity. All these 
have historical reasons-as well as the development of multi-dimensional crisis situation 
itself. Work and quality disciplines got loose, primarily, because the measure of 
achievements had not (or rarely) been the individual or teamwork: many times political 
attitude or political or economic relations counted more. Low wage levels did not stim-
ulate intensive work either. Calling to account for violation of work and quality rules 
were not frequent because in most of such cases superiors themselves had a finger in the 
pie. Workers did not have to worry about lay-off either: employment was constitution-
ally guaranteed, and the change of job came with rather increased than decreased 
income. The twisted wage and income control of the companies did not inspire for liq-
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uidation of the so called "within doors unemployment", and it is well known that redun-
dant number of employees holds back all performance. Poor organisation, the lack of 
materials and tools creating stand stills should be taken into account as attenuating cir-
cumstance, or rather elicit cause; intensive work can not be expected if employees, 
through no fault of their own, had to wonder around their workplace for hours. 
All these soaked into the employees. That is why, if a Hungarian crisis mana-
ger-using an exceptional possibility-wants to pay well the work and quality disciplines 
and the growth of productivity, the workers, even though they set this object, were 
sometimes not able to do it physiquely. (A good example of it was the objection of Hun-
garian skilled workers during their training program in the Suzuki factory in Japan). 
Quick and effective "deployment" of human resources to resolve the company cri-
sis is many times curbed by lack of the needed professional expertise. Though, the pro-
fessional knowledge of Hungarian skilled workers is generally good, the most recent or 
near to that technology would require continuation courses of the trade. There is rarely 
time and energy for that in a multi-dimensional crisis where the company struggles for 
mere existance and survival. And such course of professional development can only be 
started if the company's management clearly sees the major tasks of recovery, includ-
ing the main requirements of the renewal of the technology. Without these, training and 
development is only blind men's target practice... 
At last, not once insufficiencies of way of thinking block the key role of human 
resources in getting out of the crisis. Individual initiatives, entrepreneurship, innovative 
view and attitude breaking through walls of backwardness have been forced into the 
background on the last decades' social scale of values. Work culture declined, the level 
of its base, general culture also did. Neverthless, the company that has worn out of 
competitive markets or has not even reached them, can only be successful on these if an 
overall innovative atmosphere is created by the management and the company's prod-
ucts can prove the high work culture of its employees. All these are almost impossible 
to develop during the few months of crisis management, especially if generations grew 
up guided by requirements for carelessness contradictory to these ones. It is true that a 
number of Hungarian employees' inherited frame of mind make the innovative view 
and attitude succeed easier, makes the work culture take form in technical development, 
production and marketing, etc. Also there are characters "built" for a competitive mar-
ket, in those real enterpreneurs the change of of values and attitude happened nearly 
overnight. But at wide layers of the employees can be felt that education of an innova-
tive view and attitude, a really high work culture will better be started in the future in 
kindergartens. Certainly, this reaches beyond a crisis management's time horizon: this 
is the task of crisis management on the national level. 
SPECIAL GROUPS OF PROCEDURES IN CRISIS MANAGEMENT 
The success of multi-dimensional crisis management depends mainly on the recovery 
concept. For the right concept, the causes, particularities and cross effects of the crisis 
has to be seen clearly in all dimensions; then the way out of the crisis has to be found. 
The crisis manager needs sharp critical sight and a creating mind for developing the 
concept. 
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The good concept must also be realized that requires organisation, management 
and continuous control. By organisation, the manager creates a concept-realizing new 
company organization; by management, he regulates and stimulates the functioning of 
the organization to realize the goals of the concept; by control, he not only monitors the 
degree of realization but also decides if the recovery's original concept needs modifica-
tions in consequence of the, mostly, fast changing environment. 
By our days, number of manegarial procedures (methods) have been developed for 
the more efficient execution of management tasks and activities. Some of the proce-
dures have been used also by crisis managers. But professionals of management theory 
have not looked over whether the modem managerial theories can be applied in special 
groups to crisis management; if yes, then what grouping procedures may be recom-
mended mostly; and with how much synergy effect will the co-ordinated procedure 
groups increase the success of crisis management. 
I am seeking the answer for the management procedure groups' application in 
multi-dimensional crisis situation by introducing a "composed" group in the following. 
During that I'll shortly refer to the essence of certain procedures drawn into the group: I 
assume that all these are well known-with the exeption of the only new one which is 
shown in figure 4. (Hoványi, 1993)-by managers and theoretical professionals. 
The crisis management should start with a precise situation audit. In this, the 
SWOT matrix technique may provide help for the crisis manager. (The matrix takes the 
company's weeknesses and strenghts one by one and also threats and opportunities of 
its environment.) In a multi-dimensional crisis situation threats of non-microeconomic 
environment increase, opportunities diminish and insecurity of every environmental 
condition grows. That is why the development of the "classic" SWOT matrix may be 
recommended: which analyzes not only the company's week and strong points but also, 
those of its environment. 
The second task of crisis management is a detailed description of the crisis man-
agement concept. This is a very complex task which, ending in the setting of strategic 
objectives, but taking into account all company resources, and their contribution to the 
realization of the strategic' objectives. Such complex strategy-forming procedure is the 
"7S" method: this forms its strategic goals-as it is well known-with the contributions of 
resources in a broad meaning, therefore, technical structure, organization, functional 
(information, financial etc.) systems, human resources and professional skills, common 
values of the company and leadership style. It is very important in the view of crisis 
management that this procedure puts great emphasis on labour skill and motivation, 
common values of the company and leadership style-which all have to be renewed for 
the recovery. 
Next task is-in case of an industrial corporation-rim renewal of the product line. 
This requires the evaluation of existing and future products, generally, according to 
their marketability and profitability in their expected market life cycle. The portfolio 
method has been developped for such an analysis scrutinizing the marketability and 
profitability of particular product- and structure-variants in comparison with competi-
tive products in the expected life cycle. But in multi-dimensional crisis situation, limits 
rising from non-competitive market factors get more than usual role and-because of 
lower sales volume, more expensive credits, and inflationary price losses-profitability 
conditions also harden. Those are new elements in the procedure. 
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The good crisis management builds on innovation, creativity and exploitation of 
opportunities. In case of industrial corporations everything has great significance, espe-
cially in the area of R+D: the recovery can be best funded this way. The efficiency of 
developments-size of reached result, keeping costs in tight hand, reducing realization 
time-has been well served by the, so called, intrapreneur method which operates on 
having in-company R+D groups in competition, and liquidating step by step those left 
behind. The main virtue of this method is speeding up development processes by inter-
nal competition and in crisis situations there is always a shortage of time. 
Realization of the crisis management concept needs action plans. The efficiency 
of these short term plans, focusing on a particular market, locaton or function of the 
company may be significantly increased by the MBO (management by objectives) 
method: using this, managers of different levels set only objectives for their subordi-
nates who plan themselves how to realize the targets. The method brings into the plan-
ning process a large number of innovative ideas; strongly motivates the implementation 
of the plans-all these are big advantages in a crisis situation. The only disadvantage of 
MBO is that the planning process on different levels of the implementation is time con-
suming. For this reason the crisis manager should try to accelerate the planning process 
of the involved hierarchical levels. 
The multi-dimensional crisis management requires structural changes of the com-
pany almost without exeption. Decentralization mostly increases flexibility and effec-
tivness. Because of that the establishment of profit centers or the development of divi-
sions may be recommended. But for an efficient functioning of the profit centres or 
divisions it is necessary to delimit unambiguosly their resources (this way, their cost 
accounting) and their marketing goals, actions and achievements from the resources 
and market activities of other units. Independent management of the profit centres or 
divisions may also bring some risk in a crisis situation, the crisis manager's unified 
recovery concept worked out for the whole company may succeed decreasingly in the 
decentralized units. The crisis manager can at least moderate this contradiction, if he 
unambiguosly determines the central requirements facing the units at the moment of the 
establishment of the profit center or divisions. 
Human resources have an enormous role in resolving crisis situations. Creativity, 
identification of the individual with company objectives are such powerful resources 
which, not once, countervail the lack of "hard resources", namely this capital or tech-
nology. Therefore, one of the most important tasks of every crisis manager is to win and 
motivate middle managers and employees. The comprehension of X and Y theory can 
be well used for this because it does not look at employees as a "foolish and lazy mass" 
but as collegues filled with bright ideas, ready to act who are willing to bring great sac-
rifices for the success of the company. In crisis management, the least formal methods, 
such as "walk around management" or "open doors policy" can be well used. Crisis 
managers can not give up applications of these methods, not even when almost every 
minute of their schedule is full with oppressive cares: the problems of the non-competi-
tive product line, the obsolete technology, the lack of external financial resources, etc. 
The change of the management system itself is not a ncglectable problem in a 
multi-dimensional crisis situation. Generally, crisis management requires tightened 
work from top managers. Therefore, it is useful to introduce leadership techniques 
which decentralize the management system (but do not take away the basic decisions 
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and control from the crisis manager) which are time saving, and therefore enable him to 
focus his attention on crucial activities. The already mentioned divisional structures and 
profit centers also serve the decentralization of management systems. A good example 
for time saving is the "management by exeptions". In this case, information about 
events, processes reach the manager only if their value is above or below of a predeter-
mined limit. (Consequently, this method can be applied to, primarily, quantitative 
events and processes.) Though, in a multi-dimensional crisis situation where company 
environment is not at all stabl, the limits can't be fixed for longer time: the crisis man-
ager has to monitor these in a given case also with the help of the "management by 
exeptions" method, namely tayloring, in time, the limits of company events and 
processes to the new environmental opportunities and restrictions. 
The privatisation with foreign investment is a special way of multi-dimensional 
crisis management. Its place and role within the recovery concepts is shown in figure 1. 
There are special managerial procedures to realize such privatisation concepts. One of 
these procedures, satisfying the domestic requirements, is the "privatisation partner 
seeking" (PPS). The series of steps of the PPS method are demostrated in figure 4 
(Hoványi, 1993). The connections of the steps demonstrate that seeking of a privatisa-
tion partner with foreign investment is not a random but a systematic process which 
therefore can be planned with good care. 
The listed procedures (methods) of crisis management can, unambiguosly, be sep-
arated from each other; at the same time they create consistent concepts and series of 
activities. This is supporting the conclusion that one or more management procedures 
(methods) can be linked to the different functions of managcmcnt and neither one 
excludes the application of the others to other managerial functions. Therefore, the 
managerial procedures (methods) can be included in consistent groups. 
Accordig to leadership theory, every listed procedure increases the efficiency of 
management if it is applied to a suitable task (function). Though, it has not be proved 
yet whether the application of a particular group of procedures has a synergy effect, 
especially, in a crisis situation. Quantitative justification of this would be, of course, a 
vain undertaking. However, synergy can be seen as evidence because neither the objec-
tive nor the functioning of the presented procedures (methods), increasing the efficien-
cy of crisis management, doesn't clash with the other's objectives or functioning. 
Based on Hungarian crisis management experiences of the last three years it can be 
stressed that in the multi-dimensional crisis situation of Hungarian companies there 
would be need for a much more established, more innovative and consistent concept 
than the existing one; also the introduction of "more formal" procedures of many 
proved methods of the crisis management's practice should be necessary to solve the 
problems of the future quicker and with higher efficiency. 
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Table 1 
Development of crisis management concepts directed to 
company technology with variants taylored to fundamentals 
VIEW-POINTS C H A R A C T E R I S T I C S 
EXISTING 
TECHNOLOGY 
Modern Partially modern 
Segmentable Integrated (closed) 
Obsolete 
Segmentable Integrated (closed) 
INVESTMENT 
REQUIREMENTS 
OF COMPETITIVENESS 
Small Average, 
divided 
Average, 
in one "package" 
Large, 
divided 
Large, 
in one "package" 
ORGANIZATIONAL 
STRUCTURE 
Existing 
(one company) 
A number of new, 
smaller companies 
Existing but 
renewing 
(one company) 
A number of new, 
smaller companies 
Fundamentally 
re-organized 
company 
PRIVATISATION 
Sale ensuring 
one "controlling" 
owner 
Sale part by part 
for different owners 
Sale ensuring 
one "controlling" 
Sale part by part 
for different owners 
owner 
Sale ensuring 
one "controlling" 
owner 
TECHNOLOGICAL 
REQUIREMENTS 
Continuously 
keeping step 
Closing up by sale 
of parts of the 
company 
Closing up by 
investments of 
the new owner 
Renewal by sale 
of parts of the 
company 
Renewal by foreign 
investor having large 
investment capital 
1st table continued 
VIEW-POINTS C H A R A C T E R I S T I C S 
EXISTING 
TECHNOLOGY 
Modern Partially modern 
Segmentable Integrated (closed) 
Obsolete 
Segmentable Integrated (closed) 
NEW OWNERS TAKEN 
INTO CONSIDERATION 
AT FIRST PLACE 
Mostly domestic 
with average or 
large capital 
Mostly domestic, 
possibly foreign 
with smaller capital 
Mostly foreign, 
possibly domestic 
with average capital 
Domestic and foreign 
with average capital 
Mostly foreign with 
large capital 
PRODUCT 
DEVELOPMENTS FOR 
COMPETITIVENESS 
New or old 
products 
Mainly new, less 
old products 
Mainly new, less 
old products 
New products New products 
MARKET POLICY, 
MARKETING 
HUMAN POLICY 
Conventional and 
new markets 
Without lay-off, 
continuously 
keeping step with 
professional skills 
Conventional and 
new markets, new 
marketing 
Less lay-off, 
quick closing up 
of professional 
skills 
Conventional and 
new markets, new 
marketing 
Average lay-off, 
quick closing up 
of professional 
skills 
New markets, 
new marketing 
Average lay-off, 
quick closing up 
of professional 
skills 
New markets, 
new marketing 
Large lay-off, 
quick closing up 
of professional 
skills 
CORPORATE 
MANAGEMENT 
Existing but mostly 
renewing 
More new company 
managers, possibly 
from internal 
resources 
One new company 
manager, possibly 
from internal 
resources 
More new company 
managers, mainly 
from external 
resources 
One new company 
manager, possibly 
from external 
resources 
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Figure 1 
Development of crisis management concept built on an innovative idea 
Brain storming Break through in innovative ideas 
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test of the innovative idea 
Technological requirements 
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Figure 2 General forecast model of the Hungarian macro-economic environment 
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Figure 3 
Change of significance in Maslow's motivations in case of falling living standards 
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Figure 4 
The PPS method: steps of partner seeking, contract preparation and conclusion 
for realizing privatisation and working capital involvment 
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offer for privatization inquiry meeting 
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investment (appraisal) 
Competing: inquiry meeting with 
the potential partners; chosing 
the optimal partner 
No Yes 
Yes 
/ R e p o r t from meeting 
\ and partner selectioin J N — ' y e s 
Getting the precise investment 
motivations of the optimal parner 
I 
Setting decision criterias about the 
sale of the company (and shares) 
I 
b r f V ! 
Requesting approval 
regarding the criterias 
. ( A p p r o v a l ) - ^ - / / 
Written offer about purchase of the 
company and shares for the optimal 
partner 
T 
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Figure 4 continued 
10. Detailed negotiation and agreement 
with the optimal partner 
No Yes 
Yes 
©Requesting permision 
V for contract conclusion J 4 — ' Yes \ © 
11. 
12. 
Signing the sale and purchase 
contract 
T Initiating execution of the contract 
Signs: Resources (R 
Contents 
:
 Technical literatures, economic magazines, "who 
produces what" publications, specialist's opinions, 
Chamber inquiries. 
:
 As above, supplemented with data storages of indus-
trial and commercial Chambers, data-bank informa-
tions, daily and weekly newspapers. 
f R j ) = As above, supplemented wih company publica-
tions/newspapers, data of released balance/pa-
tent/etc. reports, bank informations, professional 
opinions, exhibition evaluations etc. 
С Л = Week and strong sides of the pamer, week and strong 
sides of the domestic company from the partners' 
viewpoint, expected contact advances for the pamers, 
obtaining references, evaluation of the multi-dimen-
sional crisis situation through the parners'eye. 
:
 Exchange of documents regarding the position of 
companies, negotiations about purchase price, 
employment, short term results and management. 
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E r z s é b e t V I S Z T 
The evolution of crisis management in 
steel regions 
Iron and steel industry fell in crisis in the last decades in several countries of Western 
Europe, resulting in unemployment and some other regional crisis phenomena. In these 
countries there is ample experience about the handling of industrial and regional crises. 
The purpuse of the research was to evaluate from a Hungarian point of view the simi-
larities and dissimilarities of crisis management in individual West-European countries, 
particularly at a regional level. As an example we took the case of Charleroi (Belgium), 
Lorrain (France) and Saarland (Germany) because a large part of the steel industry of 
Western Europe is concentrated in these regions. It was obvious that the county Borsod-
Abauj-Zempl,n was the Hungarian case to study. * 
1. REGIONAL CRISIS MANAGEMENT IN BELGIUM, 
FRANCE AND GERMANY 
1.1. Main features of Saarland, Lorraine and Charleroi 
The dominating role of iron and steel industry in the Saarland (with a population more 
than 1 million) is shown by the fact that in 1974 about 26 per cent of all industrial 
employees worked in this industry. By 1990 this value had more than halved due to the 
steel crisis. The rough steel production in the Saarland fell from 6.1 to 4.4 million tons. 
The main social consequence of the steel crisis was the significant increase in unem-
ployment in the region mainly caused by reduced employment in iron and steel industry 
and connected basic industries. The unemployment rate increased from 4.4 per cent in 
1974 to 7.7 per cent in 1977. Consequently the steel crisis, beginning in 1975, caused 
•This article is based on a research completed in the framework of the ACE project of the European Communi-
ty and an international team coordinated by the author of this article. Michel Capron (the FOPES Institute of 
the Catholic University of Louvain) completed a case study on Charleroi, Regis Larue de Toumemine and 
Francis Kern (Louis Pasteur University, Strassbourg) on Lorrain and Barbara Schlomann and Wilhelm 
Mannsbart (Fraunhofer Institute, Karlsruhe) on the Saarland. 
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fundamental economic, social and also political problems in the Saarland in the follow-
ing years. 
The effects were aggravated by the specific historical development of Saarland 
after the second world war (integrated into West-Germany only in 1957 after a referen-
dum) and the complicated ownership structure of the steel making companies (partly 
private German ownership, partly French and Luxembourgian capital). For these rea-
sons, investments in modernization and rationalization of steel plants carried out in 
other steel making regions of Germany were not undertaken here. This is a handicap 
which could not be counterbalanced even in the years to come. {Hartz, 1990) This is 
especially true for two of the three remaining steel companies of the region, the 
"Stahlwerke R'chling-Burbach" and the "Neuenkirchener Eisenwerke AG", strongly 
hit by the steel crisis. Only the "Dillinger Hüttenwerke", mainly owned by the French 
steel company Sacilor-Usinor, was less affected by the European steel crisis. This was 
mainly due to a fundamental modernization of their steel plants in the 1960s, the spe-
cialization in flat steel products, and — in contrast to the two other steel companies — a 
consistent policy over the years to have the possibly lowest level of employment at the 
firm. 
In France the region Lorraine was also suffering from the decline of the steel 
industry. Of the 110.000jobs lost by the French iron and steel industry in 1974, 65.000 
were located in Lorraine. The steel makers of this region employed 95.000 persons in 
1964 and still 80.000 in 1974 just before the crisis broke out. The number of those 
employed, however, was 30.000 in 1985 and only 15.840 in 1990, i.e. less than 20 per 
cent of the labour force before the crisis. 
In Belgium the Charleroi basin is, with Liege, one of the two major subregions of 
Wallonia affected by the steel crisis. Charleroi is a medium-sized town with some 206 
thousand inhabitants at the end of 1990. The economic activities of Charleroi were, 
since the 1950s, essentially concentrated on heavy industries: coal mining (the last pit 
was closed in 1984), steel industry, glass products and chemical industry. With the 
exception of the chemical industry, all these activities were affected by the crisis in the 
1970s and 1980s. The coal pits were closed, the steel industry lost over 9.000 jobs 
between 1975 and 1984, the metallurgical and glass industry lost about 4.000 jobs, due 
to heavy restructuring which affected labour-intensive firms like ACEC, Glaverbel, 
Verlipack, Fairey-Sonaca (aeronautics). The Caterpillar plant (created in the early sev-
enties) lost about 1.000 jobs (from a total manpower of 5.500 persons). In Charleroi the 
unemployment rate reached 18per cent in 1990. 
1.2. Active participation öf different actors involved 
Analysing the attitude of the different actors (state, regional and local organizations of 
public administration and enterprises) one of our main the conclusions is that they are in 
each case actively committed to regional crisis management. Their activities include the 
solving of the social problems, as well as the revitalization of the region's economy 
while the enterprises, generally, take less responsibilities in tackling these two principal 
problems. 
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The active participation of the state (Government) in the regional crisis manage-
ment is markedly indicated by the very fact that in the three countries these activities 
have been pursued in comprehensive programmes (plans) of the central government. 
Co-ordinated actions of the government are especially well illustrated in the case of 
Germany. The policy of regional restructuring has been an important part of economic 
policy of the country supplemented by independent development concepts of the feder-
al states. 
Because of the decreasing demand for manpower, the promotion of employment 
has been the central issue of the measures related to social policy. The support of 
employment, however, is not reduced merely to the creation of jobs, it is always associ-
ated to different objectives of economic policy. 
The crisis-stricken regions are of particular attention in economic and employ-
ment policy. Several types of subsidies have been provided for these regions also within 
the framework of employment and structural transformation programmes. In addition, 
special programmes of regional development were elaborated for crisis regions. The 
government provides several types of support for the consolidation of the enterprises 
and by encouraging mergers. The programmes of technological development serve this 
renewal as well. At the same time EC programmes, not limited by state boundaries, 
have been elaborated in order to cope with the disadvantages.(Looking at the map we 
understand immediately why these programmes are so important in case of the Saarland 
and the two other steel regions.) 
In France spectacular programmes of revitalization of the regions with declining 
industries followed each other. In 1977 the General Agreement for Social Welfare 
(CGPS) proposed by the government was signed by the social partners and renewed in 
1979,1983 and 1989. 
In Belgium the FRI (Le Fonds de Rénovation Industrielle) as a national financing 
instrument created in 1978 is to promote industrial revival and restructuring projects in 
the regions affected by the crisis of the steel- and the textile industry and the shipbuild-
ing. The FRI associates the state and the regions in making concepts, financing and 
achieving industrial projects. 
According to the experience of the three countries regional (province-level) and 
local (district, town) organs play a considerable role in regional crisis management 
and a close partnership has been established between governments and regional 
authorities. This co-operation includes both the formulation of the concepts and their 
implementation. In the light of the experiences, local authorities work hard in order to 
identify their development possibilities and they anticipate organizational and financial 
help from the central authorities. Since the majority of the industries which were char-
acteristic to the region belong to the so-called crisis industries, crisis management pro-
grammes were elaborated for several sub-regions. Among the regions to be rescued and 
developed were, for instance, the following areas: the handicapped agricultural regions 
of the Northern part of Meuse county; those of the mountain areas of the Vosges; the 
backward farms of the neighbourhood of Dieuze and Chateau-Salins; the coal basin of 
Forbach; the textile basin of Epinal; the region of Nancy, Luneville, Longwy and 
Villerupt suffering from grave unemployment. 
There are interesting new elements of enterprise behaviour in a regional crisis sit-
uation. The firms in difficult situation often try to consolidate their position through 
7 6 CRISIS M A N A G E M E N T 
mergers carried out,sometimes with state support. In the Saarland, for instance, in 1978 
the first reaction to the deteriorated situation of two of the three steel companies 
(Stahlwerke R'chling-Burbach and Neuenkirchner Eisenwerke AG) was their consoli-
dation under a parent company, the ARBED S.A. Luxembourg. The government gave 
financial support to this transaction. 
In addition to government support for the merger taking the form of a financial aid, 
a social plan was negotiated between the trade unions and ARBED, in order to allevi-
ate the social consequences of the planned layoff of about one third of the staff. This 
agreement, containing rather generous regulations for the affected workers, became 
known and often referred to as the "Steel Model of the Saarland". 
1.3. Measures implemented for restructuring the regions 
Among the numerous measures implemented in the almost two decades in Western 
European countries since the steel crisis appeared the following types of measures have 
been widely used: 
- measures related to job creation, 
- incentives for technological development and 
- measures related to transborder cooperation. 
A closer look at the cases shows how the set of measures serving regional adjust-
ment became more and more complex in each country. 
1.3.1. Saarland 
Because of the critical employment situation stemming from the steel crisis one of the 
most important group of measures related to supporting redundant employees of the 
steel industry by social plans, qualification programmes as the "Stahlstiftung Saarland" 
created in 1987 in Germany, the General Agreement for Social Welfare (CGPS) or the 
Leaves for Training (CFC) in France. 
Important regional policy goal has been the replacement of the ceased jobs of steel 
industry by creating new ones through investments in other sectors. As a consequence 
of it the employment structure of the steel regions has changed. As a result, the share of 
the industrial sector decreased and the share of service sector increased. As to the own-
ership structure the private sector gained importance. 
The financial means of the government for maintaining labour market equilibrium 
were directed partly towards the steel industry itself. As an exaple we can take the 
Stahlwerke R"ckling-Burbach and the Neuenkircher Eisenwerke AG consolidated 
under the parent company, the ARBED S.A. in 1978. This transaction was financially 
supported by the Federal Government and the Saarland Government. 
Nevertheless attempts at restructuring the steel industry in the Saarland did not 
prove very successfull during the years to come. There was a further increase in unem-
ployment to 10.5 °/o in 1982 and in 1984 it reached its peak at 14.5 %. The political con-
sequence of this unsatisfactory economic development in the Saarland mainly due to 
the steel crisis still not being solved despite the considerable aid of the government 
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resulted in a change of government from Christian Democrats and Liberals to Social 
Democrats in the 1985 election.The breakthrough in solving the continuing economic 
problems of ARBED Saarstahl finally came in 1989 by consolidation of the only flour-
ishing steel plant in the Saarland, the "Dillinger Hüttenwerke" owned by the French 
government which is specialized in flat products. This solution was favoured by the 
boom in the steel industry beginning in 1988 with a considerable increase in steel pro-
duction. Nevertheless, the number of people employed in the iron and steel industry 
went down by half during the years of the steel crisis. Therefore, besides trying to res-
cue the remaining steel plants and finding socially acceptable solutions such as social 
plans or foundations for redundant employees, structural changes within the economy 
of Saarland became necessary as a result of the diminishing importance of the steel (and 
coal) industry. This is why from 1989 on a more pronounced adjustment process was 
promoted by the government of the Saarland and the public administration of the towns 
most affected by the steel crisis. Important measures were (see Hartz, 1990): 
- the promotion of technology parks and other trades or services in former steel 
plant areas (e.g. opening of the "Saarpark-Center" in Neunkirchen in 1989, establishing 
of small and medium sized new industries in the former steel plant areas in Völklingen 
and foundation of the "Saarbriicker Innovations- and Technologiezentrum" in 1991 
comprising more than 30 innovative firms); 
- support for establishing research institutes especially in the fields of environ-
ment, energy, computer sciences and electronic engineering (e.g. Deutsches Zentrum 
fur Künstliche Intelligenz, Max-Planck Institut für Innovationswissenschaften, Interna-
tionales Begegnungs- und Forschungszentrum für Informatik, Institut für neue Materi-
alen, Institut für industrielle Reststoff- und Abfallwirtschaft); 
- support for Cooperation with Luxembourg and the French border regions ("Saar-
Lor-Lux region") in the fields of telecommunication, transport and joint advertising for 
the region. 
1.3.2. Charleroi 
Despite the crisis of coal mining beginning in the 60s and the steel industry in the 70s in 
Charleroi and in the larger Wallon region a real break-through concerning structural 
adjustment started only in 1983. The reason behind the slowness of the process was that 
most of the industrial branches represented in the region were affected by the steel cri-
sis. Several attempts mainly in the subregion have been made to promote a new devel-
opment (by infrastructural projects, foundation of high-tech firms) but their impact was 
weak in compensating the numerous job losses since the 60s. It seems that the efforts of 
the new major of Charleroi in 1983 were rather important in giving a boost to regional 
development. The different interest groups have been put together (including the 
Charleroi members of the national government, representatives of the political parties, 
the local authorities, the trade unions and the private sector). The aims became clear and 
more precise: the diversification of the existing industries, product innovation of the 
glass industry, the development of aeronautical products, the support of high technolo-
gy firms (IRE producing radio-components, microelectronics), the development of new 
industrial network (food products, electronics, telecommunication, audio-visual tech-
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nies), the establishment of new public services and a more efficient communication 
infrastructure. 
Due to three major factors during the last decade Charleroi succeeded to change 
its economic structure: the action of the local authorities and of the Intercommunal 
Committee ADEC-Igretec in the field of the urban renewal since 1984, the creation of 
Sambrinvest in 1985 with the purpose of financially supporting the creation and devel-
opment of small and medium-sized companies and the long-term action of higher and 
continuing education institutions. 
The contribution of the Intercommunal ADEC-Igretec Committee was very 
important from the point of view of a new image of Charleroi: the city is no more coal-
or steel-based but it became the city of the aeronautics and strip cartoon industry. 
Important changes have been in infrastructure, too: commercial centres were built 
instead of the former industrial areas. The Brussels South Charleroi Airport is a new 
aeropole near to Beecham (pharmaceuticals), Caterpillar and aeronautic plants (Sabca, 
Soneca, Dassault). It is becoming an attractive zone for new firms linked with the air-
port activities. The industrial areas of Gosselies, Jumet, Farciennes and Fleurus attract-
ed many medium-sized firms, creating 1.200 jobs between 1986-1991 and-finally-a 
large business park was built south of Charleroi. 
On the field of education the university centre of Charleroi CUNIC and its institu-
tions (the Institute of Public Affairs, a small- and medium-sized business center, the 
CIFOP continuing education center and the FUNOC for adult education) organize uni-
versity-level courses. In addition, the educational action of the high-skilled technical 
education centers, existing for many decades, but aiming now more modern technolo-
gies (and remaining under the constraint of the adjusment to the high tech activities), as 
the University of Labour (Universit, du Travail) and the Labour Chaplains (Aumoniers 
du Travail) should be emphasized. 
Charleroi's image is now much more attractive and many initiatives are undertak-
en to prepare this medium-sized European city to become a more attractive industrial 
and service center not only for its direct environment but also linked with the North-
East region of France. However, the results may not evaluated just in several years. 
With a modemized Cockerill-Sambre (steel plant), new investments of Glaverbel (glass 
products), a renewal of the graphic and printing industries, the aeronautics pole, several 
chemical and pharmaceutical plants Charleroi becomes an important industrial pole 
despite the present lack of major investments in high tech industries. 
1.3.3. Lorrain 
The case of Lorrain also shows an evolution of regional crisis management. In the first 
phase-in the 70s-mainly the measures related to social welfare were in forefront. Later 
parallel with the changing demand of big industrial firms for labour, retraining schemes 
were offered for the least qualified workers in order to give them a better chance to re-
enter to the labour market. 
The most global and ambitious project concerns the Longwy employment area 
with the constitution of a "Pole European de Developpement" (PED=European Devel-
opment Pole). The PED is transnational since it also covers the Athus basin in Belgium 
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and the Rodange basin in Luxembourg which experience similar crisis and implies 
financial help from the EC. 
The PED is one of the main projects of the "Action plan of the integrated operation 
for the development of the iron and steel basin of North Lorrain" presented to the EC by 
the French state and financed by the EC. The following measures can be identified in 
the action programme: 
- the creation of an innovation park on the border region of three countries with 
150 hectare in Belgium, 150 hectare in France and 100 hectare in Luxembourg; 
- a specific system of direct investment subsidies exceeding the maximum levels 
allowed in the three countries (up to 40 per cent of equivalent net subsidy), granted on a 
long enough term to be significant, with the aim to create 8.000 jobs over ten years in 
the whole area (1.500 in Belgium, 5.500 in France and 1.000 in Luxembourg); 
- co-ordinated fiscal systems of the three countries on the territory of the park; 
-common services to improve the environment of the firms establishing plants in 
the park; 
- training in the field of new technologies by way of promoting economic activi-
ties in hi-tech sectors. In addition to the existing institutions of higher and technological 
education on the PED, these new activities should lead to the creation of a common 
"college universitaire" (college) with a strong technological orientation, given an 
experimental status concentrating on initial and continuing education and applied 
research; 
- in the field of transport and communication the three countries should join 
forces; 
- to speed up the opening up programme by roads and motor ways for the connec-
tion with the outside world and improve internal transports; 
- to improve and connect the railway transport system of PED to 
Paris/Brussels/Luxembourg and Metz; 
- to offer a high level of telecommunication services to potential investors; 
- the special services in the park and around it in order to offer advantageous 
working conditions for the firms to make the environment more attractive. 
1.4. Moderate results of regional crisis management 
Beside the numerous positive impact of strategies and means applied, regional crisis 
management show up to this time moderate results in certain aspects. 
Despite the attempts to restructure steel industry in the Saarland, the employment 
situation did not improve during the years following 1975. There was a further increase 
in unemployment to 10.5 per cent, reaching its peak in 1984 with 14.5 per cent. The 
political consequence of this unsatisfactory economic development in the Saarland, 
mainly due to the steel crisis, still unsolved despite the large government aid, resulted in 
a change in government: as a result of the 1985 elections the Christian Democrats and 
Liberals had to resign and the Social Democrats came to power. 
Within the framework of the PED, on the French side, 2.500 jobs were negotiated 
in May 1992 and 1.100 were created. But as is often the case in situations where subsi-
dies are at stake, some firms consider the financial incentive by public authorities as an 
8 0 CRISIS M A N A G E M E N T 
aim in itself and go "hunting for subsidies ". Among the job creating firms it is neces-
sary to distinguish between subsidiaries of foreign firms and local SME. Foreign firms 
are looking for a site in the Unified European Market and direct supports for investment 
activities in their case have been a real incentive. This holds for Korean, Japanese, Nor-
wegian and American firms. New jobs are part of a reallocation strategy of industrial 
units doing assembly work but they fit to low qualified women and not to former iron 
and steel workers. For instance in the case of Allied Signals, the leading firm in the 
PED, producing industrial fibres for tyres created 300 jobs in three years, of the 45 per-
sons who were last hired 10 came from Longwy and 3 of them were former iron and 
steel workers. 
Despite the measures targeted diversification the local industry the rate of newly 
created firms is lower than the regional average. The income from business licences 
went down from 6.7 per cent in the Longwy district, on the other hand it enhanced by 20 
per cent in the Briey district, and by 61 per cent in the Nancy area. The average per capi-
ta taxable income in 1991 was 26.000 FF in Longwy and 34.000 FF in Nancy (31.230 
FF in the Meurthe et Moselle d,partement). 
Beyond the rhythm of job creations and income differences between Longwy and 
Nancy, the most worrying feature is the demographic crisis.. The age pyramid is about 
to be turned upside down: the surplus of birth over deaths went down to 150 in 1991 
and the fertility rate amounts to 1.5 in Longwy as opposed to 1.7 in Meurthe and 
Moselle in general. From 1975 to 1990 the population of the basin diminished from 
105 thousand inhabitants to 83 thousand i.e. a decrease of 20 per cent in 15 years. In 
1991 the basin lost another 1.500 inhabitants. As a consequence: the region seems to 
be adapted to the crisis but at the cost of increased intra-regional differences. The 
Nancy urban area has recovered its industrial dynamism by strengthening the tertiary 
sector, and thus the disappearance sof industrial centres such as Pompey and Neuves-
Maisons has only a limited impact on the general activity level and on the rate of 
unemployment. 
More isolated basins of an accentuated mono-industrial character, on the other 
hand, have to cope with a crisis which threatens their economic survival, notwithstand-
ing the number of measures being implemented. The French case also points out that 
the transition period could have been better handled by the acceptance of the fact that 
the problem of former iron and steel workers could not be solved by strongly individu-
alized mechanisms. The possibilities of re-activizing early retired people over 50 years 
of age and the further employment of people between 45 and 50 on projects aiming at 
rehabilitating some industrial sites with cultural activities or at facilitating and the 
retraining of the younger, could have maintained a social life in these basins, preserved 
a socio-professional identity which would have made it easier to transform some of the 
basins. 
The case of Charleroi proves that a political determination is very important to 
concentrate human, financial, industrial, social and economic resources for a coherent 
project. It needs thus a political consensus between employers, trade unions, political 
parties and local authorities to act together in promoting the same, often very difficult, 
case. Secondly, once such an agreement is reached, relevant and job-creating projects 
must be found and developed, often requiring significant, and not always available 
financial means. This financial constraint explains the long term character of the 
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restructuring process. The attraction of new investors depends on the success of the first 
reconversion projects requiring themselves considerable investments. 
Another problem is raised by the qualification level of the labour force: the job 
cuts during the crisis years have affected mostly low-qualified jobs. It is therefore 
urgent to develop a technical education system which prepares the entrants to the 
labour market for higher qualified jobs, especially for the hi-tech industries. In the 
Charleroi case, the financial means remain still too limited. There is a lack of major 
high technology activities and the education system (this being a general Walloon prob-
lem) remains insufficient and inadequate. Globally, even though many efforts were 
made to restructuring the Charleroi sub region, they were not able to fight efficiently 
against unemployment and the jobs created are far from compensating the lost jobs. 
Nevertheless, the Charleroi basin has been emerging slowly out of a period when the 
city was essentially based on heavy industries and turning to more diversified economic 
activities. 
At the national level, it was intricate to obtain a coherent development policy: 
regional conflicts, lack of political will and coherent projects, irresolution of the nation-
al government have, over the years, disorganized any attempt to implement an industri-
al policy. Since 1989, the SRIW and the Invests, in the frame of restricted financial 
means, have the opportunity of initiating a coherent industrial and economic redevelop-
ment policy for the Walloon region. Moreover, the holding companies and the potential 
Walloon investors have to make efforts to develop industrial projects and to invest in 
the Walloon region. 
However, since the beginning of the steel crisis, many years have been lost and the 
backwardness of the level of education, research, industrial projects and infrastructure 
improvement will be very difficult to recover. Politicians, holding companies, econom-
ic, industrial and technological research institutes have to conceive and apply a dynam-
ic development policy which will give back to the Walloon region its former economic 
and industrial capacity. 
2. REGIONAL CRISIS MANAGEMENT IN HUNGARY 
The way the industrial recession spread over in Hungary is also diversified across 
regions. Counties like Borsod-Abaúj-Zemplén and Nógrád where the basic material 
industry has been dominant have been most affected: they record industrial output 
about 40 per cent lower at the end of 1991 than in 1988 (compared to a decline in over-
all industrial production of 29 per cent during this period). Just for comparison, indus-
trial output has declined by less than 20 per cent in counties having a more diversified 
manufacturing industry, such like Zala and Tolna. 
2.1. Main Features of Borsod County 
Borsod-Abaúj-Zemplén is, with its about 760 thousand inhabitants, the second greatest 
county of Hungary. Its area is 7247 square kilometres (about the same as the area of the 
Saarland steel region). The population density here is higher than the average of the 
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country (105 persons per square kilometres). 40 per cent of the population lives in 
Miskolc, the county town, itself. 75 per cent of the inhabitants of the county are concen-
trated in the towns of the industrial area (including Miskolc itself). Due to the migration 
from the county the decline of population has been even faster than the Hungarian aver-
age. During the last decade the population of Borsod decreased from 810 thousand to 
760 thousand inhabitants. In the county the negative balance of migration is the highest 
in Hungary (followed by Szabolcs-Szatmár-Bereg, one of its neighbouring county). Bor-
sod is the only county where the decline of the population is even higher in the towns 
than in the villages: -7.5 and -2.5 per cent in the period of 1986-1990, respectively. 
Speaking in terms of regions, the crisis of the iron and steel industry means 
unequivocally the crisis of Borsod county and within this county the districts of 
Miskolc and Ozd. This region is a part of the Borsod Industrial Region and the valley of 
the Sajji river and includes Kazincbarcika and Tisza£jv ros. Within this region the city 
of Ozd and its neighbourhood of 27 settlements is of paramount importance. This 
region is the most closely tied to iron and steel making (see Table 1). 
For the employment structure of Borsod county see Tables 2. and 3. The Borsod 
Industrial Region was developed from the fifties on as the centre of the heavy industries 
in Hungary. Even in course of the seventies and eighties coal mining and iron and steel 
industry played the dominant role in employment. 
In the context of regional crisis management of Borsod it should be taken into 
account that besides iron and steel making there are here other industries in a poor con-
dition. One could mention here the engineering industry in Borsodnádasd, the coal 
mining and construction at Putnok, the chemical industry in Kazincbarcika and never-
theless, besides steel making the engineering industry in Miskolc. 
It would be reasonable to seek the ways of crisis management and structural com-
pliance over the county borders too but, for those circumstances mentioned above, it is 
easy to see the obstacles to be faced with. 
The eastern neighbour Szabolcs county is of low industialization level with a weak 
agriculture. At the same time, this county has the most rapid population growth in Hun-
gary and till now the commuting to Borsod could mitigate the employment problems of 
county Szabolcs. It cannot be expected in the near future that this county (one of the 
most backward ones in Hungary) could absorb the redundant labour force of Borsod. It 
should be taken into account that a part of the Szabolcs industrial plants have been 
closed down and the great majority of the rest have very inappropriate equipment and 
are faced with market problems. The industrial enterprises of this county have been 
plants, deployed to up-country, of former countrywide operating big companies 
(Tungsram, Taurus, Metripond, Magyar Gyapjufonó). 
In Heves county on the parts bordering Borsod there is a tourism belt with small 
villages (Bükkszentmárton, Szilvásvárad and, a bit farther away Párád, Mátraháza and 
Mátrafúred). Manufacturing industry could be found in the central parts of the county 
around Gyöngyös far from Borsod. For the well known market problems the position 
of the formerly decisive engineering industry has become uncertain here. This situation, 
accompanied by the crisis of coal mining, has contributed to the high unemployment in 
Heves. 
Borsod has a border of two hundred km with Slovakia. This neighbourhood, how-
ever, is utilized neither from economic nor from tourism or cultural points of view. In 
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course of this research no development has been found in the county which could be 
taken as a promising one with regard of an over the border co-operation. 
2.2. Crisis Symptoms in Borsod 
From 1980 to 1990, mainly after 1988, some 26.000 industrial jobs ceased to exist in 
the county. In other primary and secondary branches the employment decreased by 
about 25.000 persons. (The figure was in case of construction 7.000, agriculture 8.000, 
public transport 3.000 and trade 7.000.) Even though the employment in tertiary sectors 
has slightly increased, this was far from enough to counterbalance the indicated 
employment reduction. While the number of those employed was reduced in the prima-
ry and secondary branches by 51.000 persons, the increase in the tertiary sectors was 
only of 7.000. 
The redundant manpower on the local labour market is increasing. This can be 
illustrated by the number of registered unemployed persons. By way of comparing this 
number with the value of the registered vacant working places, it is almost month by 
month perceivable that the gap is getting wider and wider since the end of 1990. Table 4 
presents the trend and rate of unemployment pointing out the unfavorable situation in 
Borsod in comparison with the Hungarian avarage. 
The regional crisis ensuing from the cutting down the steel making industry took 
the greatest tolls till now in Ózd and its vicinity. The dependence of this area on steel 
making are reflected by the data of the census of 1980. According to these data 51.3% 
of the active earners in Ózd were employed in the steel industry and 62.4 % of the 
dependent persons lived on their salaries. The unemployment rate in Ozd is today the 
highest in the county and even in Hungary as a whole. 
The number of registered vacant jobs in the region is eliminable: in March of 1992 
there were 7 vacant jobs per 1.000 unemployed persons, the situation being hardly bet-
ter in the neighbouring towns. Every third unemployed, about 2800 person in Ozd are 
without any registered income. 
The situation of young people (seeking for their first employment) is altnost com-
pletely desperate. The number of students in higher education is decreasing, since fami-
lies cannot cover the increasing costs. This trend accompanied by brain drain has start-
ed a process of a "mental atrophy" of the region. All these phenomena are necessarily 
accompanied by some other social problems as well, e.g. the atrophy of community life, 
passive resistance of the people, and negative social phenomena of other kind (e.g. 
excessive drinking, increasing trend of divorces). These phenomena are experienced 
also in the crisis regions of other countries'. 
The enviromental situation of the county is also critical. This holds true either for 
housing and jobs or in the aspect of pollution. Even though the "towns of heavy indus-
try" had received sizeable development funds, a bleak and environmentally unaccept-
able type of housing was created. The small communities, which had far more pleasant 
life conditions, vanished at the same time because of the lack of jobs and the disadvan-
tageous position with regard for inffastructural development. Even the mere listing of 
these environmental problems can direct the attention to the fact: in this region a far 
more complex set of problems has pvto be faced with than the crisis of iron and steel 
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industry. The core of the problem is the complete failure of the industrialization policy 
of the past decades, its impacts can be experienced by the inhabitants of the county. 
2.3.Regional Crisis Management in Borsod 
The attitudes of the agents and the strategies applied in the Borsod crisis management 
are influenced by the general conditions in Hungary and in the countries of the eastern 
part of Central- Europe. It cannot be left out of consideration that 
- the agents (the Government, the local authorities and the enterprises) have not 
publicly considered the crisis and the unemployment before the change of regime in 
1990; 
- the structure of the economy, the relative importance of the three sectors 
(industry, agriculture and services) is quite different here from that of the more devel-
oped countries. Agriculture and industry have a greater and, in turn, services have a 
smaller relative importance than in the more developed economies; 
- regional crisis management has been hindered by the general crisis of the econ-
omy of the country, by the lack of government funds, and by the low level of the popula-
tion 's economic forbearance caused by the continual decrease of (low even before) 
incomes. 
Before 1989 government measures were predominantly used for preserving the 
existing industrial structure (e.g. repeated subventions for steel industry.) Measures of 
employment policy funded from state budget were applied since 1988 when the 
Employment Fund was created to absorb redundant manpower. Within this framework 
the government intended to introduce incentives for job-creation. In order to promote 
this goal, preferential credits were available through tenders. By these measures the 
government contributed to the creation of several thousand jobs in the county. In 
course of the evaluations, however, this approach received considerable criticism. 
(Kovács-Nagy, 1988.) The critics argued that 
- the jobs created (a part of them would be created without the assistance provided 
by the fund) do not serve the objective of the programme "to create new and prospective 
jobs offering possibilities for individual development"; 
- since the job-creating project was established in a time with no redundant labour 
force, the programme could not contribute to the absorption of this latter. 
The assessment of this means of labour market is recently more positive than 
before, and also the functioning of the fund could be improved. Say, local authorities 
want to have a more substantial role in assessing the applications representing the 
regional points of view. 
The preferential start up loan encourages small enterpreneurship in order to offset 
layoffs in the region. Support for retraining, public constructions and re employment 
assistance are the most well-known means of employment policy implemented to a 
great extent in the county. 
A new device among the means of employment policy is Employment Association 
created specifically to stop the further spreading of unemployment around Ózd. The 
association offers the most different ways of employment for those 1.800 persons 
becoming redundant at the steel makers after the first of March 1992. (They are 
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employed at the demolition or restructuring of unused buildings, landscaping, etc.) 
Members of the association are encouraged also to take part in retraining programmes. 
In Ozd 1380 from the 1880 persons laid off joined the association. For the time being 
they could offer jobs only for 150 of them. This state of affairs could be improved by 
the launching projects to road building and a hospital reconstruction financed by central 
resources. 
Within the training activities the development of retraining is of special impor-
tance especially in areas of redundant labour force and of low training level being low 
with hardly convertible skills (which is the case in the regions affected by the steel cri-
sis). The establishment of the Retraining Centre of Northern Hungary and its Office in 
Ozd reflects that this aspect have been given the appropriate priority in the region. The 
Centre was built within the framework of the Phare-programme, and, the training 
methods are based on the experiences of the EC-countries (first of all on the methods 
used in the Republic of Ireland). According to the experience accumulated so far, the 
participants of retraining courses have better chances to find a job. Sounder assessment 
will be possible only after a longer period of operation when participation would not 
be reduced to the most motivated persons. 
The crisis has directed the attention to the entrepreneurship boosting devices. 
However the use of these devices is more general and goes far beyond crisis manage-
ment in Borsod the following ones are in the foreground of the attention: 
- innovation parks providing area with public utilities to entrepreneurs, 
- retraining centres in Miskolc and, to lesser extent, in Ozd, 
- entrepreneurs' training centres, 
- incubator houses, 
- managerial office buildings, 
- local product exhibitions and fairs, 
- regional financial institutes, 
- programmes to encourage over the border relations. 
The Hungarian Enterpreneurship Development Foundation took an active part in 
the creation of the above mentioned devices. The Foundation pays special considera-
tion to small entrepreneurs and starting enterprises and assists them by providing con-
sultation, information and credits and helping them in establishing business contacts. 
However, there are some negative experience in the business services sector. 
While this sector is a more organic part of the regional economy in developed market 
economies, due to the overall recession and to the immature character of the market 
economy this sector is facing serious difficulties here. 
2.4. Failures of Crisis Management 
If the crisis management in the developed countries has yielded only moderate results, 
the crisis management in the Borsod region should be considered far less efficient. 
In spite of the substantial funds provided by the government to the Borsod region 
there is no significant progress in the mitigation of the unemployment. 
From 1988 to 1990 almost 4.000 jobs were created from the contribution of the 
Employment Fund. However, short-term perspectives and lack of resources are reflect-
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ed by the fact that these jobs were of low technological standards and they have been 
created in firms of low competitiveness.This is why despite the significant resources 
invested in job creation their impact hasn't been perceptible. 
Similarly unconcentrated is in the county the central fund named Resumption Loan 
created for jobless persons. It would not be easy to evaluate its effect because in course 
of 1988 -90 some 5.000 people made use of this facility. Some small-scale enterprises 
could be launched thereby but their regionwide effect is neglectable. 
In the most severely struck region of the county, in the Ozd area - where the con-
cerned agents tried to implement the available means of employment policy and territo-
ry development as early as possible - the rate of unemployment is almost three times 
higher (above 30 per cent) than the national average, and it exceeds two times the aver-
age of Borsod county itself. 
The majority of the government measures only helped to postpone the restructur-
ing the region. Delays in starting structural adjustment have led to the coincidence of 
the reduction of steel production with an overall regional crisis, and there remained no 
alternative way to employ redundant labour force of the iron and steel industry. 
Failures at Diósgyőr and Ózd in the involvement of foreign capital direct attention 
to contradictory features of privatization of the two big metallurgical enterprises. 
(Notably to unfavourable agreements, cash flow problems resulting from insufficient 
registered capital, speculative intentions, misuse of preferential tax and wage regula-
tions etc.) 
It follows that few if any structural changes could be observed in the region so far. 
For the crisis there is a continuous decline regarding both production and employment. 
Having followed the iron and steel industry other crisis industries appeared (mining, 
chemical industry, engineering, food processing, agriculture). Privatization is of slow 
pace, the inflow offoreign capital is lower than in the rest of the country. In this region 
of the tradition of large enterprises small companies are spreading much slower than in 
other regions. 
The uncertainties in the trends of industrial development and restructuration of the 
region have their marks on retraining policies as well. Retraining therefore is directed 
to provide general knowledge and, on the other hand, to profiles applied widely in 
developed countries(computer skills, managerial knowledge, foreign languages etc.). 
This might be advantageous for those starting entrepreneurial activities or seeking a 
job at a joint venture company. There are, of course, no garantees whether the persons 
having acquired up-to-date skills will work within the region itself. 
The local authorities of the regions struck by the crisis of the steel industry cannot 
play a more significant role in compensating the lost jobs, even if they perceive the 
problem itself with all its severity. There are no sufficient financial resources to secure 
even the former standards of the institutions under their responsibilities either. (Their 
revenues from personal income taxes decreased, the entrepreneurs of the region pay 
rents for estates and buildings with delays.) At the same time, for the lack of solvent 
demand, the value of the real estates is diminishing. 
It could be seen even now that the institutions responsible for regional develop-
ment do not take the structural adjustment of the region as their principal problem but 
concentrate on "first aid" measures to mitigate the acute tensions of unemployment. 
This is of course a very important item from the aspect of relieving acute social tensions 
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of the region but it hasn't contribute to solve the structural problems of the region's 
economy-as it have been experienced in Belgium, France and Germany, too. 
In the sub regions outside the industrial centres any kind of economic development 
depends to a high degree on the development of inffastructur (roads, public facilities 
and telecommunication). However, because of the high unemployment of the Borsod 
industrial region the development of these underdeveloped regions -at least from gov-
ernmental resources-has been pushed into the background. 
3. CONCLUSIONS 
The comparative experience of crisis management of the three EC-countries and Hun-
gary underlines that the regional crisis management makes imperative a more sophisti-
cated and complex system of tools. In the light of foreign experience, it seems that the 
Hungarian practice of handling regional problems has simplified the issue by concen-
trating on labour market equilibrium and paying few if any attention to a long lasting 
stability. In addition to this, the development of small-scale enterprises is strongly 
accen tu a ted -mere in communication than in action-while the promotion of larger 
investments and the development of the regional and country wide preconditions of 
their functioning remained far behind. 
Another conclusion could be drawn in respect of job creation and labour supply. 
The assistance given for job creation to investors in Western countries has generally 
been successful but according to the experience these new jobs were not fit for redun-
dant steel workers and absorbed mainly new entrants to the labour (young people and 
women). The regional programmes applied in Hungary put also their preferences on 
sectors like food processing, light industry, tourism etc. At the same time these pro-
grammes haven't faced the long-lasting unemployment resulting from the crisis of the 
iron and steel industry. This is reflected in many unsolved and growing social tensions 
caused by the high rate of unemployment in the regions effected by the steel crisis. 
It can be taken as an overall international experience that the intention of re-train-
ing could often bring moderate results only. In Hungary the re-training is very impor-
tant, due to the low level of present knowledge and skills, but a serious problem is rep-
resented by re-trainability. However, there is a danger that while re-training those who 
are able to find a job without re-training, the less mobile people who are unable to keep 
up with re-training programmes could drop out or be left behind. (People with low 
skills, elderly persons and those accustomed themselves to hard manual labour). In 
regions of iron and steel industry the share of this type of people is higher than in the 
rest of the country and even higher than in the average of the county. 
In any country affected by the steel crisis the government has taken an active part 
in crisis management. The first phase of crisis management-the seventies-was predom-
inated by defensive types of strategies (import restrictions, quotas, measures of price 
policy, antidumping proceedings), the second phase was, principally, that of the tech-
nological development and reorganization. All governments have undertaken the task 
of active contribution to the mitigation of the tensions in employment. 
In Hungary the government's role in crisis management was quite different. It 
could be related also to the fact that the government was the owner of the enterprises 
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concerned that instead of phasing back strategies a protectionist strategy was followed 
in the eighties. The government participated not only in financing technological devel-
opment, R & D and in development of infrastructural and human resources, like in more 
developed countries, but took a part in financing several huge investments of the iron 
and steel industry. This sort of government participation, however, could not bring 
results. The technological development of the seventies and eighties and the equipment 
installed did not go together with a significant improvement of competitiveness. On the 
contrary, the loans taken for the investments led to an excessive indebtedness of the 
enterprises. 
Another remarkable difference is that state intervention of this kind became weak-
er in the 1990s. Government concern is focused recently on the mitigation of those ten-
sions in employment resulted from the production cuts. The efficiency of the implement-
ed government measures have largely diminished because the retarded steel crisis 
came to its full extent in a period of an overall recession when the government's means 
available for crisis management are very limited and dispersed among too many objec-
tives. 
Crisis management has been a time consuming process with no satisfactory 
arrangement of the problems of the social groups concerned. The discontent could be 
explained also by the fact that all implements of a complex and manifold crisis manage-
ment could not be of the same efficiency. While certain large enterprises adjusted 
themselves successfully to changed economic conditions, there remained a number of 
unsolved regional problems. (A continual high unemployment and exodus of the popu-
lation from the region, the increase of the average age and the disagreeable environ-
mental conditions, the inefficiency in re-training should be mentioned here.) 
The fact that the most grave social and employment problems remained unre-
solved, is closely related to the inefficiency of crisis management: 
(i) In the crisis regions the state subsidies for job-creation led to an increase of 
jobs but the attention of the enterprises turned to obtaining state subsidies the improve-
ment of competitiveness have been neglected-as it was shown in the case of Lorraine. 
(ii) The means and devices implemented helped only to a limited extent to modify 
the elasticity of the distribution of the active labour force by industries. The transforma-
tion of the regional structure of production was limited either to modify the structure of 
labour force, or to create new jobs. In the majority of the cases the harmony of these two 
types of activities could have not been achieved. 
(iii) As international experience shows, the improvement of the structure of man-
power in the regions of steel crisis is hindered by the low level of education and train-
ing. It follows that education and training have a role in the regional restructuration. 
Progress in this respect was slower than necessary. 
(iv) The structural adjustment of the regional economy was also hindered by the 
fact that there were no investors for job creating projects or they were found late. 
Therefore a new (third) phase of steel crisis management has been taking shape in 
the West-European countries in the last years, mainly for handling the unresolved 
social problems. In this phase the deficiencies of crisis management should be correct-
ed and there is a need for wide range application of new devices as the Foundation of 
the Saarland Steel Industry established in the late eighties. The foundation serves the 
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support of those former steel workers being redundant as a consequence of the structur-
al crisis. 
The tasks to be solved in the third phase of crisis management are, of course, 
examples to be followed also in the Hungarian practice. It is particularly important to 
elaborate and more efficiently co-ordinate a sophisticated set of strategies and means. 
In widening the spectrum of the means applied it is imperative to improve the insti-
tutional conditions of investments in order to create incentives to investors and make 
them interested in job creation. It is worth drawing attention to the Belgian practice in 
crisis management. From 1980 on several efforts have been achieved to set up initia-
tives boosting an inchoative industrial policy in the Walloon region, severely affected 
by industrial decline. There were determined the crisis struck regions of Belgium and in 
course of 1982-83 several government organizations were established, including hold-
ings of both government and private capital, for the regional restructuration. A part of 
them had been created as a result of the restructuration of steel companies while other 
industrial holdings of the later phase of 1985-87 promoted the creation of non- steel-
making enterprises and job creation by financial means. Then-as third phase-from 
1988 on, the SRIW, acting as a public Walloon holding, became gradually the major 
instrument organizing and impulsing the activities of the investment companies for the 
promotion of small enterprises. These companies appeared, until now, as the most 
important means of assistance and incentives-nevertheless on a still modest scale-in 
the Walloon region. 
In order to restore the business situation in a crisis-ridden area it proved to be use-
ful-beyond giving incentives to investment-to rely on transborder cooperation (expe-
riences with the European Development Pole). Such a development strategy would be 
feasible in the case of the Borsod area and the nearby Slovak industrial area (Kosice, 
Banska Bistrica etc.), since cutting down on heavy industry raises similar problems in 
this larger area. 
Our research demonstrated that in Western Europe regional structural adjustment 
pursued other goals too, beyond employment creation (e.g. environment protection, 
technical development). This was the philosophy of innovation centers created in the 
Saarland. 
A lesson drawn from these experience is that the science and industrial park con-
cept should be as much as possible transferred to Hungary, to the Borsod region, in par-
ticular. The parks seem to be indispensable for the development of new economic activ-
ities in the region through helping the implementation of those results already existing 
in accordance with the "follower type" innovation and for attracting investors. Because 
the lack of experience and financial resources needed for setting up such parks an 
extended preparatory work might be suggested with the participation of foreign experts 
and investors. 
Even in the case of using an adequate set of policy instruments in crisis manage-
ment the succesful regional adaptation appears to be a long-term task, it needs more 
time than the stabilization of the steel industry. Also it should be taken from the West-
European experience that the suggested policy actions (measures) should not be nar-
rowed to the so-called "steel-basins " but be extended for the neighbouring regions, as 
well. Consequently, the crisis management of Ozd region needs such an extended 
approach in the context of Borsod county, at least. 
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Finally, almost all studied cases of crisis management demonstrated that both the 
goal-setting and the planning of policy instuments as parts of regional development 
programmes should be elaborated in an interdisciplinary way and in detail providing a 
much better basis for implementation than the Hungarian programmes have done so far. 
To do so, there is need for new institutional arrangements for co-ordination among the 
government, municipalities, firms and pressure groups as suggested by our analysis. 
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A D J U S M E N T P R O C E S S E S 
J u d i t V Á N Y A I : 
• 
ADJUSTMENT PROCESSES 
AND THE LABOUR MARKET: 
A REGIONAL APPROACH 
Scientific and governmental interest in the problems of regional development projects 
in backward rural areas dates back to the mid seventies in Hungary. By the mid eighties 
however the signs of a crisis in regions dominated by the heavy industries had to be 
dealt with as well. The disruption of Eastern Europe as an economic system has further 
accelerated this trend. Structural problems also made their regional impact. While a 
remarkable number of projects and government decisions tried to solve structural prob-
lems, the elaboration of regional development strategies was mostly neglected.1 
A SHORT INTRODUCTION OF THE REGION UNDER REVIEW: 
THE COUNTY OF BARANYA 
Some 4 per cent of Hungary's population lived in the county of Baranya in 1991, and 
the density of population was 93/km2. Both by size and population the county occupies 
the 9th place among the 19 counties in the country. Population has slightly been dimin-
ishing, with a loss of 1.4 % over the past five years. 
The existence of 296 villages -2/3 of them with a population under 500 beside the 
five cities (Pécs, Komló, Mohács, Siklós, Szigetvár)-can be pointed out as the deter-
mining feature of the structure of communities in the county. 40% of population resides 
in the county's center (Pécs), 20% in the other four cities, the remaining 40% in the 
small villages. This makes inffastructural development rather difficult especially with 
regard to transport and telecommunication. The first Hungarian case of a total desola-
1
 The research has been sponsored by the ACE program of the EC, drawing in research workers from the 
Deutsches Institut fur Wirtschaftsforschung (Karl Brenke) and the Université Rennes II. Haute Bretagne 
(Joelle Barreau, Alain Even, Xavier Richet, Nadine Souchard and Francois Vatin). The German partner sum-
marized the readjustment policy of a region situated in the former GDR-the present federal state of Mecklen-
burg-Vorpommern. The French researchers presented how the economic structures have changed in Brittany. 
The present article contains the main elements of the Hungarian study and the conclusions based on the French 
and German experience as well. 
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tion of a settlement, which caused a great stir through the whole country, occurred here 
(the village of Gyürűfíí). 
The econo-geographical and geopolitical conditions of the county are favourable. 
Extending in the country's southernmost part closed down by the rivers Danube and 
Dráva climate here has got a Mediterranean character. The proximity of the former 
Yugoslavia stimulated business and tourism until the outbreak of the present war. 
The relative share of national minorities in the county (Germans, Serbs and 
Croats) exceeds the national average.2 One third of the Germans and one fifth of the 
Croats minorities live here. The economic consequences of this phenomena are not neg-
ligible. The professional distribution of Germans is the same as that of Hungarians, 
while the representation of Slavs is significantly higher in agriculture. 
Almost all settlements located close to the border suffered from the creation of the 
so-called border-zone. These settlements deteriorated, the young and well-educated 
inhabitants moved to other places. In the 1970's their abandoned houses were sold to 
the Gipsy population by the municipalities at very low prices, eg. in the micro region 
Ormánság. Despite the government effort to release tension resulting from the cultural 
differences, many problems remained unsolved. There are no official data showing the 
share of unemployed by nationalities but probably the first victims of job cuts are the 
Gipsies. The increasing unemployment leads to worsening living conditions and whole 
settlements become even more backward. 
Baranya is one among the industrialized counties of Hungary. In 1991 44.0% of 
employees of material branches is in industry, just like the national average. The only 
Hungarian mines of black coal and of uranium ore can be found here, and the produc-
tion of china insulators, concrete, wood-fibre panels, leather gloves, tanned leather and 
cigarettes is significant. However, the dominance of mining is well shown by the data 
that 26% of all industrial employees was working here in 1990 and 20.1% in 1991. 
Light industries and the food sector point out the traditions providing a source of possi-
ble growth to counter the crisis due to the slump in mining. The deterioration of the 
market environment both in the country and abroad has not left these branches undam-
aged, either. The crisis is well shown by the 14.5% decrease in the number of industrial 
employees in 1991 comparing the previous year as against 11% at the national level. 
The county's center Pécs has a sometimes excessively dominant role in the region, 
and also in some local industries. Concentration of industry, infrastructure, service sec-
tor and population can be seen with the difference that due to a paralytic and obsolete 
economic structure this over-developed center itself is in a critical situation. The coun-
ty's being centered at Pécs is a fact to be considered with regard to the resulting "opera-
tional dependence" of the whole region on the city. 
The city of Komló is the other center of industrial potentials in the county. This is 
the reason for the frequent occurrence of the concept of the Pécs-Komló area including 
some fifty adjacent villages as an industrial sub-region. This is the area we can regard as 
2 Estimates can only be based on voluntary declarations. Due to possible consequences depending on political 
situation, a strong bias is present, necessarily. The weight of the German component was 36 % by the census in 
1941. The declaration of German identity has been influenced by the deportation after Wold War II. under the 
Potsdam decision and special factors have exerted an influence on declarations made by the Slavs, too. 
(Hooz-Kepecs-Klinger, 1985) 
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definitely depressed today. 80% of industrial employees and of gross fixed assets and 
79% of net values are concentrated here. The chances of a restructuring seem to be 
much better in Pécs than in Komló, where the exclusive reliance on mining and the lack 
of any other industrial traditions make prospects gloomy. 
Baranya is one out of the five best agricultural counties in Hungary, 19.8% of 
employment of material branches is in this sector, by 2% more than the national aver-
age. Similarly to the country as a whole, unfavorable trends seem to emerge in 
Baranya's agriculture, too. The decreasing price of farm products, the cut-back in 
stock-breeding and the decreasing demand on the output of attached industrial activities 
and services have together led to a radical decrease of incomes. 81 out of the 134 units 
of production reviewed by the Institute of Agricultural Research and Informatics 
became a loss-maker by the end of the year 1991 (60.4%), and bankruptcy proceedings 
are on against 16 farming co-operatives and two state-farms. (Kapronczai-Tom-
ka-Udovecz, 1992). 
The Mediterranian-like climate and a unique flora offer good conditions for 
tourism in all seasons. Sulfuric thermal springs are of extreme importance for establish-
ing spa-tourism. Historical and architectural heritage is rich, too.The main difficulty of 
tourism development is the lack of environmental culture and sufficient infrastructure. 
An improvement can only be achieved by relying on private investors, both domestic 
and foreign. The outstanding qualities of the Mecsek-Villány resort area deserve par-
ticular attention from this point of view. 
Poor infrastructure in itself can be regarded as one out of the many reasons driving 
the region into a crisis. The area is far from the axis of East-West trade routes and the 
roads joining in from southern direction tend to by-pass it similarly. The road to 
Budapest with its two narrow lanes allows only clumsy and slow transportation. With 
the radial structure of local road networks, the costs of transport and telecommunication 
are high. Roads to 108 communities are dead-ended, requiring the construction of main 
cross roads. Telecommunication infrastructure similarly to any other region in Hun-
gary-is underdeveloped and overburdened. Despite recent development of the telecom-
munication system regional disproportionalities and worn-out networks are among the 
gravest problems. Hand-operated exchanges and a lack of trunk-call possibilities still 
can be seen at some places. 
MAIN ECONOMIC FEATURES OF THE CRISIS 
The case of industry 
Between 1980-1990 the employment structure in the industry changed very slowly, but 
in 1991 a more rapid transformation can be noticed. This is reflected by the following 
data: the number of industrial employees decreased between 1980-1990 by about 15 
thousand, during a single year, in 1991 the size of decreasing reached 6.5 thousand. The 
share of persons employed in mining decreased 5 per cent during the former decade 
and by 5.8 in 1991. Inspite of these facts the branch structure of the county's industry is 
one-sided and rigid, the mining and light industry have a dominant position even today 
in industrial employment, though employment rates decrease in both branches. This 
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decline could not be offset by other branches, the structure of industry has been con-
served in a state which reflects tendencies less favourable than the typical trends in the 
country. 
Both production and use of this coal is unprofitable, and the level of productivity is 
very low in an international comparison. This is mainly a consequence of the natural 
conditions, i.e. low caloric content, unfavourable geographical circumstances and deep 
working. It is on the other hand a problem to be solved by economic policy whether coal 
should play a significant role in the energy supply of the country or not. An important 
factor of this choice will be that the costs of production are higher than the substitutive 
imports (costs of transportation included). The commitments of uneconomic coal pro-
duction-in consequence of the particular Hungarian cost and price conditions-fell upon 
some other branches, which had to utilize domestically produced coal not only because 
of the country's isolation from the world economy and the political slogan of "the secu-
rity of domestic supply", but also owing to the fact that the coal based power stations 
were planned for the coal of this quality and their technical transformation would have 
needed some more time. Of course, one may not neglect the role played by the strong 
mining pressure group defending and maintaining mining industry either. If Komló's 
mining and coal pre-processing plant was closed down abruptly or in the short run, such 
a change would induce unmanageable social, economic and political tensions and 
problems in the town.'3 The closing down of the Works would very negatively influence 
almost one half of other industrial firms and plants based in the town owing to their 
close economic linkages with coal mining. Closing down uranium mining would cause 
similarly serious problems at Pécs. The decrease of uranium ore's price on the world 
market (owing to the diminishing military demand and the decline of building of atom-
ic power stations) and the increasing production costs here made this economic activity 
successively less and less profitable. Deficits were compensated by the state in the form 
of subsidies. The price is considerably higher (60 USD/kg) than the price on the world 
market (40 USD/kg). Today it is not easy to anticipate future developments for the key 
element is the governmental guarantee which forces the Paks Nuclear Power Station to 
purchase the output of the Enterprise. 
While the problems of decrease in mining have a privileged place on the agenda of 
the country's economic policy-owing to the intensive activities of the colliers' trade 
union and their political weight -, light industry's production and employment rate 
decreased in an almost unnoticed way. The decline of the light industry is a conse-
quence of three factors: not only domestic consumption went down, but also the 
Yugoslav tourists' shopping and the exports to former CMEA partners were seriously 
reduced. 
Parallel with the shrinking of markets the majority of the firms in food processing 
industry fell also into a crisis situation. The fact that they had to reduce considerably 
their output influenced unfavourably the production in agriculture, especially in 1991-
3
 Komló is a symbol of socialist mining towns, a "town based on coal". It began to be quickly developed in 1953, 
first of all to supply with coke the "fortress" of domestic heavy industry, Sztalinvaros. The former greater vil-
lage was transformed into a town parallel with the development of the mining plants. Its inhabitants are of dif-
ferent background: in part descendants of workers settled down in the village due to the establishment of min-
ing here at the tum of the century, and the "newcomers". 
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92. Today it is yet difficult foresee what consequences would be induced if the majority 
of the county's food processing firms fell completely under foreign ownership. 
The fact that there was no cold storage facility of great capacity in the county has 
always restrained the development of its agriculture. This exerted a negative influence 
and is today also of unfavourable impact on meat industry, as well as on cultivation of 
vegetables and fruits. A further problem is the great distance of sugar producing facto-
ries-the plants situated in the vicinity were detached from the country as a consequence 
of the Versailles Treaties of 1920.4 
From the beginning of the eighties several firms made serious efforts to extend 
their economic activities: wood and poultry processing as well crisps producing plants 
were created, additional meat processing works were established. Six agricultural coop-
eratives, engaged in grape cultivation, brought about considerable wine processing 
capacities. 
The decrease of certain branches, reduction of firms' staffs and decreasing produc-
tion runs parallel with the transformation of industry's concentration. The industry was 
here characterized by a very high level of organisational concentration, which nowa-
days begins to lose its rigidity. The number of industrial plants in Baranya was 335 in 
1980, increased to 411 in 1990 and to 591 till the end of 1991. The newest data indicate 
that in the county (as in the whole country) from the beginning of the nineties a process 
of decentralisation began to take its course, increasing the number of economic organi-
sations and industrial plants. A parallel unfavourable development is, on the other hand, 
the decrease of industrial plants in Baranya having their headquarters situated in other 
counties. (Out of the 77 plants only 50 remained functioning during the past decade.) 
These plants were created in the sixties and seventies due to "directives from the top" so 
as to promote diversification mainly in engineering, light industry and building materi-
al industry. 
In one of the research projects carried out in the Research Institute of the Industri-
al Economics of the HAS the hypothesis was put forward that those plants-their staffs 
included-are in a "cumulatively unfavourable" and threatened position which belong to 
a firm whose headquarter is situated in an other county and is coping with financial 
problems. The present research confirmed this assumption. It is namely a more and 
more usual procedure that firms try to get rid of their financial difficulties by selling out 
single plants. In such cases distant plants are chosen with greater probability for they 
were under administrative pressure created in the course of a campaign to establish 
industrial plants in the provinces and therefore they do not always fit organically into 
the functioning of the whole firm. (Viszt,1989) 
Our analyses documents also that-even if the level of unemployment rate com-
pared to other counties of the country is not yet conspicuously high (it was in April 
1993 13.8%)—the region is facing difficulties in carrying out economic renewal, first of 
all because of the distorted sectorial structure of industry, and also as a consequence of 
the recession in mining and the light industry. In the counties' "rank order" of unem-
4
 The peace treaty signed in Versailles after WW I seriously effected Hungary. It lost 70 % of its pre war territo-
ry and 60 % of its population. Large areas which were mainly inhabited by Hungarians were attached to the 
newly established states of Czechoslovakia, Rumania and Yugoslavia. For Hungary revision of the Versailles 
Treaty became the paramount political issue of the interwar years. 
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ployment rate nine counties have worse values than Baranya, but the closing down of 
mines planned by the government will drastically deteriorate the situation of the county. 
THE CASE OF AGRICULTURE 
The decline of demand for agricultural products which after the collapse of the East 
European markets influenced very disadvantageous^ the cultivation of vegetables, 
fruits and grape, as well as the breeding of pigs and poultry, by the same token canning 
industry, and wine, poultry and meat processing industries. Every branch of agriculture 
was influenced further by a decrease of about 30% in domestic demand. The decrease 
of demand was so critical for the producers because it had an abrupt and shocklike char-
acter. At the same time the state moved out from market regulation, the radical reduc-
tion of export subsidies further deteriorated the marketing possibilities. While the prices 
of agricultural products fell due to their oversupply, the interest rates of credits for 
financing production were raised so much (up to 38-40%) that their profitable use in 
agriculture was excluded from the outset. Farms, having no other possibilities, eliminat-
ed unprofitable branches, dismissed redundant labour force and radically diminished 
the use of fertilizers, plant protecting sprays and quality seed-corns. In the emergence of 
the crisis those elements of uncertainty accompanying the transformation of organisa-
tional and property structures in agriculture were not any less important either. 
An overwhelming part of the county's agricultural employment has been absorbed 
by cooperatives and state farms, for private agricultural activities -as also in other parts 
of the country- have normally served only as supplementary source of income. From 
the cultivated lands only 9.9% were used by private producers. 
The transformation of the economic conditions is reflected by the changes in the 
techniques of cultivation. The unfavourable market trends of 1991 (for example the 
weak demand for wheat), the dissolution of former chains of cooperation (the impossi-
bility of outward processing of sugar beet in Yugoslavia), the losses of market shares of 
processing branches (say of canning industry) radically transformed the county's struc-
ture of sowing. The sowing area of corn and therein wheat diminished to an extent 
which formerly would have been quite unimaginable; this could not be offset even by 
the forced increase of the sowing area for autumn and spring barley. This decline of 
plant cultivation and stock breeding went parallel with the decrease of investments and 
the suspension of development decisions. In 1991 48 out of the 58 cooperatives in the 
county turned out to be unprofitable, the value of their production and their income was 
15% less than in the year before. The subsidiary activities were also reduced, first of all 
in industrial activities and their commitments in the building industry. These crisis phe-
nomena exert their impacts certainly also upon employment. While the big farms in 
1980 employed 30.997 persons, in 1990 this number was 21.482, i.e. by 30% less than 
before, in 1991 December only 12.941. 
According to the data gained in a general statistical investigation of agriculture 
(March 31, 1991) there are 54.010 small scale farms in the county, and 2.780 stock 
breeder (these latter, for the number of their stock does not exceed a certain limit, are 
not to be considered as farmers). That is to say 38% of the households are engaged in 
small scale production. 
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The ratio of small and large scale farms is in the different regions by and large the 
same, with the exception of the Ormánság and Baranya's loess island: the number of the 
small scale farms is in the former higher, in the latter lower than the average. The 
weight of small scale farms is greater in the Ormánság because the region is poor, lands 
are of low quality, working opportunities are unattractive, and the region has hardly any 
towns. The ratio of small farms in Baranya's loess island is on the other hand smaller 
because big farms there offer better living conditions for the population. 
According to this investigation, while 67.8% of small farms produce exclusively 
for the family's own subsistence, 32% produce for the market as well. (KSH 1991.) 
This sample has elucidated also some demographical features of small scale producers. 
22.6% of the producers are over 65 years of age, those over 35 years make 87.8% per 
cent of small scale producers. The high ratio of retired persons is to be explained not 
only with reference to the low level of pensions, but also by the fact that this generation 
was born into farming. 
The qualification "small scale production " refers first of all to the size of the culti-
vated land and the level of mechanisation, and not so much to the agricultural output of 
these farms. This is due to two factors. There is on the one hand the cooperation of large 
and small scale farms. The production of fodder and the more significant works on the 
small scale farms were accomplished with the machines of the cooperatives and state 
farms. The people in small farms used to work on the other hand with very great dili-
gence and well-established know-how notwithstanding the low profitability of their 
output. 
MAIN SOCIAL FEATURES OF THE CRISIS 
While quantitative indices mostly provide a good basis to evaluate an economic crisis, 
the interpretation of resulting social phenomena is more difficult. Unemployment, 
migration and the worsening of earning conditions are increasingly used as complex 
indicators. The worsening of public security, more frequent strikes, the spreading of 
political and social extremism, a higher share of population under disadvantageous con-
ditions, the marginalization of groups, the decrease in educational level due to migra-
tion, the narrowing and deterioration of the tertiary sector present a set of factors where 
the possibilities of an unbiased evaluation are even more scarce. This is the field where 
the shortcomings of regional statistics and the lack of relevant sociological surveys 
strongly limit any research. 
INCREASING UNEMPLOYMENT 
The "unemployment spiral" started working in January, 1990 in the county. Employ-
ment agencies reported 960 unemployed at that time, while one year later this number 
increased to 5.780 and to 28.721 in April 1993. The number of unemployed in April 
1993 increased by 37.2% compared to the previous year (country average is 36.4%), 
this shows that the frightening trend of size in unemployment has continously been 
worsening. Unemployment rate has been increasing in the county ever since, showing 
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0.8% in June, 1990, while 4.2% one, and 10.2% two years later, 13.8% in April 1993 
(the corresponding national figures are 0.9, 3.9, 10.1, 13.2%). The higher weight of 
males in unemployment (57% in April 1993) is explained by the excessive presence of 
the heavy industries in the area. In the meantime a structural change of unemployment 
took place characterized by the growing share of professionals (33% of the whole in 
April, 1992, 35% one year later). At the beginning the structure of unemployment by 
profession showed the dominance on unskilled and "commuting" labour-these two 
overlapping categories. An effort by companies to cut travel costs can well be seen in 
this case. Unskilled labor is certainly in the most serious situation with no more than 
262 jobs offered for 7235 unskilled workers in April, 1992. An additional problem is 
the professional discrepancy between the supply of and the demand on labor, which 
shows the importance of training. 
The number of vacancies can not follow the increasing unemployment. While in 
April 1992 the number of available jobs per one hundred of unemployed was 6.7, one 
year later only 5.03. The job opportunities uncovered by agencies, including the expan-
sion of moonlighting (as an effort to tax evasion) should also be considered here. There 
is no expert estimate to rely on in this field. There is a general assumption that the size 
of this type of employment tends to slightly exceed the number of available jobs, as 
officially reported. 
The overall picture shows a divergence of unemployment growth by regions. It 
should be noted that while the liquidation of jobs mainly takes place in the urban area, 
job-losers themselves are registered by residence, that is in villages. As a result, provin-
cial or village unemployment shows a higher growth rate (19-17-14%) and the relatively 
good statistics on the county center, Pécs (6%) tend to conceal the weakening of the eco-
nomic base. The exceedingly high share of Pécs and the area surrounding it in offering 
jobs through agencies has decreased recently, as compared with a weight of 63% at the 
end of April. One out ofsix Pécs-registrated unemployed is offered a job, while only one 
out of seventy seven in the case of Komló. The favourable situation in Pécs (where the 
service activity and growth of private business is most pronounced) has a rather relative 
value. The excessive concentration of economic activities here is the main factor of this 
relatively good situation which cannot conceal the dynamism of unemployment. The 
group of major companies concentrated here has to face serious problems due to shrink-
ing markets and poor liquidity. The negotiations with potential foreign investors show a 
limited success because of well-known difficulties, privatization is slow and sluggish. 
These days besides mining, it is the light industries that face the danger of unem-
ployment. The dominance of unskilled female labor is characteristic of the small plants 
and workshops of other low technological level, established in the region mostly as 
complementary parts of farming co-operatives. Being unprepared for an independent 
operation primarily with regard to sales and marketing the continued loss of former 
clients can easily put an end to activities in these small units. Privatization in agriculture 
is also becoming a source of unemployment and a drastic worsening of employment 
conditions can be expected as a joint effect. The subregions, recently presenting the 
above problems and the most intensive growth in unemployment, are primarily located 
in the area of Sellye, Siklós, Szigetvár and Komló. 
Voluntary leaves, ageing and the lowering of the age-limits of retirement could be 
used by employers in many cases as a tool of staff-reduction in 1991. Doubts have how-
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ever been expressed concerning the latter because of the fact that pensions have to be 
funded from company resources until normal age-limits are reached. Moreover, other-
wise needed qualified labor was dismissed in some cases purely to solve industrial con-
flicts. (Bánfalvi, 1991) In 1992 the companies had no other choice than to apply the 
cruel and costly method of severance pay with respect to employees to be dismissed. 
Regional experience shows a 54% share of planned and pre-declared staff-reduction 
within total increase. This suggests that actual figures tend to well exceed forecasted 
ones. Recent forecasts for 1993 put registered unemployment at around 30-40 thousand 
as against 140 thousand at work, and a continued differentiation both structural and 
regional-is expected. 
The above facts unanimously suggest the conclusion that the future will probably 
bring about a further increase in this high and socially critical unemployment. Though 
crisis-generating factors (bankruptcies, the privatization of agriculture, the shrinking 
demand due to the ongoing recession) exert their effects in a way differing by regions, a 
sub-regional restructuring of unemployment is not expected by county forecasts. 
Accoding to the experience sub-regions continue to produce a higher increase than the 
cities dominating them. 
SOCIAL TENSIONS 
The development of incomes of the population of Baranya provides one of the best 
tools to describe social conditions. Wealth and income statistics have traditionally 
shown the outstandingly good position of Baranya. Since 1990 data seem to indicate a 
change in this respect. 
The estimated effect of progressive taxation is put at a 10 percentage-point decrease 
in wage differentials. It can be seen that under the conditions of a general decrease in real 
incomes the industrial employees of Baranya present a separate term of increased impov-
erishment (together with their colleagues in other crisis-regions). Statistics show a 156 
thous. per capita annual taxable income as against 165 thous. as country average. (Rele-
vant figures in Borsod and Nógrád-these two counties where crisis has become general 
by now-are 148 and 141 thous.) This lag has presumably increased in the meantime due 
to the contrast of excessive supply and the limitation of demands in the labor market. 
Immigration can be a classical response to the challenge of a crisis. The potential 
for an increased immigration is rather limited in Hungary, because the swelling of 
urban population, inter-regional migration and the diminishing of the mobile part of 
provincial population were mostly over by the end of the eighties. 
A drastic increase in the cost of removals and in the cost of housing, the general 
recession with decreasing real wages have made immobility an increasingly dominant 
factor preventing the interregional equalization of unemployment. The propensity to 
receive immigrants has also diminished primarily because of less job openings in urban 
regions. Though relevant statistics are not available it is generally agreed that com-
muters are the ones who have been hit the hardest by dismissals. All this can well 
explain that the deepening of the crisis does not lead to an acceleration of immigration 
from Baranya. A regional restructuring of the real estate market can be viewed, howev-
er, as an effect of the crisis. 
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Growing unemployment and the reduction of incomes have lead to an increase in 
the number of groups and families living under conditions considered as socially 
handicapped. Though reliable statistics are unavailable, the interviews made in 
Baranya seem to unanimously support this assumption. High wages in mining allowed 
miners for example to be single earners in their family. With husbands becoming unem-
ployed, the financial security of whole families has been shaken. 
A quite special problem is presented by job-losing commuters. Their network of 
social contacts suffers from their unemployment in this case, and their access to ser-
vices and public utilities will be worse due to probable confinement to their permanent 
residence. They are confronted with poor infrastructure and increased local unemploy-
ment at their backward areas of residence, which even more increase the dismal conse-
quences of their getting unemployed. 
Though crisis does not necessarily lead to strikes, demonstrations by miners in the 
region can certainly be attributed to the concept of phasing out mining here. The fact 
that the primary reason of miners' strikes in almost each case requires a solution at gov-
ernment-level as branch problem can be pointed out to be a general feature (for example 
the taxation of loyalty bonuses, unfavorable retirement conditions).(Ого/;/!, 1991) 
The deterioration of public security has been added from the start of the nineties to 
impoverishment and the growth of unemployment as a factor of raising general social 
anxiety. Criminality has been tripled from the early eighties both in the country and 
Baranya. The research results point out the lack of any tight correlation between crimi-
nality and the level of unemployment within a given area. 
OPPORTUNITIES FOR THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE REGION 
In Hungary the government recognised the need for a more balanced development poli-
cy and created a slightly greater room for local and regional initiatives since 1982. The 
first regional development programs aimed at the bail-out of the state-owned enterpris-
es facing the danger of bankruptcy and moderate support for the development of the 
infrastructure of underdeveloped areas. In 1986 the Parliament decided to speed up the 
development of such backward areas. The preferred group of communities included 
573 towns and villages of seven counties out of the cca. 3000 Hungarian communities. 
The deepening of the crisis is shown by increasing number of backward communities: 
their number has doubled, while 1234 communities of 17 counties get support through 
development programs. 
The criteria for selecting underdeveloped regions eligible for support have been 
made more elaborate during the past six years.5 The lack of efficient coordination 
between the activities of government agencies and funds was recognised soon, but the 
problem remained unsolved. This has resulted e.g. in the lack of differentiation in 
favour of underdeveloped regions when the distribution system, or the highway system 
was open for development. Those development projects were supported primarily 
which were aimed principally at increasing the number of industrial jobs (within indus-
trial or agricultural firms). The infrastructural development projects were not promoted 
sufficiently. The regional development grants (non-refundable ones) were not used effi-
ciently. Some recipients considered it free money and used it to maintain loss-making 
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activities thus conserving an outdated production structure from public money. The pri-
vate sector was excluded from the recipients of the incentives, and the centrally distrib-
uted grants were offered mainly to ailing state owned companies. (Csernenszky, 1991) 
During the functioning of the Regional Development Fund and the Employment 
Fund between 1986 and 1990 approximately thirty thousand new jobs were created. 
The government decided to amalgamate the regional job creating portion of the 
Employment Fund with the Regional Development Fund. This action was justified also 
by the shocking contraction of the available resources for this purpose (57 per cents of 
the 1990 year amount). 
An analysis of the allocation of central funds can draw the attention to a few issues 
of a general nature. First: The projects promoted have in many cases been aimed at 
establishing jobs of definitely low technological standards, an indication of short-run 
managerial thinking. Second: The subsidies to support infrastructural investments in 
crisis zones include a discrimination against firms of small and medium-size by insist-
ing on a minimum 50 million HUF book value of assets for applicants. This is totally 
incomprehensible and against internationally accepted practices. Third: Reduced taxes 
for business startups are widely applied in areas of crisis. Moreover, some experts are 
urging tax breaks for startups. Fourth: The definition of crisis areas in terms of counties 
does not allow, to take the differences between micro-regions into account. The recent 
introduction of the micro-regional approach can help to tackle related problems. 
The Employment Fund-a source for financing new jobs for the unemployed is of 
major interest for designing a successful regional policy package. The net amount that 
can actually be spent in 1992 -after deducting the yet unpaid expenses of previous year-
sums up to 11.8 billion HUF. 38% of Baranya's communities is in need of central aid. 
Business tends to avoid them, and limited own resources are insufficient to develop 
through self-reliance nor do they have an access to central funds. 14.5% of the communi-
ties in Baranya receive so-called complementary subsidies and 97.6% of these had a 
population below 1000 in 1991. The latter figure shows the regrettable fragmentation of 
financial support which necessarily leads to efficiency problems. The size of subsidies to 
communities handicapped for external reasons-seven in the county-was 10 million HUF 
in 1991, just 0.4% of the total amount allocated in the whole country under this heading. 
5 Criteria of selecting backward communities (1986): 
1. lack of local jobs, large labour surplus, high share of long distance commuters, 
2. unfavourable agricultural conditions, 
3. inefficient or loss-making local enterprises, low wages, 
4. geographical periphery, bad telecommunication and transport system, 
5. low-level productive infrastructure, low-grade manpower, scarcity of white-collar workers and managers 
6. great migration, large proportion of elder generations, 
7. poor living conditions, deviations. 
Selecting criteria of depressed and/or underdeveloped areas (1991): 
1.9 demographic indicators-proportions of different age groups, migration, population dynamics 
2. 5 indicators of economic structure and economic development 
(quality of lands, income tax/per inhabitant, industrial employment, age structure and value of industrial 
assets ) 
3. 23 social (quality of life) indicators-new flats/population, communal infrastructure, education, etc 
4. unemployment ratio 
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Target-oriented subsidies show a more favorable picture. Baranya ranks second in 
the country by the per capita value of such subsidies as distributed in 1991. Though the 
money allocated makes up not more than 55% of the amount applied for (HUF 1503, as 
instead of2850), this does not differ from the national average. A somewhat better trend is 
shown by the increase of over 100% in the funds allocated to new investment projects in 
this framework, reaching a 1090 HUF per capita value. (László, 1992) As to the dispos-
able, decentralized part of the Employment Fund, Baranya could achieve a share of 4.4%. 
As contrasted with past periods the recent system of allocating resources tends to 
take place on a competitive, country-wide basis. This has brought about the increased 
role of regional municipal administrations, putting higher demands on their lobbying 
efforts at central organizations. Traditional pressure grouping is in many cases replaced 
with more business-like attitudes and an active participation at tenders. The size of 
funds obtained through tenders shows a strong regional differentiation. Realizing the 
need for structural changes the county's administration has been trying for years to find 
the possibilities of promoting them. The establishment in 1988 of the "Forum of the 
Engineering Industries" obviously reflected the best intentions. The establishment of 
the "Forum for Regional Co-operation" in 1989 was a similarly proper step. Though 
setting up the achievement of a complex approach to regional problems-both social and 
cconomic as its main target, the Forum's activities became limited to the distribution 
within the county of the 500 hundred thousand HUF obtained from the Employment 
Fund. Jobs for 835 persons could be created as a modest result-at least if compared with 
the founders' ambitions. Presenting a possible framework of approaching regional 
problems in their complexity and in a responsible way the disappearance of this body as 
a result of political transition is regrettable. The program of establishing the "Industrial 
Park" was another one among the more significant initiatives of the year 1989. Though 
this program was not carried out, the concept continues to survive under the heading of 
the "Pécs Industrial Zone". The Zone is destined to create a good climate and all the 
necessary conditions for new private small and medium-size companies. The county's 
administration has concentrated available sources and established an Investment Fund 
to promote new projects. This was carried out by incorporating existing assets and real 
estates. 12 companies were founded in such a way with a share of the regional govern-
ment in their capital. Three out of the 12 have been liquidated by now, and the condi-
tions of five can be described as uncertain. 
One of the most important preconditions of overcoming the region's crisis is the 
creation of an appropriate infrastructure. The road network of the county is not 
favourable. The county and the city of Pecs are not along the main arteries of the 
domestic and international road network. A special problem is the radial pattern of the 
county's roads (there are 108 "dead-end communities") and the fact that it has no free-
ways with divided lanes. 
The solution would be to build up the so-called Transdanubian Motorway which 
would connect Pecs and Budapest (218 kms). This conception is only a project for the 
time being, as also the old idea of the Southern Motorway. Both plans are supported by 
the municipal administrations, but their organizational and financial background is yet 
unclear. (A hindering factor in realization of the plans that giving concession for build-
ing the highway has not been applied in Hungary, therefore the methods have to be 
elaborated first.) Several people support the idea of building a bicycle road. The build-
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ing programme would offer new jobs, and it could be eventually linked to "New Deal" 
type communal works helping to decrease unemployment. 
The low level of the county's telecommunication infrastructure is a serious factor 
blocking economic development. This is demonstrated by the unequal territorial distri-
bution of telephone density (the number of lines per 100 inhabitants) and its low techni-
cal quality: this indicator was 9.9, much below the national average. 
The respective indicators are very different not only between towns and villages, 
but also between the different towns. The situation is the best in Pécs, where the density 
indicator is 12, the other extreme being Mohacs with 4.5. and Szigetvár with 5. There 
are still 300 manual switch board. It is characteristic for the dynamics of development 
that the parameters envisaged for 2000 in the development project a few years ago 
should be reached already in 1994: the density indicator would be 30. 
Considering the above mentioned central sources and the plans concerning on the 
development of the infrastructure one has the impression that Baranya has relatively 
better perspectives for overcoming the crisis in comparison with other crisis stricken 
counties of Hungary . This optimism is motivated by the fact that several factors of the 
economic potential can be and are worth of being better utilised (eg. favourable climate 
for agriculture, possibilities for development of tourism, adventagous geopolitical situ-
ation, well educated population, the presence of Janus Pannonius University, etc.) as we 
have already mentioned previously. 
THE PATTERNS OF INDUSTRIAL TRANSFORMATION 
Changes in the subsectoral structure and the reorientation toward manufacturing 
The most neuralgic point in the region is the shrinking of mining. There are many inter-
national experience about the way the restructuring took place in the mining regions of 
the countries of the European Community, from which Hungary can learn as well. The 
common features of the experience of these countries can be summarized as follows: 
the close cooperation of the state, local authorities and the mines; the preference of 
active tools of employment policy, the parallel, simultaneous elaboration of the devel-
opment strategies and the closure of the mines, the establishment of institutions han-
dling both the divestment process and job creation, significant financial support from 
the EEC, diversity of redundancy payments. All these can serve as a useful guide for the 
Hungarian restructuring process as a whole and for Baranya, too. 
In all probability Hungarian coal mining cannot be restructured as a profitable 
branch either. Nevertheless this does not mean however, that coal mining could abrupt-
ly be closed down, since the technical modification of coal based power stations would 
require considerable time and outlay. (Illés, 1989.) Among the positive effects provided 
by the mining industry for the county so far are its job inducing effect in the infrastruc-
ture serving both the mining industry and the miners providing well-paid jobs. In addi-
tion, the flourishing mining enterprises contributed to the cultural development of the 
regions (building and partly financing cultural centres, sports stadiums, cinemas, 
health-care institutions). Therefore it is also important to consider besides the direct 
consequences of the decline of mining the secondary (indirect) regional effects too. 
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As a matter of fact the future prognosticated for the Mecsek coal mines are very 
contradictory. The government has taken the resolute decision to close mines down, 
there are interests against this which are probably able to delay the closing down-as we 
mentioned earlier. In an ideal case some 1.500 collier will be still employed. By the 
year 2000 due to the natural decrease in the number of employees (ie. early retirement 
and job-stop) the miner profession will be practically disappeared. In other words the 
staff will get old and so new labour force will not be employed. (In the case of the min-
ers working underground only 25 years employment and 4000 shifts are necessary for 
retirement. The age-limits in Hungary for men is 60, but according to the existing law 
explained before a miner who starts working at the age of 18 can already be retired 
when 43 years old.) 
According to some experts a few small scale mines will be able to do self-financ-
ing. It is unlikely however, that mining could "revive" and regain its former position in 
the economy of the county; since its greatest customer, the heavy industry have also 
been declining. The Mecsek Coal Mining Works attempts to attract foreign loans for a 
private development program of methane gas production (with the American firm ICF 
Resources Incorporated). It would have good prospects if it merged with the Pécs 
Power Station (Pécsi Hőerőmű), in a joint stock company. 
The manufacturing based production pattern turns out to be gradually a "locus 
communis" of Hungarian economic policy, however the conditions for this in Baranya 
are quite favorable. At present light industry andfood processing have a greater share in 
employment. In the light industry outward processing for foreign companies has a 
dominant role which according to some regional experts "does not mean a real econom-
ic potential". On the other hand to ignore such type of cooperation would be a great mis-
take, since the Hungarian firms could utilize and apply the experience of their foreign 
partners and these connections could serve as references for the future, to build up a net-
work of marketing, in particular. The well-known leather and glove factories could 
recover from the serious situation caused by the collapse of the Soviet market by the 
improvement of marketing, building up new relations have to be built separately with 
each of the recently formed independent states. The first step to overcome the difficul-
ties in raw leather supply was taken by establishing a new joint venture in the Ukraine. 
In the food processing industry meat and dairy productions seem to offer the most 
promising competitive edges. Tobacco industry also plays a significant role in the 
region. The share of Pécs Tobacco Company established 80 years ago and privatized by 
the British American Tobacco is 50 per cent on the Hungarian tobacco market. The 
British American Tobacco decided to renew the obsolete machinery parallel with train-
ing. The leaders of the company count on governmental support, namely that 1% of the 
whole 30 billions Hungarian tobacco tax income be reinvested in the improvment of 
tobacco industry. This modernisation program would include not only the processing, 
but the production of tobacco as well. Another branch worth of interest could be the 
ceramics industry following the traditions of the famous Zsolnay factory. It is a pity that 
after the 1950s the factory was forced to produce mass products for the building indus-
try (isolators, etc.) pushing the company's unique profile and technical standard into the 
background. To combine the traditions with new technology is a challenge for the 
future. Engineering has also a good chance for investment, its further development 
could be based on the manufacturing of food-processing and packaging equipment 
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because of the great demand of the region. The revival of the so called "Regional Engi-
neering Forum" would be useful for coordinating ideas and options for investment. 
An increasing role for new forms of enterprise 
The private sector of the economy, first of all limited liability companies, the most pop-
ular form of enterprise, continued to increase in number in 1992. Their current number 
of 270 has doubled compared to the last year. {"Új Dunántúli Napló", June 5, 1992.) 
The number of partnerships has also increased to a considerable extent. This is motivat-
ed perhaps not simply by the wish to launch an enterprise, but also by the fact that the 
establishment of such a new firm does not require major starting capital. As far as the 
number of limited liability companies is concerned, Baranya is one of the average 
regions in the country, similarly to those crisis-ridden counties which are characterised 
by the predominance of heavy industry (Borsod, Nógrád, Veszprém). The spread of 
enterprises within the county has a markedly manifold character: their presence is gen-
erally stronger in towns than in villages, and they predominate especially in the center 
of the county. Taking the gross number of the establishment of new economic partner-
ships per 10.000 inhabitants, with other words the density indicator of enterprises, its 
low value (27) causes special difficulties in the case of Komlo, where unemployment is 
especially threatening because of the problems of the Coal Mining Enterprise and the 
structural transformation would be therefore most urgent on the level of individual 
communities. On December 31, 1991 Komló was ranking 39. among the 176 towns in 
Hungary with respect to population, and 140. as far as the density of limited liability 
companies was concerned. While in the other towns of the county the increase of limit-
ed liability companies compared to the state of the last year had by the end of 1991 a 
value of 138-145%, this development in Komló was more modest, of 86%. 
Statistics don't give sufficient evidence to demonstrate the extent to which the new 
organisations are capable to survive and function efficiently, for their numerical 
increase by itself does not prove whether or not they really promote industrial develop-
ment. Experts of the region just like those of the whole country are becoming more and 
more convinced that the economic impact of the widespread establishment of economic 
organisations is not perceivable in proportion with their number. (László, 1992.) In con-
sequence of the increase of unemployment it is often an economic necessity for individ-
uals to embark upon some entrepreneurial activities. In these enterprises, under the 
pressure of decreasing living standards, the basic objective turns out to be the short-
term maximisation of household income, and therefore the entrepreneur is not interest-
ed in capital accumulation and technical development. In consequence there is no basis 
for taking financial risks, even "the entrepreneur's important role is to take risks 
through innovations" being an elementary truth. 
Comparatively more reliable data are available as far as the joint ventures are con-
cerned. In 1991 one fourth of the total investment in foreign currency went to the min-
ing and manufacturing in the county. That time 82 joint ventures functioned in the 
industry of the county (of 2170 in Hungarian industry as a whole. We have to note that 
55% of joint ventures arc situated in Budapest). The joint ventures mainly-and similar-
ly to the general tendencies in the country-concentrated to some branches of light 
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industry (leather, fur and shoes industry, textile and garment, as well as timber process-
ing industry). All this indicates the survival of industrial tradition. 
Foreign direct investment so far has been attracted by the larger enterprises. If we 
express the degree of concentration by means of the number of employees, we could 
say that, at the end of 1991, 68 per cent of those employed in joint venture companies 
worked at four firms employing more than 500 people. The major part, namely 57 per 
cent of companies established with the participation of foreign capital was created at the 
minimally authorized level of capital investment with one million HUF. The impact of 
these firms in the county's economy is therefore minimal. The tendency, which also 
causes troubles for the time being is, that these investments do not really bring about the 
inflow of high technology, since almost four-fifths of the foreign currency invested was 
cash, although the domestic economy would have expected precisely high technology 
from foreign investors. 
It is well known that the most important precondition for attracting foreign capital 
is political and economic stability. Mostly for exogenous reasons, the county has been 
unable to improve the situation considerably in either respect. Furthermore, the inflow 
of foreign capital into the county was unfavourably influenced by the civil war beyond 
the Southern border of the county. Therefore it is increasingly more uneasy to attract 
foreign capital into the county. Those willing to invest choose trade rather than indus-
try, establishing firms which bring more considerable profits faster (without, however, 
creating working places in production). Taking into account, however, the optimism of 
the joint stock companies and their integration in the domestic economic environment, 
we think that their economic potential will be further strengthened and that these firms 
will play a constructive role in the revival of the economy. 
THE TRANSFORMATION OF AGRICULTURE 
Crisis management can rely only upon technological modernization and the increase of 
productivity. Considering the fact that agricultural employment covers 3-5 per cent of 
the active labour force in the developed countries, and that this ratio in Hungary is 10-
15 per cent, we can say that the level of agricultural employment (speaking about full-
time jobs) will decline to one-third of today's level. Decrease in manpower caused by 
agriculture's increasing productivity thus can be compensated by the emergence of 
new jobs in industry, trade and services sector, even if generally not in villages, but at 
least in towns. Considerable unemployment can not be avoided in the villages either, 
for today the main sector offering jobs is not agriculture any more. Since the non-agri-
cultural working population is involved in small scale agricultural production (for sub-
sistence or market), agriculture will play a significant role as an additional source of 
income. (The production of 68 per cent of small scale farms serves the provision of the 
producers' own household.) 
In smaller communities the crisis is aggravated by the consequences of the system 
of large farming cooperatives. The sustenance capacity of these communities was his-
torically secured by the locally articulated network of smaller agricultural production 
units. For this system was artificially concentrated in the cooperative structure, signifi-
cant part of the communities was separated from its immediate agricultural base. Their 
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inhabitants have to commute to and from the place of work, because they depend on the 
large farms because of services they need for their small scale production. In the county 
there are often even 8—10 villages around a single cooperative farm. After the dissolu-
tion of the system of large farming smaller villages can be revived. For the time being, 
however, numerous preconditions of this perspective are lacking (eg. infrastructure, 
jobs) due to the absence of financial sources. Taking the urban development tendencies 
of developed countries into account we see that the expansion of towns stops and the 
number and proportion of villages' population begins to increase. It is not the old vil-
lage that revives, but, due to polarization, certain villages expand while others may 
even vanish. Probably the transformation of the Hungarian settlement network is reach-
ing this stage nowadays. 
Among the agricultural plants the state owned farms-except for the integrated 
farm of Boly- are planned to be completely privatized. These days the agricultural 
cooperatives live through the difficulties of the transformation process. As it was 
already proved by the experience, more significant separations may be awaited in the 
"rich" cooperative farms in the environs of Mohács, in other regions people are less 
interested concerning the farms' property burdened with serious debts. 
In the transformation process much uncertainty is caused by the lands involved in 
the financial rehabilitation. Another open question is what the recipients will do with 
the lands now in their possession. The fact that the cooperative-farm members possess 
as proprietors only 18.5 per cent of the arable land in the county, creates a very contra-
dictory situation and increases uncertainty in anticipating future developments. 
The transformation of the economic structure in agriculture may mean the transi-
tion to plant cultures which require a more intensive use of land. This, parallel with the 
emergence of small private farms, decreases the size of profitable units, on the other 
hand it may increase the requirement of specific capital investment. 
Nowadays two opinions prevail in evaluating the organizational forms in agricul-
ture. On the one hand there are those who consider the land partitioning very irresponsi-
ble. Their opinion is that it is return to the past to reestablish the small farming structure 
which because of the lack of capital, instruments, sales network and information cannot 
be competitive for the time being. On the other hand we find those, first of all politi-
cians, who give the absolute priority to the private farms based structure. One should, 
however, assess size and organizational form primary in each of the agricultural subsec-
tors accordingly. Agriculture should be connected with the transformation chain of the 
food processing industry, in order to put an end to the separation between the different 
stages of the agricultural transformation chain. It is important that the producers also 
have their share from the profits which arise from food processing. In the county people 
follow with extraordinary anxiety the privatization of the food processing industry and 
the fact that foreign investors acquire the plants of this branch. 
Both representatives of large plants and farmers in small scale production evaluate 
the plans concerning Hungary's eventual membership in the European Community with 
reserve, as far as the development possibilities of agriculture are concerned. The per-
spectives they are afraid of are that the standards will be made more rigorous and food 
imports will increase, while the Hungarian custom system leaves space for unfair com-
petition (eg. cheap coffee import on the one hand, and heavily taxed domestic sales ren-
dered thereby uncompetitive on the other). 
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TOURISM-A CATALYZER OF STRUCTURAL TRANSFORMATION 
From the different forms of tourism thermal and therapeutic tourism could have priori-
ty. In addition to the functioning public baths (in Harkány, Szigetvár, Sikonda, Magyar-
hertelend) there are numerous thermal sources temporarily closed and "awaiting better 
times". The local municipalities are very active in this respect, they are looking for for-
eign investors, mainly through the German relationships. Apart from the immediate use 
of the thermal water it would be necessary to create winter conditions of utilization and 
build hotels with facilities of medical treatment. A specific and considerable develop-
ment possibility is offered by the so-called cave medical treatment. One could utilize 
the extensive forests of the county for "silvo-therapy" (promenades and relaxation in 
forests), practiced for example in France with great success. 
The buildings, establishments and events which are the usual objectives of cultur-
al tourism in the county are relatively strongly dispersed. This means at the same time 
that, except Pécs, the communities are with program unable to compete with "sojourn-
ing" tourism with independent program. The town Pécs, with its more and more beauti-
ful old city center, remnants from the middle ages, more than 20 museums and exhibi-
tions, events of fine arts, puppet-shows and theaters, is a deserving target settlement of 
travels with cultural motivation. In order that the visit to a sightseeing tour or a cultural 
event stimulates a stay as long as possible in the town -thereby bringing incomes as high 
as possible- further possibilities for recreation and money spending should be created. 
In creating the "tourism supply" of the county, the ethnographic features of the national 
minorities here should receive greater weight. In this respect Mohacs and its environs 
has a promising future, for there the Slavic "Sokac" and the German Swabian culture 
coexist in a very attractive way. To promote this development the city council of Pécs 
has several conceptions. 
Religious tourism is a specific type of cultural tourism. In addition to Szigetvár, in 
the county Turbek and Magyaregregy attract several people once a year, at the time of 
the parish-feast, while Mariagyűd (a place of Maria worship beside Harkány) is visited 
by great masses several times a year including foreign tourists. A lucrative branch of 
tourism could be conference tourism, having in Pecs excellent conditions, for Pecs as a 
university town plays a significant role in the country's scientific life. The infrastruc-
ture needed for this purpose is lacking, a conference center and an adjacent modem 
hotel should be built, together with a professional office of conference and programme 
organization. A genuine renaissance of village tourism began recently. In the regions 
struggling with economic and employment problems and the settlement development 
zones several municipal administrations and communities began to deal with rural 
tourism as a source of additional income. Programs were designed together by the inter-
ested inhabitants of the villages, and they cherished tourism and tourists in a way 
unusual in modem times. The different sectors of hobby and sporting tourism (hunting 
on a huge area rented by hunting associations, with 11 hunting-houses, rod-fishing in 
the rivers and fish-ponds in 1154 hectares, riding on an excellent turf in Üszögpuszta, 
water tourism, hiking in Mecsek and Villány hills) all have excellent natural precondi-
tions, they are awaiting their renewal in need of improvement and development. 
The forecasts for the tum of the century expect an expansion in tourism of one and 
a half or double increase. This upward trend may match the dynamics of the expected 
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increase of consumer demand in the country's capital. (Sándor, 1989) Nevertheless this 
also depends on inffastructural development and the amount of support available from 
the private sector. The promotion of the envisaged possibilities would presuppose 
financial support from the government in addition to the resources provided by the local 
municipal administrations and the tourism organizations. 
CONCLUSION ON THE BASIS 
OF THE GERMAN AND FRENCH STUDIES 
In Hungary the government had concealed the emergence of crises for a long time, dis-
tracting the attention from the evident need of structural adjustment. By the time of real-
izing the situation at the end of the eighties with a significant delay additional factors 
made the picture even more gloomy, however. Food industry has joined mining and 
metallurgy in the queue and the collapse of traditional Eastern markets has staggered 
other branches, such as the textile industries, as well. All the above show the multifac-
toral nature of regional crises in Hungary, several out of these factors could have 
caused crisis even alone. 
The situation of the Hungarian crisis regions, at least in some respects, is probably 
closer to the state of the East-German regions facing a serious crisis than to the situation of 
Brittany now free of such shocks. The parallels can be found in the level of unemployment, 
the speed of structural changes, the consequences of the transition in the ownership struc-
ture, and following from these in the application of numerous technically similar solutions. 
In Mecklenburg-Vorpommern the ratio of industrial employment was approximat-
ing the same as in Baranya, but the decline in employment has been even more consid-
erable than in our case. The causes are similar: the transformation of the organizational 
and property structure, the decline of production, the liquidation of the system of state 
subsidies, the difficult financial situation of the enterprises (aggravated in that case also 
by the currency reform and the introduction of the DEM). The perspectives of the 
region in question are influenced by the fact that the reconstruction of the industry of 
the former East Germany could theoretically be even superfluous. Owing to the small 
distances and the well-established transportation connections, the needs and demands 
in the East could eventually be met by the production of the Western part of the country. 
Notwithstanding this, investment activities have already started, following the practice 
of the developed countries according to which slumps should be utilized as times of 
preparation for business revival. Common features can also be found in the structure of 
industry: the leading branches of the regions (shipbuilding in the German region, coal 
mining in the Hungarian case) went through a very serious crisis causing a fall in 
employment, and the other branches are also confronted with adjustment problems. In 
Baranya the future of the food processing industry is perhaps more promising than that 
in the case of Mecklenburg, where the firms in retail trade hardly buy any food articles 
from East German enterprises. In Hungary the department stores and the shops are 
flooded by imported commodities which are far more expensive, although they are 
more attractively packed. 
The backwardness of infrastructure is similar in both regions, and also is the prior-
ity of efforts to develop telecommunication networks. In the transformation of organi-
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zational structure similar techniques were observed: the splitting of large integrated 
firms is a very frequent procedure, as well as the detachment of services and social 
functions. The process of transformation in the service sector is at a more advanced 
stage in Germany than in the Hungarian case, and the structure of the tertiary sector is 
similar to the cases of many modem economies. In their dynamics the banking and 
insurance services are the most conspicuous, while employment growth is the most 
accentuated in tourism and entertainment. (The increase of employment pertaining to 
tourism has been considerably slowed down by the low speed of land privatization, a 
problem often referred to also in Hungary.) In Baranya, and this is general all over Hun-
gary, the sector mostly able to promote the growth of other underdeveloped areas in ser-
vice sector is trade. Their backwardness is illustrated by the following: in the five Hun-
garian counties engaged in the Alps-Adriatic Labour Cooperation, jobs in the sector of 
personal and economic services are 1.7-3.3 per cent of the total number of labour, while 
in the case of the Austrian L„nder involved here only jobs in financial services consti-
tute 6.2-13.2 per cent of the total. (Hon'áth, 1992.) 
Similar solutions can be found with respect to labour market policies. Both coun-
tries extensively use early retirement schemes as the most human way of job cuts, but 
the retraining programs have more weight in the German region. Part time employment 
are far more frequent practice in Germany (even if with a decreasing trend). Shorter 
working hours mean as a rule in both countries maintaining hopelessly unprofitable 
jobs-the role of this system is therefore different from its application in developed 
regions. The pattern probably originated from the West German practice where the 
employer who offers a job for a continuously unemployed person receives subsidy. In 
Hungary the conditions unfortunately are already given for the application of this tech-
nique too. 
The set of means serving economic revival should be analyzed in more detail in 
order to be able to judge which are the forms also applicable in Hungary. The fact that 
the publication describing the German Land's entrepreneurship support system enu-
merates over 230 pages with 50 different promotion tools documents a very consider-
able richness of patterns available. Notwithstanding this diversity, the use and applica-
tion of subsidy seems to be more coordinated than in Hungary, though many enterpris-
es, especially smaller and newly established ones can hardly find their way in the "sub-
sidy" jungle. The most important sets of economic policy devices promoting the eco-
nomic adjustment of the new L„nder are the following: 1) renewal and extension of 
infrastructural establishments; 2) direct support of the. economy (privatization of for-
merly state-owned firms and real estate included); 3) schemes of support applied on the 
labour market. The decisions of the use of the above means are made on the level of 
central government, as also the tasks of Treuhandanstalt are regulated by federal law. 
The possibilities of taking economic policy initiatives on the level of Land governments 
-not least in consequence of the modest amount of financial means- are considerably 
limited. The Land government is able to take only supplementary measures: it can 
introduce further incentives, or it can change some aspects of the application of promo-
tional tools. 
From the point of view of local adjustment strategies, the case of Brittany is partic-
ularly interesting. Like many other French regions, it experienced a very strong rural 
migration as the population moved to the cities hoping to find a job and a standard of 
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living that the small farms could no longer offer there. Today Brittany is one of the most 
dynamic regions of France, with high-tech industries, a modem communication net-
work, and one of the most developed university and research centers in the country. The 
French studies had a special meaning, namely that being pari of the modern economy is 
not a privilege of towns and their peripheries any more. Industry practiced in rural cir-
cumstances can also be technologically advanced, rural conditions of life may also be 
attractive. The experience of Brittany offers some useful conclusions concerning the 
methods for mobilization of the existing resources at a local level and the definition of 
strategic actions for the reconversion of certain branches (eg. electronics industry) with 
aim of creating a spinoff effect. Just like in Brittany, the plans concerning the develop-
ment of electronics industries were also welcome in Baranya due to the fact that it is a 
"clear branch" and does not therefore threaten tourism in the region. 
The richness of intervention devices is very instructive also by means of which the 
state tried to stimulate change of plant location, applying subventions, decentralization 
preferences (offered for moving out from the capital), tax allowances etc. further 
schemes of support were added to the state subventions by the local authorities in the 
form of offering free access to several pieces of real estate, special loans, or even with 
covering the losses of certain airline connections, air routes (e.g. the one between 
Rennes and Paris). In the 1960s and 1970s, apart from the electronics industry, other 
large plants moved to Brittany. This was almost exclusively due to the different incen-
tives, taking into account the considerable availability of somewhat skilled and not 
strongly unionized female labour ready to accept comparatively low wages as well. 
Brittany was confronted with the challenge of other regions, first of all South-East-
Asia, from the mid 1970s, competing for such factories which use mainly unskilled 
labour. From this time on it had a special importance whether the scientific networks 
and industrial integrations have really "taken roots" here or not. The experience in this 
respect is diverse: the R&D activities have not reached their "takeoff speed", the diver-
sification of the electronics industry -appropriate to be adjusted to other diverse indus-
try activities and to serve diversified objectives of utilization- is lacking, and therefore 
the electronics industry here is also more sensitive to the fluctuations of demand. As far 
as the other side of the coin is concerned: where the research and educational activities 
were adequately integrated with each other (producing appropriate networks), there the 
productive and service units did not remain without orders either (production of proto-
types, furnishing of models, production of limited series etc.) and also the highly quali-
fied experts of electronics got appropriate professional tasks. 
The example of Rennes may give ammunition to those efforts of the Hungarian 
towns which are directed at "retaining" their population, i.e. dissuade them from migra-
tion. Rennes deliberately endeavoured to modemize the manufacturing sector of the 
town, recognizing that the presence of R&D centres and R&D-intensive branches has 
far reaching positive consequences. In Rennes over the 1950s some large plants settled 
down (Citroen, SGS, CGCT, Eternit, Ricard), high schools on university level were 
opened (INSA, Supelec, a faculty of chemistry, another of military technology), as well 
as the School of Public Health, and significant research centres were established (Celar, 
CCETT). The local political and economic actors closely cooperated with the state in 
the interests of the establishment of research and educational centres, which stimulated 
the foundation of new industrial plants. The significant development of the food pro-
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cessing industry, differing from the branches mentioned above, was not a result of a 
deliberate policy pursuing this objective. It was a result of the transformation of the 
local agriculture and the presence of the very dynamic private and cooperative firms 
instead. 
Civil service employment is an important ingredient of urban development. One 
has to take not only the quantity of civil servant jobs ensuing from the functions of the 
"local capital" into consideration (one-third of the total number of employees is 
employed by the authorities !)-but the accumulating, "spreading over" effects may not 
be ignored either. 6 The further service activities (transportation, trade, banking etc.) 
have also played a remarkable role in creating and maintaining the present level of 
employment. 
More significant measures taken by the local authorities promoting regional devel-
opment can be summarized as follows: 1) development of research structures (develop-
ment agency); 2) establishment of a committee (Codespar) involving local civil ser-
vants, employers and representatives of trade unions; 3) the creation of the Rennes-Ata-
lante technopolis which integrated several research centers (from the sector of telecom-
munications, food processing industry and medical technologies), university depart-
ments, special schools and enterprises; 4) elaboration and realization of a plan promot-
ing local employment; 5) advertisement and marketing publications which help "sell" 
the region to the public; 6) proportional distribution of the local business taxes among 
the 28 local authorities of the agglomeration. 
* » * 
SUMMARIZING the experience of the three regional studies the most important 
conclusions are the following: 
-The maintenance of the unprofitable activities through low wages or subsidies is 
only a temporary and поп-stimulate solution and will not save the crisis branches from 
decline on the long run. These "solutions" prolongate the agony of those activities 
which do not have a future in order to release social tension. 
- In regional studies greater attention has to be paid to exploring the possibilities of 
future development. Decentralization of industry led to a long-lasting development in 
Brittany which might be a good example for the Eastern European regional develop-
ment because of general demand of job creation. The creation of R&D centres, the 
appearance of universities and scientific centres changed the situation in the region sig-
nificantly. Creating technology or industrial parks (technopolis) might help to facilitate 
the transfer of new technology towards small enterprises. The promising industrial 
branches had to be selected, besides this perspectives in improving agriculture or ser-
vices have to be integrated. Tourism serves as a field of major attention. Therefore the 
regional marketing ought to be introduced, in order to attract the tourists and potential 
investors, to identify the comparative economic advantages and undervalued local 
resources. It would be necessary to strengthen the cooperation between regions (trans-
border regions), eg. in the field of infrastructure modernization. 
' According to an estimate the extension of the sector of civil servants created about 10.000 jobs in private econ-
omy. (The multiplier, according to this assessment, is 0.152.) 
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-Benefit of retraining in the crisis areas, without any definite aim of development, 
often leads to disappointment among the unemployed. 
- The privatization, the withdrawal of the state as an owner, by itself and in the 
short term does not lead to the revival of economic life, on the other hand it causes a 
considerable increase in unemployment. The investments serving modernization of 
technology, sometimes expected from privatization, are postponed according to nega-
tive perspectives of demand. 
- Statements are contradictory when it comes to the role of government interven-
tion in order to push industrialization in rural areas. 
- There is a subsidy "jungle" in Germany just like in Hungary. This greatly con-
tributes to the present situation in which the municipalities and local firms are confused 
and poorly informed about the possibilities of applying for and receiving subsidies. It 
would be necessary to establish consulting firms at regional level, which are able to 
advise would-be entrepreneurs and already working (small size) enterprises to take ben-
efit of public subsidies. 
- There is no uniform model to describe regional development of market 
economies-similarly in the case of Hungary it is impossible to apply a universal scheme 
to the different regions. The regional strategy of the government should include general 
objectives besides promotion forms of regional policy; on the other hand the local 
authorities should be competent to decide about development directions and self-devel-
opment strategy and also about the utilization of financial resources. Regional planning 
has to be introduced or strengthened, fighting the resistance in former socialist coun-
tries where during the former era the need and the quality of central planning was often 
questioned. 
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